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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis investigates the effects of financial frictions such as symmetric information on 
aspects of financial intermedation process, in particular banks and the securitisation 
industry. In the first paper, “Contingent capital structure”, I study the optimal financing 
arrangement of a bank with risk-shifting incentives and private information, in an 
environment with macroeconomic uncertainty. Leverage mitigates adverse selection 
problems owing to debt information insensitivity, but leads to excessive risk-taking. I 
show that the optimal leverage is procyclical, and contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds 
emerge as part of the implementation of the optimal contingent capital structure. 
However, the laissez-faire equilibrium entails excessive leverage and risk-taking, due to 
a bank’s private incentives to minimise arket mispricing of its securities. It is socially 
optimal to impose countercyclical capital requirements. In the second paper, “Counter-
cyclical foreclosure for securitisation”, John Chi-fong Kuong and I investigate the optimal 
forefclosure policy of delinquent mortgages in a model of mortgage-backed securitisation 
under asymmetric information. We show that it is optimal for a securitiser to commit to 
an ex-post value-destroying foreclosure policy to reduce the signalling cost. The optimal 
foreclosure policy, which can be implemented by contracting with a third-party mortgage-
servicer, features a excessive  foreclosure rate for a mortgage pools of poor quality, 
implying a counter-cyclical aggregate foreclosure rate and pro-cyclical repossessed 
property prices. Finally, the third paper, “Bankruptcy-remote securitisation with implicit 
guarantee”, explores the role of securitisation in the funding of banks under asymmetric 
information. In a two-period model, I argue that securitisation as an optimal funding 
source rely on both features. While implicit guarantee mitigates the asymmetric 
information problem, bankruptcy-remoteness allows a bank to shield its unsecuritised 
cash flows in a bad state, thereby relaxing its future financing contraint.  
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CHAPTER 1
CONTINGENT CAPITAL
STRUCTURE
1.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has brought the prudential regulation of financial institutions to
the fore as an issue of critical importance. A new type of “contingent capital” – contingent
convertible (CoCo) bonds – a form of debt that automatically converts into additional
common shareholders’ equity when a bank’s original capital is depleted, has received
much attention for its potential to restore the incentives for banks to practice prudent
risk management and to prevent the disruptive insolvency of large financial institutions.1
In this paper, I employ an agency-theoretic approach to show that CoCo bonds emerge as
part of the optimal bank capital structure to mitigate risk-shifting problems when banks
with private information face economic uncertainty.
CoCo bonds were first proposed as an alternative capital instrument by Flannery
(2005), followed by modifications put forward by various scholars in the pursuit of a
1Straight debt can be interpreted as a special case of a CoCo bond. However, unlike straight debt, which
“converts” into equity in the event of a default, CoCo bonds allow flexibility in choosing the conversion
trigger of the bonds. The proposed CoCo bonds are typically converted into equity well before a bank
enters into distress.
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prudential capital structure of banks.2 CoCo bonds have been positively embraced by
regulators including the Swiss banking supervisor, Finma. For example, Lloyds Banking
Group announced the first issue of £7bn CoCo bonds (Enhanced Capital Notes) through
a bond exchange as early as 2009. The conversion will be triggered if the bank’s core
capital falls to less than 5% under Basel II rules.3 CoCo bonds have been proven popular
among banks and investors ever since, with issuance in 2012 and 2013 exceeding $20bn,
and oversubscription being the norm.4
The literature on CoCo bonds, as surveyed below, has expanded in a short period of
time, with the focus of discussion on the issues of trigger design and the pricing of the
instrument. However, little has been done to address the following fundamental questions.
Why does contingent capital improve eﬃciency as part of the capital structure of financial
institutions, if at all? What is the role of financial regulation when contingent capital is
available? This paper is the first to formally address these issues in a model of optimal
contracting with endogenous risk choice under macroeconomic uncertainty.
The model builds upon two agency problems that are direct consequences of the
intermediating functions performed by banks, in an environment with macroeconomic
uncertainty. First, banks as informed lenders typically have better information about their
investment opportunities than outside investors. Hence there is an inherent asymmetric
information problem when banks raise capital. Second, banks as delegated monitors can
influence borrowers’ behaviour. Without modelling the borrowers explicitly, this paper
assumes that banks can aﬀect the riskiness of the businesses they lend to, and charge
higher yields on loans to riskier businesses. This creates scope for ex post risk-shifting,
i.e. the shareholders of levered banks may prefer a portfolio of excessively risky loans
at the expense of the debt holders’ interests. Moreover, the model takes into account
that the general returns on banks’ investments fluctuate with macroeconomic conditions,
to study the implications of the two agency problems for banks’ risk-taking incentives
across diﬀerent economic conditions and the role of a pre-committed contingent capital
structure.
The analysis proceeds as follows. I start with showing that, in the laissez-faire
2The idea of Flannery (2005) first appeared in a 2002 working paper.
3Source: Bloomberg (2009).
4The most recent issue of CoCo bonds is a $3bn oﬀering of Tier 2 Capital Notes by Credit Suisse.
The Credit Suisse CoCo bonds are wiped out if the bank breaches its 5% tier one capital ratio or if the
national regulator deems it is near default. Source: Financial Times (2013).
9
equilibrium, it is optimal for a bank to raise capital ex ante with a contingent capital
structure employing procyclical leverage that depends on the subsequent realisation of
the macroeconomic conditions. In this baseline model, the asymmetric information
and risk-shifting problems uniquely determine the equilibrium leverage because of the
trade-oﬀ eﬀect of leverage: leverage reduces the signalling cost because debt is an
information-insensitive funding instrument, but leads to excessive risk-taking ex post.
Moreover, the optimal contingent capital structure entails higher leverage in booms when
the information asymmetry is relatively more severe. Higher leverage must be employed
in booms because it is more diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate a good issuer from a bad one when
asset values are generally higher and the bank’s private information becomes relatively
less significant. The model implies procyclical leverage ratios for banks, consistent with
the empirical evidence documented by Adrian and Shin (2008a,b). In the resulting
equilibrium, the bank’s equity value is higher in booms and the default probability is
lower in booms.
The optimal procyclicality of the equilibrium contingent leverage can be implemented
using CoCo bonds, in addition to straight debt and equity, so that the bank has less
leverage entering into an economic downturn. The model yields implications regarding
the practical design of the CoCo bonds. First, two types of conversion features that
are seen in existing CoCo bonds can arise in equilibrium. CoCo bonds issued by better
capitalised banks should specify a debt write-down when triggered, because the bank
is not in need of much outside capital; CoCo bonds issued by poorly capitalised banks
should specify a conversion into equity. For example, Credit Suisse has issued CoCo bond
with a contingent convertible feature in 2011 and 2012, followed by CoCo bonds with a
write-down feature in 2013, as the capital position of the bank improved.5 Second, while
the model assumes a verifiable macroeconomic state as the trigger of the CoCo bonds,
which is analogous to a regulatory declaration proposed by the Squam Lake Working
Group (2009), the optimal CoCo bonds can also be implemented with triggers based on
the prices of equity (e.g. Flannery 2009; Pennacchi 2011; McDonald 2011) and the CDS
spreads of the bank (Hart and Zingales 2011). A concern raised by Sundaresan and Wang
(2013) is that the market price of equity may not be unique unless the conversion of the
5According to Credit Suisse Regulatory Disclosures (2012), the core tier 1 capital ratio of Credit Suisse
under Basel II.5 increased from 10.4% to 14.4% from 2011 to 2012, and the tier 1 capital ratio increased
from 15.1% to 18.4%.
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CoCo bonds is designed to not transfer value between the existing shareholders and the
bond holders, which precludes penalising the existing shareholders, defeating the purpose
of CoCo bonds. This paper endogenises the eﬀect of capital structure on banks’ value due
to risk-shifting incentives and shows that the existing shareholders can be diluted upon
the optimally designed CoCo conversion.
The laissez-faire equilibrium warrants regulation as it involves excessive leverage
and risk-taking driven by a bank’s private incentives to minimise the mispricing in the
securities it issues under asymmetric information. In this model, the bank can signal its
type, either by increasing the amount of leverage in its capital structure, or by deliberately
underpricing the securities it issues. While leverage is preferred by the bank as it minimises
mispricing, it incurs a social cost through the risk-shifting incentives of the bank by
reducing the value of the businesses the bank lends to. I study the optimal regulation,
defined as a set of constraints on banks’ leverage designed to maximise bank value, which
captures social welfare in this baseline model, when the bank privately optimises its capital
structure subject to the regulatory constraints. The extent to which the regulator can cap
leverage is thus limited by banks’ private incentives. The result confirms the optimality
of countercyclical capital requirements as proposed by the Basel Committee on Bank
Supervision (2010) and advocated by scholars such as Brunnermeier et al. (2009). Faced
with binding capital requirements, banks find it (privately) “costly” to issue the excess
equity relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium because of the mispricing in the market.
Banks meet the countercyclical capital requirements by issuing CoCo bonds, in a manner
similar to the implementation of the laissez-faire equilibrium.
The baseline model thus far considers the role of leverage in a bank’s capital structure
in signalling its private information at the cost of inducing risk-shifting, which negatively
impacts the value of the businesses the bank lends to. However, risk-taking by banks has
systemic eﬀects on the broader economy, as highlighted by recurrent financial crises. Large
and correlated bank failures tend to pose large negative externalities.6 Consequently,
policy-makers are unwilling or unable to allow major financial institutions to fail.7 I
6For example, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) document a run by short-term bank creditors following
the failure of Lehman Brothers, contributing to a 46% reduction in the extension of new loans to large
borrowers in the fourth quarter of 2008 relative to the previous quarter.
7For example, the run on Northern Rock, Britain’s fifth-largest mortgage lender, did not stop until a
taxpayer-backed guarantee of all existing deposits was announced in September 2007. The US Treasury
and the Federal Reserve System bailed out 282 publicly traded banks and insurance companies under the
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consider two types of state guarantees, implicit bailouts and explicit deposit insurance, in
two extensions of the baseline model, to examine moral hazard problem induced by state
guarantees and the implications for the optimal capital regulation.
The first extension assumes the systemic importance of the bank so that the regulator
has the incentive to bail out a failed bank ex post by repaying the creditors on the bank’s
behalf. The second extension includes risk averse, unsophisticated depositors as part of
the bank’s funding base, who are protected by deposit insurance. Both forms of state
guarantees create moral hazard problems because they provide an implicit subsidy when
the bank issues debt. I show that the optimal capital regulation remains countercyclical
and can be implemented using CoCo bonds with the same face value as in the baseline
model, since the face value of the CoCo bonds is determined by the relative severity of
the asymmetric information problems across diﬀerent economic states. However, in the
presence of state guarantees, the optimal capital regulation permits higher leverage in
the form of straight debt or demand deposit. This follows the previous intuition that the
extent to which the regulator can cap leverage is limited by the bank’s private incentives.
Since the moral hazard problem eﬀectively reduces the private cost of leverage to the bank,
higher leverage must be permitted to alleviate the asymmetric information problem. The
ex post bailout of a systemically important bank and explicit deposit insurance therefore
hinder the ex ante eﬃcient capital regulation of the bank. Bail-in capital, a form of
contingent debt that is wiped out in case the bank fails, has been considered by regulators
such as the Basel Committee and the Bank of England as part of the resolution regimes
for banks, in order to shield taxpayers from the need to bail out a bank that is “too big
to fail”. In light of the results in this extension, if a regulator can credibly commit to
bailing in the debt ex post, the capital market would correctly price in the risk of default
when the bank raises financing ex ante, removing the moral hazard problem of bailouts.
Literature review
This paper relates to a growing literature on contingent capital. In the first strand of
the literature, Albul et al. (2010) and Barucci and Viva (2011) endogenise contingent
capital in banks’ capital structures. These papers extend the Leland (1994) model of tax
benefit and bankruptcy cost to consider a firm’s choice of capital structure among equity,
straight debt and contingent convertible bonds. Unlike this paper, their approach does
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in 2008–9.
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not take into consideration adverse selection or moral hazard. Since risk-shifting problems
are perhaps the most important motivation for capital regulation, their settings do not
provide implications for regulating the risk of the banking system. The second strand
of the literature studies the implications of exogenously imposed CoCo bonds in banks’
capital structures. Martynova and Perotti (2012) consider the eﬀect of CoCo bonds on
banks’ risk-taking incentives. Others focus on the practical issues associated with CoCo
bonds using diﬀerent trigger mechanisms. For example, see Flannery (2005, 2009), Raviv
(2004), Squam Lake Working Group (2009), McDonald (2011), Hart and Zingales (2011),
Pennacchi et al. (2010), Pennacchi (2011), Bolton and Samama (2012), Calomiris and
Herring (2013) and Sundaresan and Wang (2013). This paper is the first to provide a
unified analysis of the optimality of CoCo bonds and the subsequent risk-taking behaviour
of a bank. The framework also provides economic intuition for the design of CoCo bonds.
This paper is also related to the discussion of countercyclical capital regulation. The
point that optimal bank capital regulations should depend on the state of the business
cycle is made by Kashyap and Stein (2004) in a model of (exogenously) expensive equity
capital and systemic cost of default. Later works by Hanson et al. (2011), Repullo
and Suarez (2013) and Shleifer and Vishny (2010) also discuss time-varying capital
requirements. A recent paper by Gersbach and Rochet (2013) studies a model of financial
frictions with complete markets in which ineﬃcient credit fluctuations arise and can be
corrected by countercyclical capital regulation. Similar to this paper, Dewatripont and
Tirole (2012) show the optimality of countercyclical capital and self-insurance mechanisms
such as CoCos, considering the risk-shifting incentives induced by leverage. The trade-oﬀ
in their model is generated by the creditor control right in default as disciplining device,
which implies that agents should be rewarded only for the part of performance that is
under managerial control. In contrast, this paper considers the benefit of mitigating
adverse selection using debt financing; generating CoCo bonds that are contingent on
exogenous macroeconomic conditions.
More generally, this paper relates to the literature on optimal corporate financing
structures. While a significant portion of the theory of corporate finance under frictions
can be categorised into two distinct paradigms, agency models (e.g. Jensen and Meckling
1976; Myers 1977; Grossman and Hart 1984; Green 1984) and financial signalling models
(e.g. Ross 1977; Leland and Pyle 1977), eﬀorts have been made to explore the implications
when the two problems are both present. In the presence of private information, John and
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Kalay (1982) study the agency costs of underinvestment, while Darrough and Stoughton
(1986) study the agency problems of eﬀort provision. Similar to this paper, John (1987)
considers the problems of risk-shifting and asymmetric information in determining the
capital structure and the investment policies of a widely held firm. John (1987) emphasises
that the risk-shifting problem increases the signalling cost in the equilibrium, relative to
the case in which the firm can commit to an investment policy. This paper diﬀers from
John (1987) in two aspects. First, I consider the impact of macroeconomic conditions on
the trade-oﬀ between risk-shifting and asymmetric information problems, generating a role
for contingent capital structure. Second, I recognise that the equilibrium is constrained
ineﬃcient, and characterise the optimal regulation, which restores constrained eﬃciency.
Although this paper shows the optimality of CoCo bonds, which are “reverse”
convertible bonds, a number of papers have shown that conventional convertible bonds
help to mitigate the asymmetric information problem by allowing the security to be
contracted on additional signals. Stein (1992) show that callable convertible bonds are
used by firms with medium quality as “back-door equity” financing to prevent bad firms
from mimicking, in a setting in which the initial asymmetry of information is completely
resolved by the time the security is called. Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2011) recognise
that the resolution of information asymmetry is likely to be imperfect, and conversion
only occurs if good news arrives. The “back-door equity” value of the securities
is correlated with the manager’s private information, thereby allowing an optimally
designed callable convertible bond to resolve the asymmetric information problem
without dissipation. In contrast, this paper considers a contingent security contracted
upon macroeconomic states, which are uninformative of the private information of the
issuer. The optimal conversion of security is therefore determined by the relative severity
of the asymmetric information and risk-shifting problems considered in this model
across diﬀerent macroeconomic states, which gives rise to optimal procyclical leverage,
implemented by CoCo bonds.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the baseline
model. Section 1.3 analyses the laissez-faire equilibrium to show the optimality of a
contingent capital structure with procyclical leverage. Section 1.4 illustrates how CoCo
bonds are part of the implementation of the optimal contingent capital structure and
discusses the optimal design of the CoCo bonds. Noticing that the laissez-faire equilibrium
14
entails excessive leverage, Section 1.5 characterises the optimal capital requirement, which
is countercyclical. Section 1.6 studies two extensions of the model to incorporate the moral
hazard of state guarantees. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Model
There are four dates: 0, 12 , 1 and 2. The model’s participants consist of a bank and a set
of outside investors.8 All agents are risk neutral and there is no discounting.
At t = 0, the bank has an opportunity to extend a total of 1 unit credit to form a loan
portfolio that pays oﬀ at t = 2. The bank is endowed with private information regarding
the payoﬀs of the portfolio at t = 0. However, at t = 1 after the loans are made, the
bank can influence the riskiness of the borrower, and charge a higher yield on loans to
riskier businesses. In order to focus on the capital structure of the bank, I abstract from
modelling the borrowers explicitly. Instead, in Section 1.2.1 I make assumptions on the
cash flows of the bank’s loan portfolio directly to capture this intuition.
At t = 12 , a verifiable macroeconomic state realises, which aﬀects the payoﬀs of the
loan portfolio.9 In order to fund the lending, the bank chooses its financing arrangement
and raises capital either at t = 0 (ex ante financing), or at t = 12 after the realisation of
the macroeconomic state (ex post financing). I detail the financing arrangements in both
the ex ante and the ex post cases in Section 1.2.1, and analyse both cases in Section 1.3
for comparison.
The timing of the events is summarised in Fig. 1.1, where the nature of the private
information θi, the macroeconomic state s and the risk choice δ of the investment are
detailed in the following section.
8In Section 1.6 I consider as an extension the case in which some outside investors are risk averse and
the bank raises funds partially through deposits issued to the risk averse investors.
9As there is only one bank in this simple framework, the state s is interpreted as a macroeconomic
state for intuitive purposes. Whether the shock to the state s is macroeconomic or idiosyncratic depends
on factors outside of this model, such as the correlation of the shock across banks. I discuss other
interpretations of the shock in Section 1.4.2 in relation to the design of the CoCo bonds that implement
the optimal contingent capital structure.
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Figure 1.1: Timeline
t = 0
Ex ante
financing
Bank’s type θs
(Private)
t = 12
Ex post
financing
Macroeconomic
state s
(Verifiable)
t = 1
Investment
risk choice δ
(Non-contractible)
t = 2
All agents
paid oﬀ
Cash flows
realise
(Verifiable)
1.2.1 Assumptions and discussion
This section presents the assumptions on the distribution of the bank’s portfolio cash
flows to incorporate both the asymmetric information and the risk-shifting problems, and
discusses how the bank can structure itself in order to finance its lending.
The bank’s loan portfolio
At t = 0, the bank has the opportunity to extend 1 unit credit and form a portfolio of
risky loans that pays oﬀ at t = 2. The final payoﬀ of the portfolio can be 0, X or X+∆X .
I will refer to the case where the portfolio returns 0 a failure, and a positive cash flow X
or X +∆X a success.10 The distribution of the portfolio cash flow over {0,X,X +∆X}
depends on the type of the bank i, the state of the economy s and the bank’s risk choice
δ as illustrated in Figure 1.2 and as specified below.
The type of the bank i ∈ {G,B} is characterised by its success likelihood ηi. A Bad
bank (B) has a loan portfolio with a higher failure probability than a Good bank (G):
ηG > ηB . The bank privately observes its type at t = 0. Outside investors do not observe
the type of the bank, but they have a prior belief that the bank is good with probability
γ.
The state of the economy s ∈ S = {1, . . . , S} also aﬀects investment opportunities,
10The assumption that the loan portfolio returns 0 in case of a “failure” is without loss of generality. If
the bank’s loan portfolio produces a positive minimum cash flow, the portfolio contains a portion of cash
flow which is safe and therefore does not impose any financing problems on the bank. Backed by this safe
part of the cash flow, a bank can issue deposits or safe debt. However, in practice banks typically take on
additional risky debt. The model therefore sheds light on understanding the additional leverage taken by
banks in the form of risky debt.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of the portfolio cash flow at t = 2
0
Success
ηi − δ
Failure
1− (ηi − δ)
X1− (θs + δ)
X +∆X
θs + δ
and is realised at t = 12 . Specifically, the state of the economy aﬀects the expected return
of the portfolio upon success. Conditional on success, the likelihood of realising a high
cash flow is θs. I shall interpret the states with relatively higher θs as booms, and those
with lower θs as recessions.
The bank can then privately choose the risk profile δ of the loan portfolio at t = 1.
The bank can increase the riskiness of the businesses it lends to, but charge a higher
yield on the loans. Specifically, the bank can decrease the success probability by δ, but
increase the expected payoﬀ of the portfolio upon success by δ∆X , through an increase in
the conditional probability of receiving a high cash flow by δ. This setup loosely captures
the trade-oﬀ between risk and return in financial investments.11
To summarise, for a given bank of type i in a given economic state s, given the risk
choice δ of the bank, the investment succeeds with probability ηi − δ. If successful, the
loan portfolio returns a high cash flow X+∆X with probability θs+ δ, or a low cash flow
X with probability 1− (θs + δ).
Bank value
The value of the bank is determined by the risk choice made at t = 1 and the type of the
bank, in any given state s. For a type i bank in a given state s, the first best risk choice
11The specific assumption that a decrease in the success probability brings an increase of the same
magnitude in the probability of receiving a high cash flow, conditional on success, is made to simplify the
expressions. The results do not change qualitatively, as long as there is a trade-oﬀ between the success
probability and the conditional probability of a high cash flow.
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δi,sFB maximises the value of the loan portfolio.
12
δi,sFB ≡ argmaxδ
(ηi − δ)[X + (θs + δ)∆X ] (1.1)
As a result, the probability of success when the risk choice is first best is given by
qi,sFB ≡ η
i − δi,sFB =
1
2
(ηi + θs +
X
∆X
) (1.2)
Therefore the model suggests that, when operated at the first best risk level, the bank
has a higher probability of success in a higher state than in a lower state, and if it is a
Good bank than if it is a Bad bank, other things equal.
Denote the portfolio value when operated at the first best risk level by V i,sFB . Assume
that V G,sFB > 1 > V
B,s
FB and γV
G,s
FB + (1 − γ)V
B,s
FB > 1 ∀s. That is, a Good bank has a
positive NPV investment if operated at an appropriate risk level, whereas a Bad bank
always has a negative NPV investment. However, at the first best risk level, an average
bank has a positive NPV investment. This implies that pooling equilibria are feasible in
this model.
As only a Good bank managed without risk-shifting produces positive NPV, the first
best outcome in this economy can be produced if the bank (i) raises financing and invests
if and only if it is a Good type at t = 0 or t = 12 , and (ii) chooses the first best level of
risk at t = 1. However, because the lending can be value-enhancing on average, a pooling
equilibrium with financing is feasible in which the bank invests regardless of its type.
Ex post and ex ante financing
The main results of the model are derived from the bank’s choice of capital structure to
finance the lending in equilibrium. I detail the financing game in this section.
After observing its type i, the bank can raise financing either at t = 12 after the
resolution of the economic uncertainty (ex post financing), or at t = 0 prior to the
resolution of the economic uncertainty (ex ante financing).
I assume that the bank is endowed with internal capital e¯ < 1. It is therefore unable
to self-finance the loans. At t = 1 the bank can finance the loan portfolio partly with
12Assume that X∆X < η
i + θs < 2, so that the probability of success qi,s and the conditional probability
of the loan portfolio paying oﬀ a high cash flow (θs + δi,s) can both lie within the range of (0, 1) in the
first best case and in all equilibria derived in this paper. The derivation of this assumption is given in
Appendix A.1.
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its internal capital e ≤ e¯ and partly from outside investors. This endowment can be
interpreted as the sum of the internal capital available within the bank and the maximum
amount of funds that can be provided by incumbent shareholders.13
This paper takes a security design approach and solves for the equilibrium financing
contract. Without loss of generality, I express the overall contract given to the outside
investors as a combination of debt with state-contingent face value F s maturing at t = 2
and a state-contingent fraction αs of the residual equity.14 The model therefore allows
financing via debt and equity, which are the forms of financing used in practice. This
framework thus also allows the study of hybrid instruments, as most of the commonly
adopted hybrid instruments can be thought of as a combination of debt and equity.
As will be shown in Section 1.3, the optimal state-contingent capital structure can be
implemented via CoCo bonds, a kind of such hybrid instruments.
In the case of ex post financing at t = 12 , the state of the economy s is common
knowledge. In state s, the bank raises capital by promising the outside investors a
combination of debt with face value F s and a fraction αs of the residual equity.15
In the case of ex ante financing at t = 0, the bank raises capital prior to the resolution
of the economic uncertainty. I consider a general contingent capital structure specification
that is given by a set of face values of the debt in each state of the economy FC ≡ {F sC}
S
s=1
and a set of fractions of the equity issued to outside investors αC ≡ {αsC}
S
s=1, so that the
ex post capital structure of the bank depends on the realisation of the economic state s.16
13The model assumes that the bank’s asset is solely comprised of the loan portfolio. One can also
interpret the portfolio as a marginal investment whose payoﬀ can be contracted upon, which would be the
case for securitisation. Alternatively, the portfolio can be a part of the on-going operations of a bank, as
long as that at t = 0 the bank does not have outstanding risky debts. If the bank has existing risk debt,
the bank’s incentives for financing and investment are distorted by the debt overhang problem. For an
analysis on the eﬃcient recapitalisation of banks under debt overhang, see Philippon and Schnabl (2013).
14Because of the three point cash flow space {0, X,X + ∆X}, in a given state s, debt with face value
F s ≤ X and residual equity replicate any contract that satisfies the usual assumption of monotonicity.
15In order to allow the diﬀerence between debt and equity as funding instruments, I restrict parameter
values such that the cost of risk-shifting is suﬃciently high relative to the NPV of the bank’s investment,
so that the bank cannot be purely debt financed.
16To highlight the economic intuition for the properties of the conversion, I assume that the
macroeconomic state is verifiable and therefore contractable. In Section 1.4 I discuss potential
implementation of the optimal capital structure contracted upon alternative variables including equity
prices and CDS spreads.
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For each case of the model, the financing game is played as follows. Firstly the bank
decides whether to raise financing and invest given its type and its knowledge regarding
the state of the economy. Assume that the bank chooses not to invest if it is indiﬀerent
between participating or not. Practically, this is the case if there is a small but non-zero
cost to participate in the capital market.
If the bank decides to raise financing and invest, it announces in the capital market
debt issue with face value F and equity issue of fraction α, where (F,α) are either
(FC ,αC) or (F s,αs) as specified above in each case of the model. The bank also puts up
e ≤ e¯ of its own capital and retains the remaining fraction (1 − α) of the equity. After
observing the financing plan (e, F,α), capital market investors form a belief regarding
the type of the bank, and decide whether or not to accept the terms and provide capital
1− e.17
1.2.2 Definition of equilibrium
A PBE with financing is a set of financing parameters (e, F,α) representing the amount of
internal capital invested by the incumbent bank shareholders, the face value of the debt
issued to outside investors and the fraction of the equity issued to outside investors; and
a consistent belief assigned by the capital market regarding the type of bank, such that
(i) the market valuation is fair given the belief and that the investors at least break even
at the issuing price, (ii) the bank optimally makes the financing decision at t = 0, and
(iii) the bank optimally makes the risk decision at t = 1.
Consistent with the existing literature on signalling games (e.g. Spence, 1973) there
exists a continuum of PBE. I invoke the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) in
order to focus on equilibria with reasonable out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Intuitively, given
the resulting equilibrium, there cannot exist an oﬀ-equilibrium-action such that (i) one
type (Bad) is strictly worse oﬀ deviating to it, and (ii) if the market indeed believes that
the deviation can only come from the other type (Good), this type strictly prefers to
defect.
17I only consider the case in which the bank raises just enough to finance its lending. This is without
loss of generality. A bank can technically raise more than 1− e in terms of outside capital, in which case
the excess can only be stored as cash. Since this part of the asset yields zero and poses no information
problems to investors, it does not aﬀect the residual payoﬀ structure of the model. In other words, every
equilibrium in which a bank raises more than necessary corresponds to an equilibrium in which it raises
exactly one unit of capital.
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In some cases of the analysis in Section 1.5, the Intuitive Criterion still leaves
equilibria with substantially diﬀerent characteristics. In these cases, I invoke the concept
of undefeated equilibrium proposed by Mailath et al. (1993). Consider a proposed
equilibrium and an action that is not taken in the equilibrium. Suppose there is
an alternative equilibrium in which some types of the player prefer the alternative
equilibrium. The criterion then requires that the beliefs at that action in the original
equilibrium to be consistent with this set of types. Otherwise, the second equilibrium
defeats the proposed equilibrium. In this model, if the Intuitive Criterion leaves both
a pooling and a separating equilibrium, the pooling equilibrium defeats the separating
equilibrium if both types are better oﬀ in the pooling equilibrium.
1.3 Laissez-faire equilibria
I derive the laissez-faire equilibria in this section and discuss the procyclicality of the
equilibrium leverage. The cases of ex post and ex ante financing are analysed separately.
Whereas the case of ex ante financing is of primary interest in this paper, the case of ex
post financing is useful for highlighting the trade-oﬀ eﬀects of the asymmetric information
and the risk-shifting problem in determining the equilibrium bank capital structure.
1.3.1 Equilibrium with ex post financing
In this section I consider the case of ex post financing. In the absence of any
macroeconomic uncertainty at the time of financing, this version highlights the interaction
between the two main frictions considered in this model.
In this case, at t = 12 after the macroeconomic state s becomes common knowledge, the
bank announces its financing plan (e, F s,αs). Following a backward induction process, I
firstly inspect the risk choice of the bank at t = 1, and then solve for the optimal financing
plan at t = 12 .
At t = 1, for a bank of type i in state s, given a financing plan (e, F s,αs), the risk
level δ is chosen to maximise the expected value of the retained cash flow by the bank
(1 − αs)(ηi − δ)[X + (θs + δ)∆X − F s]. Alternatively, the optimal risk choice δi,s(F s)
maximises the equity value of the bank
δi,s(F s) = argmax
δ
(ηi − δ)[X + (θs + δ)∆X − F
s] (1.3)
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The face value of the outstanding debt F fully determines the bank’s risk choice, because
for a given capital structure, equity value is independent from the ownership structure
αs. In turn F s also completely determines the success probability, equity value and the
total bank value in equilibrium. Denote the equity value and the total value of a type
i bank in state s given the optimal risk choice as Ei,s(F s) and V i,s(F s) respectively. In
particular, denote the equilibrium success probability given leverage F s by qi,s(F s), given
by
qi,s(F s) ≡ ηi − δi,s(F s) =
1
2
(ηi + θs +
X − F s
∆X
) (1.4)
This highlights the risk-shifting incentives induced by leverage, which decreases the success
probability. Therefore the first best risk choice can only be implemented if and only if
the bank has an unlevered capital structure, i.e. F s = 0.
I now turn to the security design problem at t = 0. Applying the Intuitive
Criterion allows the Good firm to select the “least-cost separating equilibria”, as stated
in Proposition 1. A separating equilibrium (e, F s,αs) is characterised by the following
constraints
(PCB) : (1− αs)EB,s(F s) ≤ e (1.5)
(PCG) : (1− αs)EG,s(F s) ≥ e (1.6)
(IR) : V G,s(F s)− (1− αs)EG,s(F s) ≥ 1− e (1.7)
The participation constraints for the Bad bank and the Good bank, (PCB) and (PCG)
respectively, dictates that only the Good bank raises financing and invests. The investors’
rationality constraint (IR) takes into account that the outside investors, regardless of the
kind of securities they hold, claim the total value of the bank less the equity retained by
the insiders. I will henceforth refer to an equilibrium in which the (IR) holds in equality
as a fair-price equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Any equilibrium under ex post financing that satisfies the Intuitive
Criterion is a fair-price separating equilibrium in which only a Good bank raises financing
and invests. The equilibrium capital structure is given by
arg max
e,F s,αs
(1− αs)EG,s(F s) s.t. e ≤ e¯, (PCB) and (IR) (1.8)
Proof. This and all other proofs are provided in Appendix A.2.
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The above optimisation programme allows us to characterise the equilibrium capital
structure that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion in further detail. Firstly, notice that
in equilibrium, the bank should always prefer internal financing to outside financing.
That is, the equilibrium financing plan involves putting in all the internal capital e¯,
whenever outside leverage is used. This is because internal financing is free from either
the risk-shifting problem or the asymmetric information problem in this model.
I proceed to consider the optimal mix of debt and equity when outside debt financing is
required, and the unique equilibrium leverage is summarised in the following proposition.
Corollary 1 (to Proposition 1). There exists a threshold e˘s such that, in any equilibrium
under ex post financing that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion,
• If e¯ ≥ e˘s, the bank issues only equity and no debt.
• If e¯ < e˘s, the unique equilibrium capital structure is (e¯, Fˆ s(e¯), αˆs(e¯)), where Fˆ s(e¯) >
0 and αˆs(e¯) are characterised by the binding participation constraint of the Bad bank
(PCB) and the investors’ rationality constraint (IR).
The intuition for this result is illustrated in Fig. 1.3, for a Good bank with a given
level of internal capital e¯. The figure plots the value of the Good bank NPV G + e¯
(dashed line), and the maximum payoﬀ to the inside shareholders of the Good bank
(1−αs)EG,s(F s) (solid line), in any equilibrium with a given leverage F s. It can be shown
that there exist thresholds F˘ s(e¯) and Fˆ s, such that the maximum payoﬀ to the inside
shareholders of the Good bank is obtained in a pooling equilibrium amongst equilibria
with face value F s ≤ F˘ s(e¯), it is obtained in a separating equilibrium with underpricing
amongst equilibria with face value F s ∈ (F˘ s[e¯), Fˆ s(e¯)], and it is obtained in a fair-price
separating equilibrium amongst equilibria with face value F s ≥ Fˆ s(e¯). The leverage in
an equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion Fˆ s (if Fˆ s ≥ 0) maximises the retained
equity payoﬀ in equilibrium to the Good bank, as given by Proposition 1.
Fig. 1.3 indicates that the unique leverage level in any equilibrium that satisfies the
Intuitive Criterion is the lowest level of leverage that achieves separation at fair-price.
This is because, firstly, in any fair-price separating equilibrium, the bank retains the
entire NPV created by the bank’s lending (the dashed line in Fig. 1.3, which coincides
with the solid line for F s ≥ Fˆ s(e¯)), which is decreasing in the amount of leverage due
to risk-shifting problems. It therefore does not have the incentive to increase leverage
any further than Fˆ s(e¯). Secondly, if the bank chooses a leverage level F s < Fˆ s(e¯),
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Figure 1.3: Equilibrium selection using the Intuitive Criterion
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it has to either underprice the securities issued to signal its type, or pool with a Bad
bank. In either case, the Good bank receives less than the full NPV from the lending.
By increasing leverage, the Good bank enjoys a private benefit greater than the cost of
risk-shifting because of reduced mispricing. The Good bank therefore prefers to separate
by using leverage Fˆ s(e¯).
Corollary 1 shows that in the unique Intuitive equilibrium, only a Good bank raises
funds in the capital market, by issuing fairly priced securities. As in the literature on
asymmetric information, the constrained eﬃcient outcome can only be achieved when the
bank has suﬃcient internal capital. For e¯ < e˘s, the bank employs additional leverage and
subsequently chooses a higher risk profile.
The framework also demonstrates the intuition of Myers and Majluf (1984) that in
the presence of asymmetric information, there is a tendency to rely on internal sources
of funds, and to prefer debt over equity if external financing is required. If the bank has
suﬃcient amount of internal capital, the first best result can be achieved.
The pecking order theory, based on asymmetric information alone, is silent about the
determinants of the debt capacity.18 The interaction between the risk-shifting incentive
and the adverse selection problem in this model, similar to that studied by John (1987),
endogenously determines the unique equilibrium level of leverage and hence the capital
structure. Specifically, leverage mitigates the adverse selection problem, but incurs a cost
due to excessive risk-shifting incentives. The debt capacity in this model is thus provided
by the extent of the risk-shifting problem.19
18The model of Myers and Majluf (1984) shows that the a firm with private information always issues
debt and never issues equity.
19Other models of capital structure with frictions that predict an interior solution for leverage can also
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1.3.2 Equilibrium with ex ante financing – Contingent capital structure
I now turn to consider the equilibrium capital structures if the bank raises financing at
t = 0 prior to knowing the realisation of the underlying economic state. I solve for the
equilibrium capital structure within a general class of contingent capital structure given
by a set of face values of the debt FC and a set of fractions of equity issued to outsiders
αC specified for each state s.
A separating equilibrium (e,F C ,αC) is characterised by the following constraints,
(PCBC ) : E
[
(1− αsC)E
B,s(F sC)
]
≤ e (1.9)
(PCGC ) : E
[
(1− αsC)E
G,s(F sC)
]
≥ e (1.10)
(IRC) : E
[
V G,s(F sC)− (1− α
s
C)E
G,s(F sC)
]
≥ 1− e (1.11)
This set of conditions is similar to the set of conditions 1.5–1.7 for the case of ex post
financing which was analysed in the previous section. The diﬀerence is that in this section,
financing is obtained prior to the realisation of the underlying economic state. Since the
economic uncertainty only resolves at t = 12 , the risk choice at t = 1 takes into account
the macro state s, while the financing terms at t = 0 only relies on the prior distribution
of the economic states. The equilibrium conditions are therefore given in expectation,
and are weaker than those in the case of ex post financing.
Following similar intuition as in the case with ex post financing, a bank prefers internal
financing to outside financing, and chooses leverage levels to maximise its retained equity
payoﬀ, trading oﬀ between the asymmetric information and the risk-shifting problems.
The resulting equilibria are given as follows.
Proposition 2. Any contingent capital equilibrium under ex ante financing that satisfies
the Intuitive Criterion is a fair-price separating equilibrium in which only a Good bank
raises financing and invests. The set of equilibrium contingent capital structures is given
by
arg max
e,FC ,αC
E
[
(1− αsC)E
G,s(F sC)
]
s.t. e ≤ e¯, (PCBC ) and (IRC) (1.12)
There exists a threshold e˘C such that the bank issues debt if and only if e¯ < e˘C .
be interpreted as providing a debt capacity, such as Darrough and Stoughton (1986), Leland (1994) among
others.
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Similar to the case with ex post finance, in any equilibrium with ex ante financing
that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion, the Good bank chooses the leverage level that allows
it to separate from the Bad at the least cost of risk-shifting.
1.3.3 Properties of the laissez-faire equilibria
Procyclical equilibrium leverage
This section highlights the procyclicality of the equilibrium leverage in the cases of ex post
and ex ante financing, which creates scope for contingent convertible bonds as discussed
in Section 1.4. In this section I examine the implications of procyclical leverage on the
bank’s risk-taking incentives and the resulting default probabilities.
Proposition 3. The face values of debt in an equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive
Criterion are procyclical in both the case with ex post financing and the case with ex ante
financing. That is,
Fˆ s(·) ≥ Fˆ z(·), ∀ θs > θz (1.13)
where the inequality is strict if and only if e¯ < e˘s; and
Fˆ sC(·) ≥ Fˆ
z
C(·) (1.14)
for any s, z ∈ {s ∈ S : αˆCs < 1} s.t. θ
s > θz, where the inequality is strict if and only if
e¯ < e˘C .
The procyclicality result is due to the fact that the information asymmetry problem
is relatively more severe in a good state when the returns on the loan portfolio are high
in general. This is because in this model, the marginal impact on the value of the bank’s
claims brought by an increase in the economic fundamentals is greater for a Bad bank
than for a Good bank.
1 <
EG,s(F )
EB,s(F )
<
EG,z(F )
EB,z(F )
∀ θs > θz (1.15)
This is consistent with the view of diminishing marginal return, or when the
complementarity between the economic fundamentals and the bank’s type is not too
high. As a result, the diﬀerence between the Good and the Bad banks’ (retained) equity
value becomes relatively insignificant in booms. Therefore in equilibrium, relatively higher
leverage is required during economic booms in order to resolve the information asymmetry.
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The result that the equilibrium leverage of banks is procyclical is supported by Adrian
and Shin (2008a), who document that changes in total assets are positively correlated with
changes in leverage of financial institutions. This model suggests that banks employ
procyclical leverage to minimise the cost of asymmetric information and the cost of
risk-shifting incentives.20
Although either case produces procyclical leverage in equilibrium, the contingent
capital structure in the ex ante financing case is less procyclical than the equilibrium
in the case with ex post financing. This is driven by the fact that the cost of risk-shifting
is convex in the amount of leverage in this model, i.e. ∂V
i,s(F s)
∂F s =
F
2∆X
> 0.21 Financing ex
ante with a contingent capital structure therefore allows the bank to reduce the cyclicality
in its leverage to minimise the expected cost of risk-shifting. This is reflected in the
cyclicality of the resulting equilibrium default probabilities (Proposition 4). Intuitively,
on the one hand, the intrinsic success probabilities are higher in booms, while on the other
hand, procyclical equilibrium leverage implies higher risk-taking in booms which tends to
increase the default probabilities of the bank.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium default probabilities are procyclical in the case of ex post
financing. For e¯ ≤ e˘z,
1− qG,s(Fˆ s) > 1− qG,z(Fˆ z) ∀ θs > θz (1.16)
The equilibrium default probabilities are countercyclical in the case of ex ante financing.
For e¯ ≥ e˘C or for any s, z ∈ {s ∈ S : αˆsC < 1},
1− qG,s(Fˆ sC) ≤ 1− q
G,z(Fˆ zC) ∀ θ
s > θz (1.17)
With ex post financing, the resulting default probabilities are procyclical. In
equilibrium, the bank’s choice of leverage overcompensates for the better economic
prospects, because they do not fully internalise the cost of leverage in the presence of
information asymmetry. To see this, notice that for any leverage level less than Fˆ s, a
20It is widely acknowledged that the leverage ratios of financial institutions are procyclical, contrary
to non-financial firms, who tend to exhibit negative correlation between asset returns and leverage ratio,
known as the “leverage eﬀect”. For example, Adrian and Shin (2008b,a) attribute such observation
to banks targeting a leverage ratio given by the value-at-risk, while Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and
Geanakoplos (2010) show that collateral constraints generate leverage that tends to be procyclical.
21The convexity of the cost of risk-shifting in leverage is also what ensures an interior solution for the
choice of leverage.
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Good bank must issue its securities at a discount because of information asymmetry. The
existing shareholders of the bank therefore do not retain the full value created by its
loan portfolio. In particular, they share with the outside investors the value destruction
brought by an increase in leverage. This conflict of interests leads to excessive risk-taking
in booms, sowing the seeds of a bust. Taking the view that securitisation is an important
source of funding for banks, this implication is consistent with the findings of Griﬃn and
Tang (2012) that AAA-rated CDO tranches issued between 2003 and 2007, when asset
values were high, were of increasingly deteriorating quality leading up to the crisis.
With ex ante financing, however, the equilibrium default probabilities given a
contingent capital structure are countercyclical. An ex ante financing decision allows
the bank to take advantage of the relative severity of the information asymmetry problem
in diﬀerent macroeconomic states, which helps the bank to internalise the cost of leverage,
alleviating the risk-shifting problem. In particular, to maximise the benefit of leverage
in mitigating the information asymmetry problem at the ex ante stage, a bank prefers to
employ more leverage in the state in which the information asymmetry problem is more
severe. This is the state that is less risky as measured by a lower default probability,
because the information content in the equity is less pronounced when it is less risky, i.e.
1 <
EG,s(F s)
EB,s(F s)
<
EG,z(F z)
EB,z(F z)
iﬀ qi,s(F s) > qi,z(F z) (1.18)
Therefore a bank would never take on so much more leverage in a high state such that
it results in a default probability higher than that in a low state, because the excessive
leverage employed in the high state is ineﬃcient in resolving either of the two frictions.
Specifically, a bank in such a situation would benefit from reducing the excessive leverage
employed in the high state and increasing leverage in the low state. In doing so, the bank
incurs less cost of risk-shifting in expectation due to the convexity of the risk-shifting
problem in leverage, as well as improves the eﬃciency in mitigating the information
asymmetry problem, as leverage is shifted to the state in which the information asymmetry
problem is more severe.
Eﬃciency of the contingent capital structure
In this section I compare the ex ante eﬃciency of the equilibria in the case of ex post
financing and the case of ex ante financing. Ex ante eﬃciency is measured by the sum of
all agents’ expected payoﬀs, or the expected value of the bank, in equilibrium.
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Proposition 5. Raising capital ex ante using a contingent capital structure is (weakly)
preferred to raising capital ex post.
E
[
V G,s(Fˆ sC(e¯))
]
≥ E
[
V G,s(Fˆ s(e¯))
]
∀ e¯ (1.19)
where the above inequality is strict for e¯ < e˘C .
Since the ex ante financing problem nests the ex post financing problem, it is clear
that it is at least as eﬃcient as the ex post problem, because the set of constraints for
the ex ante financing problem is weaker. Moreover, the ex ante financing equilibrium is
strictly preferred to the ex post financing equilibrium whenever the two are not identical.
This is for e¯ < e˘C , as evident from the earlier discussion regarding the cyclicality of the
equilibrium default probabilities.
This section asserts that the optimal capital structure is contingent on the
realisation of the economic state in the laissez-faire equilibrium. The contingent
capital structure equilibrium minimises the expected cost of risk-shifting necessary to
signal the bank’s private information, by employing procyclical leverage to balance the
information-sensitivity of the residual equity in diﬀerent states. The bank would therefore
voluntarily issue contingent capital securities to implement the procyclical equilibrium
leverage, without restriction.22
1.4 Implementation using contingent convertible bonds
The key result of the baseline model is that the optimal contingent capital structures
feature procyclical leverage that is higher in booms and lower in busts. Contingent
convertible bonds are a natural addition to debt and equity in order to implement the
optimal capital structures of the bank, as it contractually specifies a reduction of the
face value of the debt in an economic downturn. This section presents an example of an
economy with the possibility of a tail event to illustrate the key features of the CoCo
bonds that implement the optimal contingent capital structure. I then discuss the issues
surrounding the practical design of CoCo bonds.
In this section, I consider the special case of an economy with two possible states
S = {L,H}. The High state θH occurs with probability β, and the Low state θL occurs
22In practice, if the banks are subject to a leverage constraint that binds in all states, they would
not employ contingent capital structure, because their capital structure is determined by the leverage
constraints.
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with probability 1 − β, where β is large. We can interpret the High state as the normal
state, and the Low state as an unlikely adverse state – the “tail event”.
1.4.1 CoCo bonds and procyclical leverage
I characterise the two types of the equilibrium that satisfy the Intuitive Criteria in the tail
event economy, and then present an implementation of the equilibrium capital structure
using contingent convertible bonds contracted upon the verifiable macroeconomic states
in this model.
By Proposition 2–4, the equilibrium of contingent capital structure that satisfies the
Intuitive Criterion is a fair-price separating equilibrium in which only a Good bank raises
financing and invests. The equilibrium capital structure (F C ,αC) are such that the
equilibrium leverage and equity values are procyclical, i.e. FˆHC ≥ Fˆ
L
C and E
G,H(FˆHC ) ≥
EG,L(FˆLC ).
23
The optimality of procyclical leverage naturally points towards contingent convertible
bonds as instruments for the implementation of the optimal capital structure. The reverse
convertible feature of CoCo bonds reduces the face value of the debt in the bank’s capital
structure in the Low state. By contrast, conventional convertible bonds, which have been
shown to play a role in mitigating adverse selection problems (e.g. Brennan and Kraus,
1987; Constantinides and Grundy, 1989) and moral hazard problems (e.g. Green, 1984;
Mayers, 1998), do not implement the required contingency in this model.
The following proposition summarises the equilibrium contingent capital structure and
proposes an implementation of the equilibrium contingent capital structure that involves
CoCo bonds. Two scenarios of contingent capital structures can arise in this tail event
economy depending on the value of e¯.
Proposition 6. There exist thresholds e˘C and e˘T such that any contingent capital
equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion is a fair-price separating equilibrium in
which only a Good bank raises financing and invests.
• If e¯ ≥ e˘C , the bank issues only equity and no debt.
• If e¯ ∈ [e˘T , e˘C), the equilibrium contingent capital structure is (e¯, {FˆHC (e¯), Fˆ
L
C (e¯)},
{αˆHC (e¯), αˆ
L
C(e¯)}), where Fˆ
L
C (·) = αˆ
L
C(·) = 0, and Fˆ
H
C (·) > 0, αˆ
H
C (·) ≥ 0 are given by
23That the equity value is procyclical follows the fact that the default probability is countercyclical,
because EG,s(F ) =
[
qG,s(F )
]2
∆X .
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the binding (PCBC ) and (IRC).
The bank implements the equilibrium contingent capital structure by issuing
– CoCo bonds with face value FˆHC (e¯) that is written down to zero contingent on
the Low state; and,
– Warrants of fraction αˆHC designed such that they are only exercised in the High
state.
• If e¯ < e˘T , the equilibrium contingent capital structure is (e¯, {FˆHC (e¯), Fˆ
L
C (e¯)}, {αˆ
H
C (e¯),
αˆLC(e¯)}), where Fˆ
H
C (·) = Fˆ
L
C (·) +
θH−θL
∆X
so that qG,H(FˆHC (·)) = q
G,L(FˆLC (·)), and
FˆLC (·), αˆ
H
C (·), αˆ
L
C(·) are given by the binding (PC
B
C ) and (IRC).
The bank implements the equilibrium contingent capital structure by issuing
– Straight bonds with face value FˆLC (e¯);
– Equity of fraction αˆHC (e¯); and,
– CoCo bonds with face value θ
H−θL
∆X
that convert into equity in the Low state so
that the fraction of outside equity becomes αˆLC(e¯) ≥ αˆ
H
C (e¯).
The first scenario (corner solution) is for a bank with an intermediate level of internal
capital e¯ ∈ [e˘T , e˘C), that issues CoCo bonds with a write-down feature. As the bank is
relatively well capitalised, the amount of leverage required to achieve separation is small.
Since the debt issued in the High state is relatively less information-sensitive, leverage
is only used in the High state, i.e. FˆHC (e¯) > Fˆ
L
C (e¯) = 0. This is implemented with
CoCo bonds that write down to zero in the Low states. Moreover, given the equilibrium
leverage, the residual equity is still less information-sensitive in the High state when the
default probability is lower. The equilibrium equity issuance is therefore only in the High
state but not in the Low state, implemented with warrant, in order to minimise the “cost
of capital”.24 The insiders thus retain full ownership in the Low state to align their
incentives, i.e. αˆHC (e¯) ≥ αˆ
L
C(e¯) = 0.
24This is in line with the results of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) that warrants can be part of the
equilibrium signalling device employed a good issuer with private information. In their model, firms issue
warrants because the risk-averse inside shareholders of the good firms, which are also riskier, find it less
costly to issue warrants than those of the safer firms that also have lower expected values. The warrants
in this model, by contrast, are driven by the fact that in equilibrium, equity is less information-sensitive
in the High state than in the Low state.
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The second scenario (interior solution) is for a bank with a low level of internal capital
e¯ < e˘T , that issues CoCo bonds with a contingent convertible feature, in addition to
straight debt and equity. In this case, a high amount of leverage is required to achieve
separation, and debt must be issued in the low state as well as in the high state. In
equilibrium the default probability 1 − qG,s(Fˆ sC(·)) is equalised between both states in
order to minimise the costs of risk-shifting associated with leverage. Moreover, since
in this case the equity value is equal in both states, there is one degree of freedom in
determining the equity allocation between the High and the Low states. The optimal
contingent capital structure in this scenario is therefore implemented using CoCo bonds
with face value θ
H−θL
∆X
that converts into equity in the Low state, in addition to straight
bonds and equity.25 This scenario highlights the eﬃciency gain provided by using CoCo
bonds to implement the optimal contingent capital structures, which take advantage of the
relative severity of the asymmetric information and risk-shifting problems across diﬀerent
states. This is evident from the fact that the face value of the CoCo bonds required
θH−θL
∆X
is determined by information regarding the verifiable state θs but not the private
information of the bank ηi.26.
This simple model of agency frictions endogenously gives rise to two types of CoCo
bonds that are seen in the market. The model predicts that well capitalised banks issue
CoCo bonds with a write-down feature, whereas banks in need of much capital issue
CoCo bonds that convert into equity. For example, the first issues of CoCo bonds were
by Lloyds Banking Group with a contingent convertible feature in November 2009 and by
Rabobank with a write-down feature in March 2010. The tier 1 capital ratios of the two
banks were 8.6% and 13.8% respectively prior to the issuances.27 Credit Suisse issued
CoCo bond swith a contingent convertible feature in 2011 and 2012, followed by CoCo
bonds with a write-down feature in 2013, as the capital position of the bank improved.28
25Because there is one degree of freedom in determining the fractions of equity held by outsiders across
states, implementation using CoCo bonds is feasible for αˆHC (e¯) ≥ αˆ
L
C(e¯). The write-down feature is
therefore also a special case of the conversion of the CoCo bonds in this scenario, if the fractions of the
equity issued to outsiders are equal in both states.
26In this model, the state s is verifiable and thus serves as the trigger for the conversion of the CoCo
bonds. Although for the ease of interpretation I have referred to it as a macroeconomic state, the model
is also consistent with the interpretation that the state s is driven by idiosyncratic events, provided that
they are contractible. I discuss CoCo bonds with market triggers in the following Section
27Sources: Lloyds Banking Group (2009) and Rabobank Group (2009).
28According to Credit Suisse Regulatory Disclosures (2012), the core tier 1 capital ratio of Credit Suisse
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1.4.2 Interpreting the contingent convertible bonds
The role of commitment and CoCo bonds
It is worth noting that the optimal contingent capital structure can only be implemented
with ex ante contingent contract. As shown in Section 1.3.1, a bank raising capital ex
post after the realisation of the macroeconomic state employs leverage that is excessively
procyclical.
After financing is arranged at t = 0, it is crucial for the implementation of the optimal
contingent capital structure that the bank commits to its pre-specified contingent capital
structure until the payoﬀ of the loan portfolio is realised. The model derives the optimal
contingent capital structure assuming that the bank commits to the capital structure it
chooses at t = 0. In fact, this commitment is necessary, as the equilibrium outcome may
not be supported in a sequential PBE if the bank is able to alter its capital structure
subsequent to the initial oﬀering.
Specifically, leverage in this model sends a credible signal regarding the type of the
issuer because the substitution of debt for equity financing is more costly for the Bad bank
than for the Good. After the initial oﬀering, however, a levered bank would be better
oﬀ buying back the debt by issuing equity in order to remove the risk-shifting incentives
whenever the market believes that it is of a Good type. Anticipating that the eventual
capital structure would be unlevered, at t = 0 the investors would not be able to form
the separating belief.
In practice, such commitment is likely to be enforced for a number of reasons. Firstly,
it is likely to be costly to issue equity subsequently because of new asymmetric information
problems that can arise. Under the current tax regime, there is also a tax disadvantage to
issuing equity. Furthermore, a levered bank would be unwilling to issue additional equity
or buy back existing debt because of the “debt-overhang” problem.
Current outstanding CoCo bonds are mostly long term. This helps to create a
“debt-overhang” problem that reinforces the commitment by the bank to its optimal
contingent capital structure. For example, the contingent convertible bonds issued by
Credit Suisse have a 30-year maturity, and the Enhanced Capital Note issued by LLoyds
Banking Group has fixed maturities ranging between 10–22 years.29
under Basel II.5 increased from 10.4% to 14.4% from 2011 to 2012, and its tier 1 capital ratio increased
from 15.1% to 18.4%.
29This model provides a supply-side rationale for the long-term nature of CoCo bonds. Bolton and
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Trigger design
While so far in this model I refer to the verifiable state s as a macroeconomic state,
the model is consistent with a trigger based on idiosyncratic events, provided that they
are contractible. Examples of proposals for CoCo bond design based on idiosyncratic
events include Flannery (2009), Hart and Zingales (2010, 2011), Pennacchi et al. (2010)
and Pennacchi (2011). Others have proposed a dual trigger structure based on both
an idiosyncratic event and a measure of macroeconomic downturn, such as Squam Lake
Working Group (2009), McDonald (2011) and Kyle (2013).
Alternatives for a trigger that is placed on the idiosyncratic events of the issuing bank
include regulatory capital ratios, or market prices of claims on the bank. Although a
market price is a “criteri[on] that is informative, objective, timely, diﬃcult to manipulate,
and independent of regulators’ intervention, avoiding the problems associated with other
types of triggers”, according to Sundaresan and Wang (2013), all the CoCo bonds that
are issued thus far have triggers based on regulatory capital ratios. This is because a
conversion trigger based on the market price of equity can suﬀer from the multiplicity or
the absence of equilibria in the price of the equity of the issuing bank. Sundaresan and
Wang (2013) show that a unique competitive equilibrium exists only if the conversion is
designed to leave the equity price equal before and after the conversion. Moreover, the
authors claim that this condition precludes penalising the existing shareholders, defeating
the purpose of the CoCo bonds.
This model can be modified to allow a trigger based on the equity price of the bank.
In this model, there exists a conversion ratio of the CoCo bonds that gives rise to a unique
pricing equilibrium, while diluting the existing shareholders. This contrasts with the result
of Sundaresan and Wang (2013), because unlike their model, this model endogenises the
risk taking incentives of the bank and hence the bank value. The conversion of the
CoCo bonds creates value since it lowers the leverage of the bank and reduces the bank’s
incentive to take excessive risk. The condition that the equity price remains constant
therefore implies that the fraction of equity held by existing shareholders is diluted upon
conversion.
Formally, assume that the state s is observable but not contractible, and that there
Samama (2012) and Hart and Zingales (2010) present a demand-side argument that CoCo bonds are
likely to be purchased by long-term investors seeking to enhance yield in good times by risking losses in
bad times.
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is no frictions in the secondary market so that the price of the equity reflects perfectly
the value of the equity in state s, given the capital structure of the bank and the market
belief.30 Suppose the bank has outstanding straight debt, CoCo bonds and common
equity according the optimal contingent capital structure, and the number of common
shares outstanding is N . The equity price in the high state is thus pHw/o ≡
EG,H(FˆHC (e¯)
N
without conversion. Suppose that the trigger price is set at pHw/o. That is, conversion
occurs if the price falls below pHw/o, and the CoCo bonds convert into n shares of common
equity, which correspond to a fraction nN+n ≡ αˆ
L
C(e¯) − αˆ
H
C (e¯) of the equity. In the Low
state, the equity prices with and without conversion are given by pLw ≡
EG,L(FˆLC (e¯))
N+n < p
H
w/o
and pLw/o ≡
EG,L(FˆHC (e¯))
N respectively.
31 Consider a conversion ratio characterised by n
such that the equity prices with and without conversion in the Low state are equal,
i.e. pLw = p
L
w/o. It then follows that such a conversion ratio is indeed dilutive, i.e.
αˆLC(e¯)− αˆ
H
C (e¯) = 1−
EG,L(FˆHC (e¯)
EG,L(FˆLC (e¯)
> 0.32
Hart and Zingales (2010) propose an alternative trigger mechanism based on the price
of the CDS spreads, which reflects the default risk of the issuing bank. In this model, for
a bank with a low level of internal capital e¯ < e˘T , the optimal contingent capital structure
specifies a conversion of the CoCo bonds in the Low state to keep the default probability
constant. This property suggests that the CDS spread can also act as a conversion trigger
that is free from the equilibrium problem, following similar arguments as those given
above for a trigger based on equity prices.
30I abstract from the discussion regarding the informativeness of the equity price. Martynova and
Perotti (2012) discuss the eﬃciency of an exogenously given CoCo bond triggered by equity prices that
are noisy signals of the equity value. The authors find that a mandatory conversion based on such equity
prices leads to more frequent conversions, and a regulatory trigger produces fewer conversions.
31That pLw =
EG,L(FˆLC (e¯))
N+n < p
H
w/o =
EG,H(FˆHC (e¯))
N is due to the fact that the equity values are equal in
both states given the optimal contingent capital structure, i.e. EG,H(FˆHC (e¯)) = E
G,L(FˆLC (e¯).
32It is straightforward to check that given this conversion ratio, the unique equilibrium is indeed for
the CoCo bonds to convert only in the Low state. Firstly, since the equity prices in the Low state with
and without conversion are both below the trigger price, pLw = p
L
w/o < p
H
w/o, the unique equilibrium in
the Low state is for the CoCo bonds to convert. Secondly, the unique equilibrium in the High state is
for the CoCo bonds not to convert, and for the equity price of be equal to pHw/o. In the High state, the
equity price, if the CoCo bonds convert, is given by pHw ≡
EG,H(FˆLC (e¯)
N+n . However, since the conversion ratio
results in less dilution in the High state than in the Low state when the equity value is higher for any
given amount of leverage, a conversion would result in a higher equity price pHw > p
H
w/o, which contradicts
with the conversion trigger of the CoCo bonds.
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1.5 Optimal countercyclical capital regulation
Although the equilibrium capital structure trades oﬀ the cost and benefit of leverage,
the bank takes on excessive leverage when its level of internal capital is low, due to its
private incentive to minimise the mispricing in the securities it issues. The laissez-faire
equilibrium thus warrants regulation, since excessive risk-shifting by the bank decreases
the value of the businesses the bank lends to, incurring a social cost. In this section I
characterise the optimal capital requirements, which are countercyclical, and discuss how
CoCo bonds can be used to implement the regulated equilibrium.
In any given state s, a minimum capital requirement is defined as a cap on the face
value of the debt, F¯ s. Given a capital requirement, there exist Intuitive equilibria in
which the bank issues debt with face value no higher than F¯ s in state s. The optimal ex
ante capital requirement is a set of state caps F¯ ≡ {F¯ s}Ss=1 such that it maximises the
expected value of the bank in the resulting equilibria that satisfy the Intuitive Criterion.
Imposing a cap on the face value of the debt F¯ s is equivalent to requiring a minimum
capital ratio ci,s(F¯ s) ≡ E
G,s(F¯ s(·))
V G,s(F¯ s(·))
in a given state s, because the capital ratio of the
bank is monotonically decreasing in F¯ s. In this section I refer to a minimum capital
requirement as a cap on the face value of the debt, as opposed to a capital ratio, to
simplify exposition and to allow direct comparison with the previous section. The optimal
capital regulation F¯ derived below can be implemented with a state-contingent minimum
capital ratio c ≡ {cs}s∈S .
1.5.1 Optimal capital regulation
The following proposition summarises the optimal capital regulation.
Proposition 7. The optimal minimum capital requirement can improve the eﬃciency
of the laissez-faire (contingent) capital structure equilibrium and produce the constrained
eﬃcient outcome. There exists e˘CP and e˘
C
LP such that
• For e¯ ≥ e˘C , the capital requirement never binds. The bank issues only equity in the
capital market and invests if and only if it is of the Good type.
• For e¯ ∈ [e˘CP , e˘
C), the capital requirement of maximum leverage F¯ (e¯) = 0 binds. The
bank issues only equity in the capital market and invests if and only if it is of the
Good type.
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• For e¯ ∈ [e˘CLP , e˘
C
P ], the capital requirement of maximum leverage F¯ (e¯) = F˘ (e¯) binds.
The bank issues both debt and equity in the capital market and invests if and only
if it is of the Good type. F˘ (e¯) is the least-cost leverage cap a regulator can impose
that implements a separating equilibrium, which is given by
arg max
FC
E
[
V G,s(F sC)
]
s.t. vG(FC ; e¯) ≥ v
G
P (F C ; e¯) (1.20)
where vG(F C ; e¯) and vGP (FC ; e¯) are the expected retained equity value of the Good
bank in the least-cost separating equilibrium that in the least-cost pooling equilibrium
respectively, given the capital regulation.
• For e¯ < e˘CLP , the capital requirement of maximum leverage F¯ = 0 binds. The bank
issues only equity in the capital market and invests regardless of its type.
I discuss the intuition for Proposition 7 using, as an example, the simplest case where
there is only one macroeconomic state, i.e. no macroeconomic uncertainty. In this case
the capital regulation is a single cap on leverage F¯ . I will comment on the cyclicality
of the optimal capital regulation in relation to macroeconomic uncertainty in the next
section (Section 1.5.2).
Fig. 1.4 highlights the ineﬃciency in the laissez-faire equilibrium and hence the
rationale for capital regulation. The figure plots the social value produced by the bank
(solid line) and the payoﬀ to the inside shareholders of the Good bank (1−αs)EG,s(F s),
in the equilibrium that maximises the payoﬀ to the inside shareholders of the Good bank
for a given leverage F s. The social value is measured as the value of the Good bank,
NPV G(F s) + e¯, if the equilibrium is separating, and as the expected value of the bank,
γNPV G(F s) + (1− γ)NPV B(F s) + e¯, if the equilibrium is pooling.
Figure 1.4: Ineﬃciency in the laissez-faire equilibrium
F¯
F˘ (e¯) Fˆ (e¯)
Social value
Private value
Pooling
Underprice
separating
Fair-price
separating
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Section 1.3 has shown that in the laissez-faire equilibrium, a bank with e¯ < e˘C chooses
leverage level Fˆ (e¯) when raising capital, which maximises its retained payoﬀ. Figure 1.4
illustrates that the laissez-faire equilibrium leverage Fˆ is too high and induces excessive
risk-taking by the bank. Although a lower leverage level increases the value of the bank
and the social value produced by the bank’s lending, the bank is unwilling to reduce
its leverage because of the underpricing in the securities it issues due to asymmetric
information.
A capital regulation that reduces the equilibrium leverage improves the social value
of a Good bank with e¯ < e˘C , as represented by the solid line in Fig. 1.4. However, the
extent to which the regulator can cap leverage is limited by the bank’s private incentives
to maximise its retained payoﬀ. As the bank’s leverage is capped to be less than Fˆ (e¯),
the bank finds it privately costly to signal its type through underpricing. Faced with
a stringent capital requirement F¯ < F˘ (e¯), the Good bank would prefer to pool with
the Bad bank, instead of incurring the heavy cost of signalling (Eq. 1.20 is violated).
This results in another social loss, as it enables the Bad bank to raise capital and make
value-destroying investments.
Constrained by the private incentives of a bank with little internal capital e¯ < e˘CP , the
optimal capital regulation is either F¯ (e¯) = F˘ (·) to implement a separating equilibrium,
or F¯ (e¯) = 0 to implement a pooling equilibrium, depending on whether it is less costly to
resolve the asymmetric information problem or to curb the risk-shifting incentives. This
result highlights the inherent tension between how the information asymmetry and the
risk-shifting problems can be solved in this model. That is, higher leverage mitigates
the information asymmetry problem as it reduces the information-sensitiveness of the
securities issued and hence the potential mispricing, but it also incurs social losses due to
the excessive risk-taking incentives it creates. Fig. 1.5 illustrates how this trade-oﬀ varies
with the bank’s internal capital e¯.
It is worth noting that the optimal capital requirement F¯ s(e¯) depends on the level
of the bank’s internal capital e¯. This raises an important distinction between “inside”
and “outside” capital. Regardless of the type of the security issued to obtain outside
financing, the equilibrium outcome depends on the bank’s “skin in the game” e¯, rather
than the total debt to equity ratio.
Depending on the bank’s internal capital e¯, the optimal capital regulation falls into
one of the two regions (Fig 1.5). For a relatively better capitalised bank, the optimal
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Figure 1.5: Optimal capital regulation
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capital regulation limits the amount of leverage the bank can employ, in order to reduce
the cost of risk-shifting while allowing the bank to signal through underpricing in addition
to leverage (the separating region). For poorly capitalised banks, however, the amount of
leverage required to achieve separation is high, and the optimal capital regulation imposes
zero leverage and implements a pooling equilibrium (the pooling region).
The optimal capital requirement, while improving social value by curbing excessive
risk-taking induced by leverage, nevertheless makes financing costly for the Good bank
in terms of mispricing. The amount of mispricing is illustrated by the wedge between the
private value received by the bank and the social value (Fig. 1.4). This is consistent with
the observation that equity capital is generally perceived to be expensive. For example,
Elliott (2009, p.12) states that “the problem with capital is that it is expensive. If capital
were cheap, banks would be extremely safe because they would hold high levels of capital.”
In this model capital is costly in the regulated equilibrium because of the two frictions,
in the absence of which the bank would indeed choose no capital market debt and the
first best risk level. As argued by Admati et al. (2010), however, it should be noted that
capital is not necessarily socially costly, which creates scope for capital regulation.
1.5.2 Countercyclical capital regulation and CoCo bonds
Having characterised the optimal capital requirements, this section explores the
countercyclical property of the optimal capital regulation using again the example of the
tail event economy, and discusses the role of CoCo bonds in the regulated equilibrium.
A minimum capital requirement is defined as countercyclical, if in the resulting
equilibrium, the bank has a countercyclical capital ratio.
Proposition 8. In the tail event economy, the optimal minimum capital requirement is
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countercyclical. That is, given the procyclical leverage caps F¯H(e¯) ≥ F¯L(e¯), the bank has
a countercyclical capital ratio cH ≤ cL, where cs ≡ E
G,s(F¯ s)
V G,s(F¯ s)
. The inequalities are strict
for e¯ ∈ [e˘CLP , e˘
C
P ].
In particular, there exists a threshold e˘TLP such that for e¯ ∈ [e˘
C
LP , e˘
T
LP ], the bank
implements the equilibrium contingent capital structure subject to capital regulation by
issuing CoCo bonds with the same face value as in the laissez-faire equilibrium θ
H−θL
∆X
that convert into equity in the Low state, in addition to straight debt with a lower face
value than in the laissez-faire equilibrium F¯L(e¯) < FˆLC (e¯) and equity.
That the capital regulation imposes procyclical leverage follows the same reasoning
to those of Proposition 3. As the capital regulation in this case intends to achieve
separation (following Proposition 7), higher leverage is required in the High state, when
asset values are high and the asymmetric information problem is more severe. The
amount of CoCo bonds in the bank’s capital structure is therefore the same as in the
laissez-faire equilibrium, capturing the relative severity of the asymmetric information
problem across the High and the Low states (for parameters that give rise to an interior
solution). Nevertheless, the optimal capital regulation lowers the amount of leverage in
the resulting equilibrium, improving the social value of the bank.
The proposition suggests that the optimal capital regulation is countercyclical.
The capital ratio in the regulated equilibrium is countercyclical because the optimal
procyclicality of the leverage equalises the equity values across the High and the Low
states, in order to maximise the eﬃciency of the leverage in mitigating the asymmetric
information problem, following similar reasoning to those of Proposition 4. The capital
ratio is therefore higher in the Low state, as the bank value is lower. This result
confirms the optimality of countercyclical capital proposed by the Bank for International
Settlement (Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, 2010), in which the regulators call
for a capital buﬀer that takes account of the macro-financial environment in which banks
operate. The proposal suggests that the buﬀer be “deployed ... when excess aggregate
credit growth is judged to be associated with a build-up of system-wide risk to ensure
the banking system has a buﬀer of capital to protect it against future potential losses.”
This idea, advocated by scholars such as Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and Griﬃth-Jones
and Ocampo (2011), is shown to be optimal in this model of risk-shifting incentives and
adverse selection.
CoCo bonds emerge as part of the implementation of the optimal countercyclical
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capital regulation. Currently Basel III developed by the Basel Committee on Bank
Supervision (2011, p. 58) requires that the countercyclical capital buﬀer is deployed by
national jurisdictions with a pre-announcement by up to 12 months before the system-wide
risk materialises, to allow time for banks to adjust to a buﬀer level. In practice, it is not
clear that the build-up of the buﬀer can always be achieved in a timely fashion. In light of
the results in this model, the optimal countercyclical capital buﬀer can be implemented
using CoCo bonds, which are voluntarily issued by banks well before the build-up of
the system-wide risk to meet the countercyclical capital requirement. The CoCo bonds,
subject to a mandatory conversion triggered by a regulatory declaration of a state of
systemic risk, implements an immediate recaptalisation of the banks.
1.6 Extensions
The baseline model thus far considers the role of leverage in a bank’s capital structure in
mitigating the asymmetric information problem at the cost of inducing risk-shifting by the
bank. The optimal contingent capital structure entails procyclical leverage implemented
with CoCo bonds, because the asymmetric information problem is relatively more severe
in booms. Due to the bank’s private incentive to reduce any mispricing in the securities
it issues, however, the bank employs excessive leverage, and incurs a social cost as its
subsequent risk-shifting behaviour negatively impacts the value of the businesses the bank
lends to. The laissez-faire equilibrium thus warrants countercyclical capital regulation,
which curbs excessive leverage and risk-taking, while preserving the procyclicality of the
bank’s leverage.
Recurrent financial crises have highlighted the systemic eﬀect of large and correlated
bank failures, including a direct impact on the real economy through credit contraction,
and a network eﬀect on the financial health of other financial institutions.33 Consequently,
regulators are unwilling or unable to allow major financial institutions to fail.34 While
33For example, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) document a run by short-term bank creditors following
the failure of Lehman Brothers, which contributed to a 47% reduction in the extension of new loans to
large borrowers in the fourth quarter of 2008 relative to the previous quarter.
34For example, the run on Northern Rock, Britain’s fifth-largest mortgage lender, did not stop until a
taxpayer-backed guarantee of all existing deposits was announced in September 2007, and the US Treasury
and the Federal Reserve System bailed out 282 publicly traded banks and insurance companies under the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in 2008–9. Sources: Economist (2007) and Wilson and Wu (2012).
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extending state guarantee can be ex post optimal for a regulator to alleviate the systemic
impact of a bank failure, it creates a moral hazard problem that incentivises ex ante
risk-taking by the bank.
This section provides two extensions of the model to consider two types of government
guarantees: implicit bailouts and explicit deposit insurance. I analyse the moral hazard
problem created by the government guarantees and examine the implications for the
optimal capital regulation in relation to the frictions considered in the baseline model,
using again the example of a tail event economy.
1.6.1 Bailout and bail-in
This section modifies the baseline model to incorporate the systemic importance of the
bank. I assume that the regulator has the incentive to bail out a failed bank ex post by
repaying the creditors on the bank’s behalf, to reduce the systemic externalities posed by
the failure of the bank. I analyse the moral hazard problem created by the bailouts and
study the optimal ex ante capital regulation. Noticing that the ex post bailout incentives
hinder the eﬃciency of the ex ante capital regulation, I discuss the role of “bail-in” capital
in alleviating the moral hazard problem created by bailouts.
Assume that a systematically important bank failing to meet its promised repayment
to creditors poses a large cost to the rest of the economy ξ¯. Although not modelled
explicitly, this large social cost intends to capture the systemic eﬀects of a bank failure
and the costs to the real economy. Assume also that an ex post bailout by the regulator
can reduce the cost to ξ < ξ¯, which accounts for any remaining externalities that cannot
be resolved by a bailout and the deadweight loss associated with financing the bailout.
Bailouts and moral hazard
Suppose the regulator maximises social welfare but cannot commit to any
time-inconsistent policies. Ex post at t = 2, the government has the incentive to bail
out a failed bank, by repaying the creditors on the bank’s behalf to reduce the social cost
from ξ¯ to ξ.
The incentives for a bailout at t = 2 creates moral hazard problems for the bank.
At t = 2, the bank receives a bailout whenever its cash flow is less than its promised
repayment F s. Anticipating a bailout, the bank issues eﬀectively risk-free debt in the
capital market at t = 0 and receives an implicit subsidy of the amount E[(1− qi,s(F s))F s]
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for any given debt structure F . Since the value of the implicit subsidy is increasing in
F s, the bank without restriction takes on unlimited leverage and destroys the value in
the loans through subsequent risk-taking. This simple extension of the model captures
the moral hazard problem of government bailouts, such as those documented by Duchin
and Sosyura (2013).35
Recognising the moral hazard problem as well as the ineﬃciency discussed in Section
1.5, the regulator at t = 0 designs the optimal ex ante capital regulation F¯ as defined in
1.5, with the expectation of a bailout at t = 2. The ex ante objective of the regulator is
to maximise the expected social value of the bank less the social loss associated with bank
failures, i.e. E[V G, s(F¯ s) − (1 − qG,s(F¯ s))ξ]. The following proposition characterises the
optimal ex ante capital regulation of a systemically important bank, given the expectation
of a bailout ex post.
Proposition 9. In the tail event economy, with the expectation of a bailout ex post, the
optimal minimum capital requirement is countercyclical.
In particular, there exist thresholds e˘BOLP and e˘
BO
P such that, for e¯ ∈ [e˘
BO
LP , e˘
BO
P ], the
optimal capital requirement for a systemically important bank implements a contingent
capital structure equilibrium in which the bank issues CoCo bonds with the same face
value as in the baseline model θ
H−θL
∆X
that convert into equity in the Low state, in addition
to straight debt with a higher face value than in the baseline model under optimal capital
regulation F¯LBO(e¯) > F¯
L
T (e¯), and equity.
The optimal capital regulation of a systemically important bank remains
countercyclical, and can be implemented using CoCo bonds with the same face value
as in the baseline model (for parameters that give rise to an interior solution). This is
consistent with earlier results that the amount of CoCo bonds in a bank’s capital structure
is determined by the relative severity of the asymmetric information problem across the
High and the Low states, in order to minimise the expected cost of risk-shifting induced
by the leverage required to signal the private information of the bank.
Relative to the optimal capital regulation derived in Section 1.5, the optimal capital
regulation of a systemically important bank permits higher leverage in the form of straight
debt. This follows from the earlier intuition that, the extent to which the regulator can
35Duchin and Sosyura (2013) show that banks make riskier loans and shift investment portfolios towards
riskier securities after being approved for government assistance.
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impose leverage caps is limited by the bank’s private incentives. Since an ex post bailout
creates a moral hazard problem which reduces the private cost of risk-shifting internalised
by the bank, higher leverage must be allowed to alleviate the asymmetric information
problem. The ex post bailout of a failed bank to mitigate the ex post social loss therefore
hinders the eﬃcient capital regulation of the bank ex ante.
Bailout and bail-in
Bail-in capital, a form of contingent debt that is automatically wiped out in case the bank
fails, has been considered by regulators such as the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision
(2011) and the Bank of England, in order to shield taxpayers from the need to bail out a
bank that is “too big to fail”.36 In light of the results in this extension, if a regulator can
credibly commit to bailing in the debt ex post, strictly capital regulation, as characterised
in Section 1.5, can be imposed, resulting in lower leverage and less risk-taking by banks
in equilibrium.
With all capital market debts “bail-inable”, the bank writes down its liabilities at t = 2
in case it cannot meet the promised repayments. As the bank now fully internalises the
cost of risk-taking when it issues risky debt in the capital market ex ante, the equilibrium
and the optimal capital regulation are identical to those characterised in Section 1.3–1.5
and can be implemented using CoCo bonds. That is, the bank issues the optimal amount
of equity, straight debt and CoCo bonds at t = 0, where both the straight debt and CoCo
bonds have a bail-in feature. At the interim, if a low microeconomic state realises, the
CoCo bond conversion is triggered, subsequently reducing the incentives for risk-shifting.
Finally at t = 2 when the loan portfolio pays oﬀ and the securities mature, the debt
holders and CoCo bond holders (if they remain unconverted) are paid oﬀ if the bank
produces suﬃcient cash flows. Otherwise, all bonds are written oﬀ according to the
bail-in arrangement, and the bank enters into an orderly resolution.
This extension highlights the diﬀerential roles played by the two types of contingent
capital instruments. While CoCo bonds provide early conversion well before bankruptcy
to implement the optimal procyclical leverage, bail-in capital features a write-down of
the debt only in the event of a default. Bail-in capital is eﬀective in avoiding socially
costly bank failures and forcing the bank to internalise the cost of risk-taking ex ante,
thereby resolving the moral hazard problem created by the government’s incentive to bail
36Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporateion and Bank of England (2012).
44
out failed banks ex post. Given the ex post incentives to bail out a failed bank, not only
does bail-in capital improve the eﬃciency of the bank in managing its loan portfolio, it
also leads to fewer incidences of bank failures ex post, reducing the cost associated with
the failure of a systemically important bank.
1.6.2 Depositors and deposit insurance
Banks perform the important functions of maturity transformation and risk
transformation by oﬀering deposit contracts. The model thus far has abstracted from
this aspect by assuming risk neutral investors, to focus on the trade-oﬀ eﬀect of leverage
across diﬀerent macroeconomic states. This section modifies the model to extend the
funding base of the bank to include a set of risk averse, unsophisticated depositors with
liquidity needs.
I provide conditions for when deposit insurance is essential, and show that deposit
insurance creates a moral hazard problem similar to that of a bailout, in that it allows
the bank access to cheap funding via insured deposits, without internalising the cost of its
risk-taking decision. As a result, the optimal ex ante capital regulation in this extension
remains countercyclical and can be implemented with CoCo bonds, but permits high
levels of leverage using a combination of demand deposits and straight debt, because the
extent to which the bank can cap leverage is limited by the bank’s private incentives.
Depositors
In this extension I assume that the risk neutral capital market investors have limited
capital k < 1−e¯, but there is an unlimited supply of funds from a continuum of depositors.
The bank thus must raise financing from the depositors in order to finance its lending.
Each depositor has 1 unit of endowment and faces idiosyncratic liquidity shocks
following Diamond and Dybvig (1983). I assume the unsophisticated depositors can only
observe whether or not their bank runs out of funds. Therefore they would only accept a
debt-like contract.
Each depositor demands early consumption at t = 1 with probability λ or late
consumption at t = 2 otherwise. The utility of each depositor is given as
U(c1, c2) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
u(c1) if Early, with prob. λ
u(c2) if Late, with prob. 1− λ
(1.21)
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At t = 0, a depositor is willing to deposit with the bank if the bank oﬀers expected utility
of at least u(1). I normalise u(0) = 0, u(1) = 1. The liquidity shock is i.i.d. across
depositors and unobservable while the probability λ is common knowledge.
Deposit insurance and moral hazard
As the bank must raise financing at least partially via demand deposits, this section
provides conditions for when deposit insurance is essential for the depositors to be willing
to provide capital. I then discuss the moral hazard problem associated with deposit
insurance and the implications for the optimal capital regulation.
Deposit insurance is a commitment from the government to inject up to D¯ to the
bank in case the bank runs out of funds to repay the depositors. I assume that the
deposit insurance is financed by charging an ex ante fair insurance premium so there is
no deadweight loss associated with proving the insurance ex post.
Suppose the bank takes D1−λ amount of deposits from a mass
D
1−λ of depositors,
promising each depositor a consumption plan (c1, c2) upon request, where c1 ≤ c2 so that
it is incentive compatible for a late depositor to wait. Ex post exactly a mass λ1−λD of
the depositors demand early repayment at t = 1, and the remaining mass D of depositors
wait until t = 2.37 In order to prevent illiquidity at t = 1, the bank holds λ1−λD in liquid
reserve (storage) to meet the withdrawal at t = 1.38 The bank’s t = 2 liability to the
depositors is therefore Dc2. Denote the total liability of the bank in state s as F s.
At t = 2, there is a positive probability that the bank returns 0. Assuming sequential
service of deposits, in case the bank runs out of funds, a depositor who joins the queue
late receives nothing, whereas one who is at the front of the queue receives full promised
repayment. With any given deposit insurance D¯ ≤ Dc2, in a symmetric equilibrium in
which all late depositors wait untill t = 2, a late depositor receives the full repayment
with probability D¯Dc2 , and 0 otherwise. A depositor is willing to deposit with the bank
only if his expected utility provided by the deposit contract is at least that if he enjoyed
37Assuming sequential service of deposits and given the government guarantee at t = 2, the Late
depositors prefer waiting until t = 2 to joining the queue at t = 1.
38The bank optimally chooses to hold reserve to prevent premature bankruptcy given its own capital
input e > 0. If there is a new generation of depositors at t = 1, the bank can also raise fresh capital via
deposits at t = 1 to meet the withdrawal by the first cohort of depositors. This extension of the model
refrains from the coordination problem at t = 1 to focus on the moral hazard problem associated with
possible bank failures at t = 2.
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his endowment with certainty, given the capital structure of the bank. Having normalised
u(0) = 0 and u(1) = 1, the break-even condition of a depositor is
λu(c1) + (1− λ)E
[
qi,s(F s) + [1− qi,s(F s)]
D¯
Dc2
]
u(c2) ≥ 1 (1.22)
The following proposition provides a suﬃcient condition for full deposit insurance to
be necessary to fund the bank.
Proposition 10. If the depositors are suﬃciently risk averse such that u′(1) ≤
(1−λ)(1−e¯−k)
2∆X
, the bank cannot raise deposits without a deposit insurance. The cost to the
government for providing the insurance is minimised at full coverage up to D¯ = 1− e¯− k.
Proof. Appendix A.2.9
The intuition is as follows. For a given amount of deposit insurance D¯ < Dc2, a
risk averse depositor would demand a payoﬀ c2 > 1 at t = 2, knowing that the bank
defaults with positive probability. In turn, a higher liability induces the bank to increase
its portfolio risk in an attempt to maximise shareholders’ value, resulting in higher default
probability. If the depositors are suﬃciently risk averse, they require a high yield which
creates a risk-shifting problem so severe that the depositors would not deposit with the
bank whenever the deposit is risky. Therefore the government must provide full deposit
insurance D¯ = D. Given full coverage, the demand deposit is risk free and the bank
chooses to promise c1 = c2 = 1 to allow the depositor to break even. This part of the
result suggests that the risk aversion of the outside investors exacerbates the risk-taking
incentives of the bank.
A full coverage deposit insurance creates a moral hazard problem similar to that of
a government bailout. Given the total t = 2 liability F and a full coverage guarantee
on the deposit D¯, the bank has the incentive to maximise its deposit base up to the
coverage of the deposit insurance programme, as it enjoys an implicit subsidy of the value
E[1− qi,s(F s)] per unit deposit taken. The total value of the bank, therefore, consists of
the value of the loan portfolio E[V i,s(·)] and the implicit subsidy of value E[1−qi,s(F s)]D¯,
which is increasing in the deposit coverage D¯. As the bank cannot be financed without
deposits, which induce risk-shifting in equilibrium, the first best outcome is not attainable.
For constrained eﬃciency, the government should provide the minimum amount of deposit
insurance to enable financing D¯ = 1 − e¯ − k as long as the value of the loan portfolio
V G,s(D¯) > 1. I will assume this is true for comparability with the baseline model.
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With the optimal deposit insurance D¯ in place, the financing plan of a bank is now
given by (e,D,F ,α), where F s ≥ D is the total book leverage of the bank at t = 2, of
which (F s − D) is capital market debt. The bank, when making the capital structure
choice, considers the value of the bank as the sum of the value of the loan portfolio and
the implicit subsidy provided by the deposit insurance. That is, the bank of type i in
state s given the leverage level is Bi,s(F s) ≡ V i,s(F s) + [1 − qi,s(F s)]D¯. Assuming that
this is the case, the following proposition summarises the consequence of the moral hazard
problem associated with deposit insurance, which is similar to that of bailouts.
Proposition 11. Lower availability of capital market funds increases the reliance of
banks on fully insured deposits. This induces greater leverage and risk-taking by the
banks. The procyclicality of the leverage in the optimal contingent capital structure and
the countercyclicality of the optimal capital requirements derived in Section 1.3–1.5 go
through. In particular, the face value of CoCo bonds remain the same at θ
H−θL
∆X
for banks
with little internal capital.
This result contrasts with the baseline case with only risk neutral investors. Deposit
insurance provides the bank with an implicit subsidy, similar to the bailout of capital
market debts analysed in Section 1.6.1. However, while capital market debts can
be made “bail-inable” to mitigate the moral hazard problem associated with ex post
bailouts, depositors must be protected in all circumstances, leaving an implicit subsidy
of the amount E[1 − qi,s(F s)]D¯, which lowers the eﬀective cost of leverage for the bank.
The equilibrium capital structure chosen therefore entails higher leverage, trading oﬀ
the benefit of mitigating asymmetric information problems and the cost of inducing
risk-shifting. However, it remains optimal for a bank to issue CoCo bonds, since CoCo
bonds improve the eﬃciency of the bank by allowing the bank to employ higher leverage
in booms when the asymmetric information problem is relatively severe. In particular,
the face value of the CoCo bonds remain the same as in the baseline model, and is only
determined by information regarding the microeconomic states θs. Since the extent to
which the regulator can limit leverage is constrained by the bank’s private incentives, the
optimal countercyclical capital regulation permits higher leverage than in the baseline
case.
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1.7 Concluding remarks
Capital regulation of financial institutions has long been at the centre of policy discussions.
The recent financial crisis led to the realisation that a single risk-weight capital ratio fails
to address macro-prudential concerns. Since then scholars and regulators have called for
higher capital requirements and contingent capital to address the procyclical problems
of bank leverage. However, a theory is required that incorporates the problems under
consideration in order to assess the plausibility of any capital regulation as a solution.
This paper presents a model of the financial structure of a bank that is in need of
outside capital for investment. The bank has private information regarding the returns
of the investment opportunities, and has a risk-shifting incentive ex post to increase
the shareholders’ value at the expense of the debt holders. These two agency frictions
endogenously determine the equilibrium capital structures of the bank, trading oﬀ the
benefit of leverage as an information-insensitive security and the cost of risk-shifting
induced by leverage. Moreover, since the asymmetric information problem is relatively
more severe in booms, it is optimal for the bank to raise capital ex ante specifying ex post
procyclical capital structures.
The optimal contingent capital structure can be implemented using contingent
convertible (CoCo) bonds in addition to straight debt and equity. The model generates
both the write-down feature and the contingent convertible feature seen in the CoCo
bonds issued by banks.
Although the model predicts that banks have the incentives to voluntarily issue CoCo
bonds in a laissez-faire equilibrium, banks are subject to financial regulation in practice.
The model notes that the privately chosen leverage levels are generally excessive due to the
bank’s incentives to minimise market misplacing of its securities. The optimally designed
capital requirements, which are countercyclical, can improve the eﬃciency of the banks.
Subject to the optimal capital regulation, the bank maximises its shareholder value by
issuing CoCo bonds to meet the capital requirements.
Banks’ excessive risk-taking not only harms shareholders’ value, but also brings
significant instability and associated costs as highlighted by the recent financial crisis. I
introduce state guarantees in the form of government bailouts and deposit insurance. The
moral hazard problems associated with state guarantees reduces the cost of risk-shifting
internalised by a bank. This limits the extent to which a regulator can restrict bank
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leverage ex ante. Nevertheless, countercyclical capital regulation remains optimal,
because the optimality of the procyclical leverage implemented by CoCo bonds is
determined by the relative severity of the asymmetric information problem across diﬀerent
macroeconomic states.
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CHAPTER 2
COUNTERCYCLICAL FORECLOSURE
FOR SECURITISATION
2.1 Introduction
The epidemic of mortgage foreclosures in the US which started in 2008 has raised concerns
from the general public and policy makers.1 The number of foreclosures started to surge in
2007 and continued to rise into 2010. It has been argued that foreclosures create significant
losses for both the lenders and the borrowers, and have major negative externalities to
the broader society.2 In response, the Federal Reserve has set up a series of programs
in an attempt to reduce mortgage foreclosure, such as the Home Aﬀordable Modification
Program. The scale and significant economic implication of foreclosure deserves attention
in order to achieve an understanding of its driving force and the underlying mechanism.
Recent studies and reports have suggested that securitisation and the biased incentives
of mortgage servicers could have contributed to the wave of foreclosure. For instance,
Piskorski et al. (2010) show that, during the recent crisis, mortgages in a securitised pool
are more likely to be foreclosed than otherwise similar mortgages on bank portfolios. In
addition, an analysis of the complex compensation structure of the servicers by Thompson
1For example, the Huﬃngton Post has a designated section for news on the foreclosure crisis.
2See for example Pennington-Cross (2006) for a survey on the deadweight loss on foreclosure.
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(2009) concludes that the servicers’ legal and financial incentives bias servicers towards
foreclosure instead of modifying delinquent mortgages, even when investors would profit
more from modification than foreclosure.
This paper investigates the optimal foreclosure policy of securitisers in a framework of
mortgage-backed securitisation under asymmetric information. This framework allows us
to answer the following questions. How does information asymmetry in the securitisation
process give rise to a foreclosure policy that is ex post ineﬃcient? Why does foreclosure
appear countercyclical? What is the role of a third-party servicer in the securitisation
process? In aggregate, how can a “foreclosure crisis” arise?
We explicitly model the foreclosure decision in the mortgage-backed securitisation
and the market for repossessed property. A securitiser has a mortgage pool which
returns risky cash flows, and securitisation is motivated by the liquidity needs of the
securitiser a la` DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999). However, some mortgages subsequently
become delinquent and the securitiser must decide whether to modify or foreclose the
delinquent mortgages. If a mortgage is modified (forbearance), the full repayment is
recovered with some probability. If a mortgage is foreclosed, the underlying property is
repossessed and sold in a designated market for repossessed properties. Investors in the
market for repossessed properties post an aggregate downward sloping demand curve,
generating market clearing prices of repossessed properties that are decreasing in the
amount of property foreclosed.3
The securitiser has private information regarding the probability of recovery on the
delinquent mortgages. This may be because the securitiser has access to the specific
borrower information. The securitiser then designs and sells a mortgage-backed security
to the outside investors. Consistent with existing literature on security design (e.g. Myers
and Majluf (1984); Nachman and Noe (1994)), we establish that the securitiser chooses
to issue a senior security, or debt, to the outside investors. As in DeMarzo and Duﬃe
(1999), securitisers with high quality mortgage pools signal their type by retaining the
residual junior tranche, which entails a liquidity cost.
The main result of the paper is that information asymmetry in the securitisation
process leads to countercyclical foreclosure. In the baseline model, we consider the optimal
foreclosure policy if the securitiser can choose a set of type-contingent foreclosure rates
3This is micro-founded in the model by modelling a mass of investors with heterogeneous renovation
costs when investing in repossessed properties.
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prior to obtaining any private information on the mortgage pool and commit to the
foreclosure policy ex post. Compared to the full information benchmark, the optimal
foreclosure rates under asymmetric information are more negatively related to the quality
of the mortgage pool ex post. In other words, signalling concerns lead to more foreclosure
when the mortgage pool is of poor quality, and vice versa. This implies that the aggregate
foreclosure is negatively related to the overall quality of the mortgage pools in the
economy.
The intuition of the above result is as follows. The optimal foreclosure policy under
asymmetric information maximises the securitiser’s expected payoﬀ by trading oﬀ the
costs of signalling against the ex post ineﬃciency in the foreclosure decision. In order to
reduce the signalling costs, a securitiser designs a policy that discourages the low type from
mimicking the high type. The low type’s payoﬀ from mimicking comprises the proceeds
from selling the debt claim at the high type’s price and the value of the retained cash
flow. The foreclosure policy of the securitiser has two eﬀects on the incentive for the low
type to mimic. Firstly, an ineﬃciently low foreclosure rate for the high type reduces the
incentive to mimic by decreasing the value of the debt security issued by the higher type.
Secondly, an excessively high foreclosure rate for the low type discourages mimicking
by decreasing the value of the retained junior claim (levered equity), since foreclosure
reduces the risk in the overall cash flow from the mortgage pool. This is because, ex post
under any given market condition, foreclosing a mortgage brings an immediate cash flow
equal to the market price of the property, while forbearance entails risk in the potential
recovery of the delinquent mortgage. Therefore the equilibrium optimal foreclosure policy
is excessively countercyclical.
The ability of the securitisers to commit to the ex ante chosen optimal foreclosure
policy is crucial in the above mechanism. In an environment where the commitment
power is not naturally available, we show that, in equilibrium, third-party servicers play
a role in enforcing such commitment. First of all, if the securitiser cannot commit to
the ex ante chosen optimal foreclosure policy, she would tend to foreclose less ex post.
Moreover, ex post foreclosure policy is positively related to the quality of the mortgage
pool. This is because, given that the high quality securitiser retains the junior tranche,
which is convex in the cash flows, she benefits from riskier cash flows ex post. However,
the lack of commitment power hurts the ex ante securitisation process, leading to a lower
expected payoﬀ in equilibrium for the securitisers.
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We then propose a mechanism that resembles the industry practice to enforce such
commitment power, which involves mortgage servicers. This is inline with the view of
Thompson (2009), who argues that the rise of the servicing industry is a by-product of
securitisation.4 An important function performed by mortgage servicers is the decision
of forbearance versus foreclosure. A third-party servicer allows the separation of this
decision from the securitiser, potentially enabling the securitiser to commit to a set of ex
ante chosen foreclosure policies.
In this mechanism, a mortgage originator with a pool of mortgages can choose to
(i) securitise the pool himself with the ex post servicing done in-house, in which case
the foreclosure decision will be made ex post as illustrated previously; or (ii) sell the
mortgage pool to a securitiser but remain as the servicer of the mortgages. In the latter
case, the securitiser oﬀers a compensation contract that includes a payment transfer and
fees dependent on the ex post cash flow of the mortgage pool. The securitiser then
proceeds to issue the optimal mortgage-backed securities, while the servicer makes the ex
post foreclosure decision according to the incentives given by his compensation.
We show that there exist contracts that implement the optimal foreclosure policy.
Because selling the mortgage pool to a securitiser enables commitment and reduces the
costs associated with asymmetric information, it is more eﬃcient than in-house servicing.
Moreover, for mortgage pools of low quality, the compensation to the servicer is designed
to lean towards foreclosure. This implements the optimal foreclosure policy which would
appear to be excessive ex post, namely, the ex post foreclosure may result in a loss to the
investors. This is evident in the past financial crisis. For example, Levitin (2009) estimates
that lenders lose approximately 50% of their investment in a foreclosure situation.
Finally, we extend the model to consider an economy with multiple securitisers who
compete in the market for repossessed property when mortgages are foreclosed. The
foreclosure policy is still higher for a lower quality mortgage pool, and lower for a high
quality one. This leads to countercyclical foreclosure in equilibrium, that is, the overall
foreclosure is higher in an economic downturn in which many mortgage pools are of low
quality. The prices in the repossessed property market are hence procyclical.
We also examine the two additional sources of friction brought by the competitive
4The servicer performs duties including collecting the payments, forwarding the interest and principle
to the lenders, and negotiating new terms if the debt is not being paid back, or supervising the foreclosure
process.
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environment considered in the market for repossessed property. On the one hand, the
fire-sale externality arises with competition, which tends to result in excessive foreclosure
in equilibrium. This is because a securitiser does not internalise the negative externality
of her decision to foreclose a delinquent mortgage on the other securitisers’ payoﬀ due to
its price impact. On the other hand, the market power of each securitiser decreases with
competition. This tends to increase foreclosure as it reduces the ineﬃciency associated
with oligopoly in terms of insuﬃcient foreclosure. The overall eﬀect suggests that under
strong competition, prominent fire-sale externality exacerbates the countercyclical eﬀect
of asymmetric information and leads to significant excessive foreclosure in bad economic
times, which can be interpreted as a foreclosure crisis.
Related Literature
This paper belongs to the growing body of literature on the incentive problems associated
with mortgage securitisation. Various studies argue that securitisation relaxes the ex ante
lending standards. Keys et al. (2010, 2012), using evidence from securitised subprime
loans, show that the ease of securitisation reduces lenders’ incentives to carefully screen
the mortgage borrowers and that mortgages with higher likelihood to be securitised have
higher default rates. Mian and Sufi (2009) find that securitisation of subprime loans
is associated with credit expansion and, as a result, counties with a high proportion of
subprime mortgages face a larger number of defaults. Elul (2011) also finds securitised
prime loans have a higher default rates than otherwise comparable portfolio loans. Our
work adds a diﬀerent dimension to this literature by studying the decision of ex post
mortgage foreclosure in relation to securitisation.
Our paper also relates to the study of optimal loan modification and foreclosure policy.
Wang et al. (2002) show that when a lender (bank) has a high screening cost to ascertain
whether a borrower is in distress, it could be optimal for the bank to randomly reject loan
workout requests to deter the non-distressed borrower from opportunistically applying for
a loan modification. Riddiough and Wyatt (1994) study the case in which the lender’s
foreclosure cost is private information and the borrowers will infer this cost from past loan
foreclosure decisions and consequently decide their default decision and concession request.
The lender thus may costly foreclose many loans today to reduce future expected default
and loan modification costs. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) focus on the free-riding
problem among multiple creditors and show that when the cost of debt concessions is
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private but the benefit is shared, a creditor’s incentive to grant concessions to a distressed
firm is reduced. While the literature typically finds that the frictions lead to excessive
foreclosure, this model predicts procyclical foreclosure policy based on the asymmetric
information problem which is present in the mortgage-backed securitisation process.
Finally, while this paper is the first to formalise the role played by foreclosure in
mortgage-backed securitisation in a model of asymmetric information, several empirical
studies identify securitisation as being an important impediment for eﬃcient renegotiation
following delinquency, e.g. Agarwal et al. (2011); Piskorski et al. (2010); Zhang (2013).
Particularly related to our model are the empirical findings of Agarwal et al. (2011) The
authors find that the incentives of servicers present an impediment to loss mitigation
of delinquent mortgages and attribute this to the holdup problem posed by dispersed
investors of the senior tranche when the servicers hold the junior tranche. Our model
provides a theoretical argument for distortions in the foreclosure decision of securitised
mortgages.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents our model
of mortgage-backed securitisation with foreclosure policy under asymmetric information.
Section 2.3 solves the model and formulates the optimal pre-committed foreclosure policy.
In Section 2.4 discusses the role of third-party servicer in the MBS industry. Section 2.5
extends the baseline model to show that fire-sale externality can generate “foreclosure
crisis”. Finally Section 2.6 summarises the empirical implications produced by the model,
and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Model setup
This section sets up the baseline model and comments on the assumptions which are
central to the model.
There are four dates: 0, 1, 2 and 3. The baseline model’s participants consist of a
securitiser and a continuum of outside investors each with one unit of cash. All agents
are risk neutral. The securitiser is impatient and has a discount factor δ < 1 between
t = 1 and t = 3. This follows the assumption of DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999) and can be
interpreted as the securitiser’s incentive to raise capital by securitising part of her long
term assets as he has access to some positive return investment opportunities. There is
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no discounting for the outside investors.
Securitiser and mortgage pool
At t = 0, the securitiser has a pool of a continuum of identical mortgages that pays oﬀ at
t = 3. We henceforth refer to the securitiser as “she”. All mortgages have independent
probability to become delinquent at t = 2. Therefore a fixed portion of the mortgages
becomes delinquent. We normalise the measure of the delinquent mortgages in the pool
to 1.The remaining mortgages continue to repay and have an exogenous value of V . The
delinquent mortgages can be foreclosed or granted forbearance. In case of foreclosure,
the collateral property is repossessed and sold for a liquidation proceed L to outside
investors. In case of forbearance, the fixed mortgage repayment of value X is resumed
with probability θ; otherwise the loans are worthless. For simplicity, we assume that the
repayments of all delinquent mortgages are perfectly correlated. It can be interpreted to
capture the systematic variations in the risk of the mortgages.
Denote λ the fraction of delinquent mortgages foreclosed. The overall cash flow from
mortgage pool at t = 3 is then V + L+(1 − λ)X with probability θ, and V + L with
probability (1− θ), as illustrated in Fig 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Mortgage pool cash flow
θ V + L+(1− λ)X
V + L
At the beginning of t = 1, the securitiser receives a private signal regarding the
recovering rate of the delinquent mortgages θ ∈ {θH , θL}, where θ = θH with probability
γ. The assumption that the private information only concerns the credit risk of the
delinquent mortgages is to simplify analysis and is not central to the model. Nevertheless,
one interpretation could be that there is generally less data on delinquent loans, making
it more diﬃcult to assess the recovery rate of such borrowers.
After receiving the private information at t = 1, the securitiser designs a security that
depends on the cash flow of the mortgage pool at t = 3, and sells it to outside investors.
The securitiser retains the residual cash flow from the mortgage pool after paying oﬀ the
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investors. We will henceforth refer to it as the mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The
MBS market is detailed below.
Investors and markets
There are two markets in this model. There is a market of MBS issue at t = 1, and a
market for distressed property at t = 2. The investors are risk neutral, and the discount
rate is 0. Since the MBS only pays oﬀ at t = 3, the investors can participate either in the
MBS market, or the distressed property market, or neither.
At t = 2 the market for distressed properties opens. Each property is valued at X by
the outside investors. However, the investors need to incur a heterogeneous cost r ≥ 0 per
unit capital invested in the distressed properties. This cost r can reflect the significant
renovation and repair costs associated with distressed properties, as well as other liens
such as unpaid fees and taxes. The heterogeneity in the costs can be driven by the time,
skill and experience of the investors to conduct such renovations.
In Section 2.3 and 2.4, we assume that the private cost r of each investor is observable
by the securitiser. This allows the monopoly securitiser to implement perfect price
discrimination and extract all social surplus. As a baseline model, this setup has the
benefit of removing any ineﬃciency induced by the market structure. This therefore allows
a clean representation of the welfare implication of the optimal foreclosure policy under
asymmetric information, as presented in Section 2.3.5 Denote with I(R) the measure of
investors with 1 + r ≤ R, with I(1) = 0, I ′(R) > 0 and I ′′(R) < 0.
Given that r is observable to the securitiser, at t = 2 the securitiser makes a take it
or leave it oﬀer to each investor with a price b(r). The investor then chooses whether or
not to accept the oﬀer. An investor is able to accept the oﬀer only if the investor has
not invested in the MBS security at t = 1. As a tie break convention, we assume that
an investor prefers to wait and invest in the distressed property market if the investor
expects to be made an oﬀer that will be accepted at t = 2, when the investor is indiﬀerent
between investing in the MBS security at t = 1 and in the distressed property market at
t = 2. If an investor accepts the oﬀer b(r), the investor purchases a measure 1/b(r) of the
distressed properties. The cost r is incurred at the end of the periods when the payoﬀs
are realised.
5The assumption that the private cost r is observable by the securitiser will be relaxed in Section 2.5
to study the eﬀect of competition amongst securitisers in the market for distressed properties.
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At t = 1, the securitiser designs an MBS and issues it to the market. Observing the
choice of security on oﬀer, the investors form a belief θˆ regarding the private information
of the issuer and decide whether to subscribe to the issue. The investors strictly prefer to
subscribe if the issue is priced below the market valuation, and vice versa. Therefore the
market clearing price of the security p is equal to the market value of the security given
the investors’ belief.
Foreclosure policy
In Section 2.3, we assumed that at t = 0, the securitiser commits to a set of foreclosure
policies {λH ,λL} contingent on her type when it realises at t = 1. We then solve for
the optimal foreclosure policy. We relax this assumption in Section 2.4 and provide a
mechanism that involves a third party, the mortgage servicer, to implement the optimal
foreclosure policy.
The timeline of the model is summarised in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Baseline model timeline
Commits to
foreclosure policy
{λH ,λL}
Mortgage pool
quality realises;
Designs and issues
MBS
Proceed L from
foreclosure of
delinquent mortgages
All cash flows
realise;
All agents paid oﬀ
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
2.3 Pre-committed foreclosure policy
This section firstly presents the full information (first best) benchmark of the model.
We then solve for the optimal foreclosure policy and compare it to the full information
benchmark to assess the welfare implications.
2.3.1 First best benchmark
We follow a backward induction process to compute the first best benchmark. First, we
solve for the distressed property market pricing equilibrium for a given foreclosure policy.
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This then allows the characterisation of the securitiser’s problem regarding security design
and foreclosure policy choice.
Distressed property market
In order to obtain closed-form results, we use in Section 2.3 and 2.4 the following function
form for I(R), the measure of investors with renovation cost such that 1 + r ≤ R,
I(R) = aX ln(R), for some a ∈ [a, a¯]6 (2.1)
At t = 2, a fraction λi, i ∈ {H,L} of the delinquent mortgages are foreclosed, and the
underlying properties oﬀered to the market. In order to maximise the liquidation proceeds,
the securitiser prefers to make oﬀers to investors with the lowest r at the highest prices
that will be accepted. An investor will only accept an oﬀer if it allows the investor to at
least break even. That is, the payoﬀ to the investor after incurring the renovation cost,
X
1+r , is (weakly) higher than the price b(r) the investor pays for the property.
X
1 + r
≥ b(r) (2.2)
In equilibrium, the securitiser sells to the investors with the highest valuation. In this
situation, there exists a threshold rˆ(λi) in equilibrium such that the securitiser makes the
following oﬀer bˆ(r). We will later solve for the threshold rˆ(λi) by market clearing.
bˆ(r) =
X
1 + r
, ∀ r ≤ rˆ(λi) (2.3)
In equilibrium, the strategies of the investors thus depends on their cost r. All investors
with r ≤ rˆ(λi) will wait until t = 2. They accept the oﬀer b(r) made by the securitiser
and purchase measure 1+rX of the distressed properties, if the oﬀer b(r) allows the investor
to break even, i.e. satisfies Eq 2.2. All the investors with r > rˆ(λi) compete in the t = 1
MBS market.
Finally, the equilibrium threshold rˆ(λi) is given by the clearing condition that the
total demand for the properties is equal to the supply,∫ 1+rˆ(λi)
R=1
1
bˆ(r)
dI(R) =
∫ 1+rˆ(λi)
R=1
R
X
dI(R) = λi (2.4)
6The bounds for the parameter a¯ is imposed to guarantee interior solutions in all the relevant sections,
where a = and a¯ ≡ θL1−θL
γ(1−δ)θH+(1−γ)(θH−δθL)
γ(1−δ)(θH−δθH )+(1−γ)(θH−δθL)
.
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Using the function form given by Eq. 2.1, the equilibrium threshold rˆ(λi) and
liquidation proceed Li(λi) is
rˆ(λi) =
λi
a
(2.5)
Li(λi) = aX ln
(
1 +
λi
a
)
(2.6)
The liquidation proceeds are increasing and concave in the foreclosure policy of the
mortgage pool. That is,
∂ Li(λi)
∂λi
=
a2X
λi + a
> 0 (2.7)
∂2 Li(λi)
∂λ2i
= −
a2X
(λi + a)2
< 0 (2.8)
First best securitisation and foreclosure
At t = 1, a securitiser of type i chooses a security (Fi, fi) that correspond to the payoﬀs to
outside investors when the delinquent mortgages resume repayments or not respectively.
The securitiser’s expected payoﬀ at t = 1 is comprised of two parts (Eq. 2.9).
p(Fi, fi) + δ (θi [V + Li(λi) + (1− λi)X − Fi] + (1− θi) [V + Li(λi)− fi]) (2.9)
The first is the proceeds from issuing an MBS at t = 1 backed by the mortgage pool, and
the second is the residual cash flow from the mortgage pool at t = 2. The proceeds from
security issuance is given by the market clearing condition (MC) under full information,
(MC) p(Fi, fi) = θiFi + (1− θi)fi (2.10)
We can also rewrite Eq. 2.9 as Eq. 2.11 below. This oﬀers an alternative interpretation
comprising of a first part that represents the saving of retention cost due on proceeds
p(Fi, fi) from the security issuance, and a second part that is the intrinsic value of the
mortgage pool’s cash flows to the securitiser (Eq. 2.11).
(1− δ)p(Fi, fi) + δ [V + Li(λi) + (1− λi)θiX] (2.11)
In the first best benchmark, the securitiser chooses the security to maximise its
expected payoﬀ subject to the limited liability constraints (LL) on the MBS (Eq.
2.13–2.14) and the market clearing constraint (MC) under full information (Eq. 2.10).
From Eq. 2.11 it is clear that the securitisation process does not alter the intrinsic payoﬀ
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of the mortgage pool, the securitiser simply maximises her proceeds from the MBS issue.
(FFBi , f
FB
i ) ≡ arg max
(Fi,fi)
p(Fi, fi) (2.12)
s.t. (MC) and
(LL) Fi ≤ V + Li(λi) + (1− λi)X (2.13)
fi ≤ V + Li(λi) (2.14)
Since any security issued would be priced correctly under full information, the
securitiser chooses to issue a security backed by the entire cash flow of the mortgage
pool to minimise her retention cost. The payoﬀ to a securitiser of type i under full
information is V + Li(λi) + (1− λi)θiX.
We can now formulate the first best foreclosure policy. Anticipating the securitisation
process, at t = 0 the securitiser chooses a foreclosure policy (λFBH ,λ
FB
L ) to commit to, in
order to maximise its expected payoﬀ.
(λFBH ,λ
FB
L ) ≡ arg max
(λH ,λL)
γ[V + LH(λH) + (1− λH)θHX]
+(1− γ)[V + LL(λL) + (1− λL)θLX] (2.15)
The solutions are characterised by the first order conditions (FOC) because the second
order conditions are satisfied. That is, at the first best level of foreclosure, the marginal
gain from the property sale in the market is equalised to the expected value of mortgage
forbearance (henceforth the forbearance value).
(FOCFB) :
∂ Li(λFBi )
∂λi
− θiX = 0 ∀ i ∈ {H,L} (2.16)
The following proposition then summarises the first best benchmark results.
Proposition 12. In the full information equilibrium, the securitiser commits to a
foreclosure policy (λFBH ,λ
FB
L ) at t = 0, where
λFBi =
1− θi
θi
a ∀ i ∈ {H,L} (2.17)
She then securitises all of its mortgage pool cash flow at t = 1, which is fairly priced in
the market. At t = 2 the securitiser forecloses fraction λi if she is of type i, and obtains
liquidation proceeds LFBi ≡ Li(λ
FB
i ) = aX ln
(
1
θi
)
from selling the distressed properties
in the market.
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In the full information equilibrium, a high type securitiser forecloses a smaller fraction
of delinquent mortgages and obtains less liquidation proceed than a low type, λFBH < λ
FB
L
and LFBH < L
FB
L . This is because the good type has a higher forbearance value and is
therefore less inclined towards foreclosure.
2.3.2 Foreclosure policy under asymmetric information
We now solve for the optimal foreclosure policy given that securitisation occurs under
asymmetric information, following a similar backward induction procedure. Notice that
given a foreclosure policy, the liquidation proceeds from distressed property sales at t = 2
are the same as before. This section therefore focuses on the optimal security to be issued,
and presents the equilibrium foreclosure policy.
Securitisation with signalling
At t = 1, the securitiser with private information θi designs and issues an MBS security
backed by the cash flow of the mortgage pool. In this section we restrict our attention to
only consider the least cost separating equilibrium.
First, notice that in a separating equilibrium, the low type securitiser always receives
the fair price on the security she issues. Therefore she maximises her payoﬀ by selling
the entire cash flow from the mortgage pool to outside investors. There is no distortion
in the form of ineﬃcient retention for the low type. Given the pre-committed foreclosure
policy, denote Ui(λi) as the equilibrium payoﬀ to a securitiser of type i. Therefore the
equilibrium payoﬀ to the low type securitiser is
UL(λL) = V + LL(λL) + (1− λL)θLX (2.18)
Next, we solve for the equilibrium security of the high type securitiser in the least
cost separating equilibrium. Consider a general security that specifies a set of payoﬀs
F ≡ (FH , fH , FL, fL) for each of the two possible cash flow realisations of the mortgage
pool respectively for each type of the securitiser. Table 2.1 details the mapping from the
realisation of the cash flow to the payoﬀ of the security to the investors.
Specifically, Fi is the payoﬀ of the security if the cash flow of a type i securitiser
realises with the delinquent mortgages recovered, and fi is the payoﬀ of the security if the
cash flow of a type i securitiser realises without any recovery. This is because the final
cash flow of the mortgage pool will reveal the true type of the securitiser. We restrict our
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Table 2.1: Payoﬀs of the security issued by the high type
Type Realisation of cash flow Security payoﬀ F
High V + LH(λH) + (1− λH)X FH
V + LH(λH) fH
low V + LL(λL) + (1− λL)X FL
V + LL(λL) fL
attention to only monotonic security payoﬀs. That is, a higher realisation of the mortgage
pool cash flow should leave both the outside investors and the securitiser a (weakly) higher
payoﬀ.7 In the least-cost separating equilibrium, the optimal security for the high type
securitiser is given by
Fˆ = arg max
(FH ,fH ,FL,fL)
p(F) (2.19)
s.t. (MC) p(F) = θHFH + (1− θH)fH (2.20)
(LL) ∀ i ∈ {H,L} and (2.21)
(IC) UL(λL) ≥ p(F) + δθL [V + LL(λL) + (1− λL)X − FL]
+δ(1 − θL) [V + LL(λL)− fL] (2.22)
where Eq. 2.20 is the market clearing condition (MC) when the market believes that the
issuer of the security F is of the high type, and Eq. 2.22 is the incentive compatibility
constraint (IC) for the low type to not mimic the security issued by the high type.
Since the monotonicity of the security payoﬀs depends on the ranking of the cash
flow realisations, which depends on the foreclosure decisions of the securitisers. This
significantly complicates the analysis as the foreclosure decisions are endogenously
determined in equilibrium. For the rest of the paper, we present the results for the
relevant case where (λH ,λL) are such that
LH(λH) ≤ LL(λL) and (2.23)
LH(λH) + (1− λH)X ≥ LL(λL) + (1− λL)X (2.24)
7Although this implies some loss of generality, it is not uncommon in the security design literature, e.g.
Innes (1990) and Nachman and Noe (1994). One potential justification provided by DeMarzo and Duﬃe
(1999) is that, the issuer has the incentive to contribute additional funds to the assets if the security payoﬀ
is not increasing in the cash flow. Similarly, the issuers has the incentive to abscond from the mortgage
pool if the security leaves the issuer a payoﬀ that is not increasing in the cash flow. If such actions cannot
be observed, the monotonicity assumption is without loss of generality.
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It will become clear in Section 2.3.2 that this scenario indeed arises in equilibrium, and
we show in Appendix that this is the only equilibrium outcome.
The following proposition summarises the optimal securities in this assuming that Eq.
2.23–2.24 holds.
Proposition 13. In the least-cost separating equilibrium, the optimal security issued by
the low type securitiser is all the equity, whereas that issued by the high type securitiser is
a debt with face vaue Fˆ (λH ,λL), where
Fˆ (λH ,λL) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
V + (1−δθL)LL(λL)+(1−δ)(1−λL)θLX−(1−θH )LH(λH )θH−δθL ,
if 1−θHθH−θL [LL(λL)− LH(λH)] ≤ (1− λL)X
V + LL(λL)+(1−λL)θLX−(1−θH )LH (λH )θH , otherwise
(2.25)
Proof. See Appendix.
The result presented in Proposition 13 is two-fold. First, the high type issues a debt
security to the outside investors and retains the residual cash flow. The retained cash
flow incurs a deadweight loss of (1− δ). Such costly retention of the mortgage pool cash
flow allows the high type securitiser to signal her type and receive a fair market price for
the security it issues. This result is in line with DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999). Second, in
the presence of asymmetric information, the optimal securities issued by the securitiser
are debt contracts, with equity being a special case of extremely high face value. This is
because debt contract minimises the information sensitivity, a well established intuition
in e.g. Myers and Majluf (1984).
The two cases presented in Proposition 13 correspond to when Fˆ is greater than or
smaller than the low type’s good realisation of cash flows, V + LL(λL) + (1 − λL)X,
respectively. That is, the cases correspond to whether the low type would have to default
even when the delinquent mortgages resume payments, should she mimic the high type.
In the first case, information asymmetry measured by 1−θHθH−θL is large. The high type issues
a debt with low face value in order to separate from the low type, because a high face
value increases the market price of the security, increasing the incentive for the low type
to mimic. This, however, incurs a high retention cost on the high type. In the second
case, information asymmetry is less severe, and the high type can separate at a relatively
high face value of debt with minimal retention cost. In what follows we assume that
information asymmetry is so severe that the first case is true. This allows the asymmetric
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information to have a material eﬀect and generate interesting implications for the optimal
foreclosure policy.
In this case, the high type securitiser enjoys a total payoﬀ of UH(·) (Eq. 2.26) in
equilibrium which is comprised of two parts – the saving of retention cost on the proceeds
p(Fˆ (·), fˆ (·)) from the security issuance, and the intrinsic value of the mortgage pool’s
cash flows to the securitiser.
UH(λH ,λL) = (1− δ)pˆ(λH ,λL) + δ [V + LH(λH) + (1− λH)θHX] (2.26)
where pˆ(λH ,λL) ≡ p(FˆH(λH ,λL), fˆH(λH ,λL)) (2.27)
FˆH(λH ,λL) = Fˆ (λH ,λL) (2.28)
fˆH(λH ,λL) = V + LH(λH) (2.29)
Optimal ex-ante foreclosure policy
We can now solve for the ex-ante optimal foreclosure policy, given the securitisation game
at t = 1. The securitiser chooses a foreclosure policy (λˆH , λˆL) at t = 0 prior to the
realisation of her private information, to maximise her expected payoﬀ.
(λˆH , λˆL) ≡ arg max
(λH ,λL)
γUH(λH ,λL) + (1− γ)UL(λL) (2.30)
The first order conditions that characterise the solutions are
(FOCH) : γ
(
(1− δ)
∂pˆ(λˆH , λˆL)
∂λH
+ δ
[
∂ LH(λˆH)
∂λH
− θHX
])
= 0 (2.31)
(FOCL) : γ(1− δ)
∂pˆ(λˆH , λˆL)
∂λL
+ (1− γ)
[
∂ LL(λˆL)
∂λL
− θLX
]
= 0 (2.32)
(FOCH) is comprised of two components. The first part is the total impact of a
change in the foreclosure policy of the high type issuer on her proceeds from security
issuance ∂pˆ(λˆH ,λˆL)∂λH , and the second is the impact on the total value of the mortgage pool
of the high type. (FOCL) comprises of two components too. The first part is the impact
of a change in the foreclosure policy of the low type issuer on the proceeds from security
issuance by the high type, ∂pˆ(λˆH ,λˆL)∂λL , and the second is the impact on the total value of
the mortgage pool of the low type. The first component comes from the fact that, when
the foreclosure policy is chosen ex ante, the securitiser takes into account the eﬀect of the
low type’s foreclosure policy on her signalling cost if she is of the high type. The second
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component encompasses the eﬀect on the low type’s proceeds from security issuance since
the low type securitises all of her cash flow from the mortgage pool in equilibrium.
Proposition 14. The optimal foreclosure policy (λˆH , λˆL) under asymmetric information
is more countercyclical than under full information. The equilibrium property prices in
equilibrium under asymmetric information are more procyclical.
λˆH < λ
FB
H < λ
FB
L < λˆL, (2.33)
bˆ(rˆ(λˆH) > bˆ(rˆ(λ
FB
H ) > bˆ(rˆ(λˆL) > bˆ(rˆ(λ
FB
H ) (2.34)
That is, there is insuﬃcient foreclosure if the mortgage pool is of high quality, and
excessive foreclosure if the mortgage pool is of low quality.
Proof. We express the high type issuer’s proceeds and the total impacts of the foreclosure
policy on the high type issuer’s proceeds as follows.
pˆ(λH ,λL) = θH Fˆ (λH ,λL) + (1− θH) [V + L(λH)] (2.35)
= V +
θH(1− δθL)
θH − δθL
LL(λL) +
θH − δθH
θH − δθL
(1− λL)θLX
−
δθL(1− θH)
θH − δθL
LH(λH) (2.36)
∂pˆ(λˆH , λˆL)
∂λH
= −
δθL(1− θH)
θH − δθL
∂ LH(λˆH)
∂λH
(2.37)
∂pˆ(λˆH , λˆL)
∂λL
=
δθH(1− θL)
θH − δθL
∂ LL(λˆL)
∂λL
+
θH(1− δ)
θH − δθL
[
∂ LL(λˆL)
∂λL
− θLX
]
(2.38)
It is thus apparent that at the first best level of foreclosure (λFBH ,λ
FB
L ), the left hand
side of the (FOCH) (Eq. 2.31) is strictly negative and that of the (FOCL) (Eq. 2.32)
is strictly positive. Therefore the equilibrium is such that there is insuﬃcient foreclosure
in the high quality mortgage pool, i.e. the marginal value of foreclosure is greater than
the forbearance value of the mortgage θHX, and there is excessive foreclosure in the low
quality mortgage pool, i.e. the marginal value of foreclosure is lower than the forbearance
value of the mortgage θLX.
The second part of the proposition regarding property prices follows immediately from
the fact that bˆ(rˆ(λ)) = aXλ+1 in equilibrium.
The distortion in the equilibrium foreclosure policy is driven by the signalling concern
of the issuer under asymmetric information. Given the equilibrium payoﬀ to the low type
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issuer, consider the payoﬀ to her is she mimics the high type issuer and issues a debt
security. This mimicking payoﬀ is comprised of two parts – the cash proceeds she gets
from the security issuance, and the value of the retained cash flow. For a given security
issued by the high type, when the high type issuer chooses a less than first best level of
foreclosure, the payoﬀ to the debt holders is reduced and hence the value of the security,
decreasing the incentive for the low type to mimic. On the other hand, when the low type
issuer chooses a higher than first best level of foreclosure, the value of the levered equity
she retains decreases, again reducing her incentive to mimic.
The above intuition can be confirmed by the fact that Eq. 2.23 and 2.24 are implied
by Proposition 14. This is because the high type is intrinsically riskier than the low type.
The results imply that the cash flow from the mortgage pool of the low type is safer in
equilibrium than in the first best scenario, and that of the high type is riskier. Therefore
in equilibrium the two types become similar, mitigating the asymmetric information
problem.
It is also worth noting that the equilibrium foreclosure policy is not time-consistent.
Specifically, consider a high type issuer at t = 2. Having issued a debt security, the
securitiser retains a levered equity stake. This gives her an incentive to prefer the risky
cash flow, i.e. that from forbearance, to a safe cash flow, i.e. that from distressed property
sales. For a given face value F , the problem of the high type issuer at t = 2 is
max
λH
θ [V + LH(λH) + (1− λH)X − F ] (2.39)
The solution to the above problem is given by ∂ LH(λˆH )∂λH = X. Using the functional form of
Eq. 2.1, this implies zero foreclosure in the high quality mortgage pool if the foreclosure
decision was made ex post at t = 2. This is even lower that the equilibrium foreclosure
policy λˆH =
θH−θL
θH−δθL
1−θH
θH
a.
2.4 Servicer and the optimal foreclosure policy
Having established the importance of commitment power to a set of foreclosure policies ex
ante in the previous section, we now propose a mechanism that resembles the real world
and involves a mortgage servicer to implement the desired commitment power.
We now assume that at t = 0, the loan originator (“he” henceforth) has the pool
of mortgages. The loan originator is risk neutral and is subject to the same liquidity
68
constraint δ as the securitiser. Neither the originator nor the securitiser has information
about the quality of the mortgage pool until t = 1. At t = 0, the loan originator is
approached by the securitiser intending to acquire the beneficial rights to the mortgage
cash flows. After the sale, the initial originator does not retain any claim to the cash
flows, but remains the servicer of the mortgages for a fee to be paid by the securitiser.8
The servicer performs duties including collecting the payments, forwarding the interest
and principle to the lender(s), and negotiating new terms if the debt is not being paid
back, or supervising the foreclosure process.
This mechanism rests on the fact that the decision of forbearance versus foreclosure is
made by the servicer as opposed to the securitiser. Therefore the institutional distinction
between the originator and the securitiser does not play a role. In some cases mortgage
servicing is done in-house, meaning that an institution is both the lender and the
administrator of the loan. In this section we consider also this case when the originator
decides whether or not to sell the mortgage pool to the securitiser. If he does not, he is
free to securitiser the loan himself, with the servicing done in-house.
Because the incentives required to implement the optimal foreclosure policy can be
diﬀerent depending on the quality of the mortgage pool, the securitiser oﬀers a menu of
compensation contracts to the servicer. For simplicity, assume that all cash flows from
the mortgage pool are passed on to the securitiser, and that the securitiser has suﬃcient
funds to pay the fees specified by the contract.
The rest of the game is played in a similar way as before. To summarise, at t = 0, the
originator is oﬀered a menu of contracts by the securitiser to acquire the mortgage pool. If
the originator declines the oﬀer, he is free to continue securitising the mortgage pool at t =
1 and becomes an originator-securitiser with in-house servicing. If the originator accepts
the oﬀer, he remains as a third-party servicer and the menu of contracts is verifiable. At
t = 1, the securitiser with private information regarding the quality of the mortgage pool
designs a security and sells it to the investors. The originator with private information
chooses a contract from the menu and agrees to receive compensation according to the
chosen contract. At t = 2, the servicer makes the foreclosure decision given the incentives
provided by his compensation contract.
8Practically, the servicer need not be the originator but they are often the party as the skill set required
to perform both functions are similar. There is, however, a secondary market for the transfer of servicing
rights through a security called Mortgage Servicing Rights (MSR).
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In this section, we first solve for the equilibrium payoﬀ to the originator if he securitises
the mortgage pool with in-house servicing. We then solve for the incentive contracts that
induce the originator to sell the mortgage pool and implement the optimal foreclosure
policy. This finally allows us to comment on the implications of the separation of servicing
on securitisation.
2.4.1 Securitisation with in-house servicing
At t = 2, the originator-securitiser makes the foreclosure decision to maximise his retained
cash flow given his type i and the security issued (Fi, fi) at t = 1,9
λoi ≡ argmax
λi
θi [V + Li(λi) + (1− λi)X − Fi] + (1− θi) [V + Li(λi)− fi] (2.40)
The foreclosure decision therefore depends on the riskiness of the retained cash flow. If
the entire cash flow has been sold to the investors, i.e. Fi = V + Li(λi) + (1 − λi)X
and fi = V + Li(λi), assume that there is no conflict of interest and that the first best
foreclosure decision λFBi is made. For Fi < V +Li(λi)+(1−λi)X, the originator-securitiser
chooses the first best level of foreclosure λFBi if he retains some cash flow in the downside,
i.e. fi < V + Li(λFBi ). Otherwise, he chooses zero foreclosure due to the risk-shifting
incentive induced by risky retained cash flow, as shown in the last part of Section 2.3.2.
We now turn to the security design problem at t = 1, anticipating the consequential
foreclosure decisions. The following proposition characterises the optimal security and
the equilibrium foreclosure.
Proposition 15. With in-house servicing, the security issued by the originator-securitiser
in the least-cost separating equilibrium is a standard debt with face value F o ≡ Fˆ (0,λFBL )
if he is of the high type, and an equity contract if he is of the low type. The ex post chosen
foreclosure policy is (λoH ,λ
o
L) = (0,λ
FB
L ). That is, there is excessive forbearance if the
mortgage pool is of high quality.
Proof. For the low type issuer, he should optimally securitise the entire cash flow and
choose the first best foreclosure policy. This is the first best outcome. For the high type
issuer, however, he faces the problem as given by Equation 2.19–2.22.
The proof of the high type’s security consists of two parts. First we show that the
above securities are indeed the optimal security, if the securities issued are such that the
9We maintain the assumption that the security issued must satisfy the monotonicity assumption.
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equilibrium foreclosure policy is (λoH ,λ
o
L) = (0,λ
FB
L ). Given the equilibrium foreclosure
policy, the cash flows of the two types satisfy the conditions in Eq. 2.23 and 2.24. That
is,
LH(0) = 0 < LL(λ
FB
L ) = aX ln
(
1
θL
)
and (2.41)
LH(0) + (1− 0)X = X > LL(λ
FB
L ) + (1− λ
FB
L )X
= X − aX
[
1− θL
θL
− ln
(
1
θL
)]
(2.42)
Therefore Proposition 13 applies and the equilibrium security is as described above. As
the high type issues a risky debt, it indeed chooses zero foreclosure ex post. The low type
issues equity, it then chooses the first best level of foreclosure.
Secondly we show by contradiction that there does not exist an equilibrium in which
another foreclosure policy is chosen. Suppose there is an equilibrium in which the high
type originator-securitiser chooses the first best foreclosure level. The resulting cash flows
of the mortgage pool still satisfy Eq. 2.23 and 2.24 and the high type would issue a risky
debt contract. However, given an outstanding risk debt, the originator-securitiser would
not choose the first best level of foreclosure.
Therefore, if the originator does not sell the mortgage pool, his payoﬀ ω0 from the
subsequent equilibrium is given by
ωoH ≡ γUH(0,λ
FB
L ) (2.43)
ωoL ≡ (1− γ)UL(λ
FB
L ) (2.44)
The expected payoﬀ ωo ≡ γωoH + (1− γ)ω
o
L is lower than the expected payoﬀ obtained if
the securitiser can commit to the optimal foreclosure policy with commitment (λˆH , λˆL).
This therefore creates the incentive to trade between the originator and a securitiser, if
the securitiser has the commitment power.
2.4.2 Mortgage servicing contract
We now consider the securitiser’s problem at t = 0. She would like to acquire the mortgage
pool from the originator and provide the originator-servicer with incentive to implement
the optimal foreclosure policy (λˆH , λˆL) at t = 2.
Conjecture an aﬃne contract (α,β, τ) ∈ R3+ that includes a percentage α of the
forbearance cash flow to be paid at t = 3, a percentage αβ of the foreclosure cash flow to
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be paid at t = 3 and a flat transfer τ to be paid at t = 1, if the mortgage is of high quality.
Similarly for the tie break convention, assume that the originator prefers to accept an oﬀer
if he is indiﬀerent between accepting or not. Given a contract, the originator’s expected
payoﬀ ω(α,β, τ) given his private information θ is given by
ωi(α,β, τ) ≡ max
λ
τ + δα [β Li(λ) + (1− λ)θX] (2.45)
By construction, the choice of foreclosure policy only depends on β. Specifically, the
mortgage servicer chooses λ according to the following first-order condition
β
∂ Li(λ)
∂λ
− θiX = 0 (2.46)
A comparison between Eq. 2.46 and (FOCH) and (FOCL) (Eq. 2.31 and 2.32) which
characterise the optimal foreclosure policy suggests that the securitiser must oﬀer diﬀerent
contracts (βi) to the servicer depending on the type of the mortgage pool in order to
implement (λˆH , λˆL) respectively. Specifically, the contract to a servicer with type i
mortgage pool must be such
βˆH = 1− (1− δ)
θL(1− θH)
θH − δθL
(2.47)
βˆL =
γ(1− δ)θH(1− δθL) + (1− γ)(θH − δθL)
γ(1− δ)θH(1− θL) + (1− γ)(θH − δθL)
(2.48)
The required incentive contracts are such that βˆH < 1 < βˆL. This is because β = 1
should implement the first best level of foreclosure. Therefore the compensation to the
servicer must lean towards forbearance if the mortgage pool is of high quality, and towards
foreclosure if the mortgage pool is of low quality, in order to implement the optimal
foreclosure policy (λˆH , λˆL). Contracts that satisfy Eq. 2.47 and 2.48 implement the
optimal foreclosure policy regardless of the specific functional form of I(R).
Since the type of the mortgage pool is not contractible, however, the contracts cannot
be type-contingent. Instead, at t = 0 when both parties are uninformed, the securitiser
can oﬀer a menu of incentive-compatible contracts {(αi,βi, τi)}i∈{H,L} to the servicer, who
chooses a contract from the menu according to the type of his mortgage pool at t = 1.
Therefore, the securitiser’s problem is to design this menu of contracts to implement a
set of foreclosure policies that maximises her expected payoﬀ from the mortgage pool less
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the fees paid to the servicer. Formally, her maximisation problem is
max
{(αi,βi,τi)}i∈{H,L}
γ [UH(λH ,λL)− ωH(αH ,βH , τH)]
+(1− γ) [UL(λL)− ωL(αL,βL, τL)] (2.49)
s.t. (PC) : γωH(αH ,βH , τH) + (1− γ)ωL(αL,βL, τL) ≥ ω
o (2.50)
(ICH) : ωH(αH ,βH , τH) ≥ ωH(αL,βL, τL) (2.51)
(ICL) : ωL(αL,βL, τL) ≥ ωL(αH ,βH , τH) (2.52)
(ICλ) : λi(βj) ≡ argmax
λ
[βj Li(λ) + (1− λ)θiX] (2.53)
where (PC) is the participation constraint for the servicer to prefer loan sales to
securitisation with in-house servicing at t = 0, (ICi) are the incentive compatibility
constraints for a type i servicer to choose the corresponding contract at t = 1, and
(ICλ) is the ex post incentive compatibility constraint for a type i servicer to choose the
foreclosure policy at t = 2, after he has picked the contract j at t = 1. Thus his potential
deviation at t = 1 is considered and the ex post foreclosure choice λi(βj) is implicitly
embedded in ωi(αj ,βj , τj).
Proposition 16. At t = 0 the securitiser oﬀers an optimal menu of contracts
{(αˆi, βˆi, τˆi)}i∈{H,L} to the servicer who at t = 1 implements the optimal foreclosure policy
(λˆH , λˆL).
Proof. We rewrite the servicer’s payoﬀ as follows
ωi(αi,βi, τi) = τ + δαiK(θi,βi) (2.54)
where K(θi,βi) ≡ maxλ [βi Li(λ) + (1− λ)θiX] (2.55)
The suﬃcient condition for the securitiser to prefer to implement the optimal
foreclosure policy (λˆH , λˆL) in equilibrium, which oﬀers her the maximum expected value
from the mortgage pool, is for her to pay the minimum fees to the servicer. That is, (PC)
binds.
In particular, consider contracts with βˆi and τˆi such that
τˆH = ω¯ − δαHK(θH , βˆH) (2.56)
τˆL =
ωo − γω¯
1− γ
− δαLK(θL, βˆL) (2.57)
for some ω¯ > ωo. That is, the servicer receives ω¯ if the mortgage pool is of high quality
and ω
o−γω¯
1−γ < ω¯ otherwise. As shown in (2.47) and (2.48), {βˆH , βˆL} implements (λˆH , λˆL)
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while by construction {τˆH , τˆL} binds the (PC). Finally we need to choose {αH ,αL} to
ensure (ICH) and (ICL) satisfied. That is,
δαH
[
K(θH , βˆH )−K(θL, βˆH)
]
≥
ω¯ − ωo
1− γ
≥ δαL
[
K(θH , βˆL)−K(θL, βˆL)
]
≥ 0 (2.58)
By the Envelope Theorem, it is straight forward that K(θi,βi) is increasing in θi.
Therefore there exists αˆH and αˆL that satisfy the above inequalities.
2.4.3 In-house versus third-party mortgage servicing
Third-party mortgage servicers frequently come under public criticism for the foreclosure
crisis because of their apparent recklessness in foreclosing mortgages. Levitin and Twomey
(2011) asserts that the services’ compensation structures create a principal-agent conflict
and they do not make the decision whether to foreclose or modify a loan based to maximise
the net present value of the loan. Indeed, Credit Suisse reports a loss severity rate of 55%
on securitised subprime mortgages in the six months ending in May 2008.10
We would like to point out with this model that there need not be an agency conflict
in equilibrium. The separation of servicing from securitisation allows the securitiser to
commit to an ex-ante optimal foreclosure policy, resulting in higher ex ante eﬃciency in
securitisation in equilibrium than the in-house servicing case. Through the compensation
contract given to the servicer, the optimal foreclosure policy can be implemented.
Nevertheless, the optimal foreclosure policy appears ineﬃcient ex post. If the mortgage
pool is of low quality, the ex post marginal proceeds from foreclosure is lower than the
forbearance value as indicated in Proposition 14. In order to implement such foreclosure
policy, the compensation given to the servicer is such that βL > 1. That is, the servicer
receives an incentive tilted towards foreclosure. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence
such as that of Goodman (2009).
Moreover, compared to the optimal foreclosure policy with in-house servicing, the
foreclosure rate with a third-party servicer is generally higher. Specifically, λˆH > λoH = 0
and λˆL > λoL = λ
FB
L . This is an empirically testable implication of our model.
10Source: Cordell et al. (2008), page 12. Loss severity measures the total foreclosure costs borne by
investors as a proportion of the total unpaid principal on a mortgage.
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2.5 Fire-sale externality and foreclosure crisis
We have thus far established that the securitiser under asymmetric information
implements ineﬃciently procyclical foreclosure policy. In the baseline model and the
model involving a servicer, we have assumed that the securitiser operates as a monopoly
with perfect price discrimination in the distressed property market. In this case, the
distressed property market is eﬃcient. In this section, we study an extension of the
model in which fire-sale externality in the distressed property market exacerbates the
countercyclicality to generate a “foreclosure crisis” when the overall quality of the
mortgages in the economy is low.
In this extension we make two changes to the baseline model described in Section
2.2. First, we relax the assumption that the investors’ private renovation costs r are
contractible. Instead, a investor’s cost r is only privately known to the investors and is
non-verifiable. Second, we consider an economy in which there are N ≥ 1 securitisers,
each endowed with an i.i.d mortgage pool of the size 1/N .
We solve for the model assuming that all securitisers can commit to a set of
foreclosure policies at t = 0.11 We follow the backward induction process to first consider
the distressed property market under competition, then characterise the equilibrium
foreclosure policy. This finally allows us to study the welfare implications of competition
on the securitisers’ foreclosure preference.
2.5.1 Distressed property market under competition
In order to obtain closed-form results, we use the following functional form in this section,
I(R) = aX
(
1−
1
R
)
, for some a ∈ [0, a¯] (2.59)
At t = 2, the total supply of the distressed properties is given by Λs ≡
1
NΣ
N
n=1λ
n
i ,
where s ∈ S ≡ {H,L}N is the overall state of the economy given the realisation of all
securitisers’ types, λni is the fraction of delinquent mortgages foreclosed by securitiser n
given her type i. Because the investor’s renovation costs r are private, the market clears
at one price bs such that the measure of investors who are willing to enter the market at
11We have illustrated in the previous section that the exogenous assumption of commitment power is
not critical to the implementation of the equilibrium foreclosure policy.
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this price clears the market, i.e.
I(
X
bs
) = bsΛs = Ls (2.60)
Using the functional form given by Eq. 2.59, the equilibrium property price bs(Λs)
and total liquidation proceed Ls(Λs) is
bs(Λs) =
aX
Λs + a
(2.61)
Ls(Λs) = aX
Λs
Λs + 1
(2.62)
For securitiser n, her liquidation proceed is given by
Lni (λ
n
i ,Λ
−n) ≡ bs(
1
N
λni + Λ
−n)λni = aX
λni
λni +N(Λ
−n + a)
(2.63)
where Λ−n ≡ Λs −
1
N λ
n
i is the total supply of properties by all the other securitisers.
The liquidation proceeds of securitiser n are increasing and concave in her foreclosure
policy,
∂ Lni (λ
n
i ,Λ
−n)
∂λni
= aX
N(Λ−n + a)
[λni +N(Λ
−n + a)]2
(2.64)
∂2 Lni (λ
n
i ,Λ
−n)
∂λni
2 = −2aX
N(Λ−n + a)a
[λni +N(Λ
−n + a)]3
(2.65)
Moreover, there is a fire-sale externality in the equilibrium. That is, the liquidation
proceeds of securitiser n is decreasing in the foreclosure policy of her competitor m of
type j,
∂ Lni (λ
n
i ,Λ
−n)
∂λmj
= −aX
λni
[λni +N(Λ
−n + a)]2
(2.66)
This is because an increase in the foreclosure policy of other securitisers leads to a lower
market clearing price, which reduces the proceeds obtained by securitiser n for a given
foreclosure policy.
2.5.2 Symmetric equilibrium foreclosure policy
At t = 1, a securitiser of type i designs and sells an MBS to the investors. Observing
all the securities on oﬀer, the investors correctly infer the types of the securitisers in
equilibrium. In response, all securitiser are fairly priced as in Section 2.2. Because the
securitisers have mortgage pools with independent quality, we restrict our attention to
only symmetric equilibria.
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Consider for any securitiser n. By the same intuition as in Proposition 13, a low type
issuer securitises the entire cash flow from the mortgage pool. For a given set of foreclosure
policy λni ≡ {λ
n
i,s}s∈S for i ∈ {H,L} by securitiser n and a given set of foreclosure policies
Λ−n ≡ {Λ−ns }s∈S by all other securitisers, the low type securitiser obtains payoﬀ
UnL(λ
n
L;Λ
−n) = V + EL
[
LnL,s(λ
n
L,s,Λ
−n
s ) + (1− λ
n
L,s)θLX
]
(2.67)
where Ei [·] is the conditional expectation over all states s ∈ S given the securitiser’s
private information i.
On the other hand, a high type securitiser designs a monotonic security that specifies
a set of payoﬀs {(Fi,s, fi,s)}i∈{H,L},s∈S for the high and low cash flow realisation of
the mortgage pool respectively for each type of the securitiser in each state. Since
the securitiser does not know the state s, the realisation of the price of the security
varies across states. In the least-cost separating equilibrium, the optimal security for the
high type securitiser {(Fˆi,s, fˆi,s)}i∈{H,L},s∈S maximises her expected proceed from security
issuance subject to the usual limited liability constraints (LL), market clearing constraint
(MC) and the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) for the low type not to mimic.
max
{(Fi,s,fi,s)}i∈{H,L},s∈S
EH [p
n
s (FH,s, fH,s)] (2.68)
s.t. (LL) ∀ i ∈ {H,L}, s ∈ S and (2.69)
(MC) pns (FH,s, fH,s) = θHFH,s + (1− θH)fH,s (2.70)
(IC) UnL(λ
n
L) ≤ EH [p
n
s (FH,s, fH,s))] +
δ
(
θL EL
[
V + LnL,s(λ
n
L,s,Λ
−n
s ) + (1− λ
n
L,s)X − FL,s
]
+(1− θL)EL
[
V + LnL,s(λ
n
L,s,Λ
−n
s )− fL,s
])
(2.71)
We consider foreclosure policy (λnH ,λ
n
L) such that the resulting cash flows satisfy the
following conditions in any pair of states s and s′ in which all other securitisers are of the
same type, except for securitiser n who is of the high type in state s and the low type in
state s′. It will become clear that this is indeed the case in equilibrium.
LnH,s(λH) ≤ L
n
L,s′(λ
n
L,s′) and (2.72)
LnH,s(λ
n
H,s) + (1− λ
n
H,s)X ≥ L
n
L,s′(λ
n
L,s′) + (1− λ
n
L,s′)X (2.73)
Denote the equilibrium face value of the debt Fˆ (λnH ,λ
n
L). Suppose the face value
is such that in all states, a securitiser who issues this security defaults if her cash flow
77
does not recover in case of forbearance of the delinquent mortgages, and never defaults if
the cash flow recovers. The conditions for this to be the optimal security is provided in
Appendix B.1.2. This simplifies the analysis and allows direct comparison to the baseline
case.
Given the optimal security, the high type securitiser enjoys an expected payoﬀ of UnH(·)
given by
UnH(λ
n
H ,λ
n
L;Λ
−n) = (1− δ)EH
[
pˆns (Fˆ (·);λ
n
H,s,λ
n
L,s)
]
+δ
(
V + EH
[
LnH,s(λ
n
H,s,Λ
−n
s ) + (1− λ
n
H,s)θHX
])
(2.74)
where pˆns (Fˆ (·); ·) ≡ θFˆ (·) + (1− θ)
[
V + LnH,s(λ
n
H,s,Λ
−n
s )
]
(2.75)
The equilibrium foreclosure policy in a symmetric equilibrium is therefore chosen by each
securitiser to maximise her expected payoﬀ,
(λˆ
n
H , λˆ
n
L) ≡ arg max
(λnH ,λ
n
L)
γUnH(λ
n
H ,λ
n
L;Λ
−n) + (1− γ)UnL(λ
n
L;Λ
−n) (2.76)
where Λ−n is given by all other securitisers choosing the same foreclosure policy. Denote
N sL the number of securitisers that are of the low type in state s. Therefore the total
amount of foreclosure in equilibrium in state s is given by Λˆs(λˆnH,s, λˆ
n
L,s) ≡
N−NsL
N λˆ
n
H,s +
NsL
N λˆ
n
L,s.
Proposition 17. (i) The equilibrium foreclosure policy is higher for a low type issuer
and lower for a high type issuer. That is, for any pair of states s and s′ in which
all other securitisers are of the same type, except for securitiser n who is of the high
type in state s and the low type in state s′,
λˆnH,s < λˆ
n
L,s′ (2.77)
(ii) For N ≥ 2, the equilibrium foreclosure policy of each securitiser is procyclical. That
is, for all states z, z′ in which N zL < N
z′
L ,
λˆni,z > λˆ
n
i,z′ ∀ i ∈ {H,L} (2.78)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 17 highlights the countercyclicality of the equilibrium under fire-sale
externality. This result follows similar intuition to those for the baseline model
(Proposition 14). This is because there are more securitisers of low quality in a worse state,
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which are following a high foreclosure policy than the high quality securitisers. This leads
to procyclical distressed property prices. In turn, depressed property prices in a worse
state discourages the securitisers from foreclosure, leading to procyclical foreclosure policy
individually.
Proposition 18. There exists a menu of aﬃne contracts {(αi,βi, τi)}i∈{H,L} such that
a securitiser can implement the optimal foreclosure policy in equilibrium through a
third-party servicer, where βi = βˆi.
Proof. See Appendix.
Similarly, this equilibrium foreclosure policy can be implemented through a third-party
servicer. Because of the independence assumption, there only needs to be two contracts
in the menu, one for each type of the mortgage pool. Moreover, the contracts specify
the same relative sensitivity towards foreclosure relative to forbearance, βi = βˆi, as in
the monopoly case, despite a much more complex equilibrium that is being considered in
this section. This suggests that it is relatively easy for the securitisers to implement their
desired foreclosure policy in practice.
2.5.3 Foreclosure crisis
In this section, we present two benchmarks for comparison in order to understand the
equilibrium foreclosure policy characterised above. The equilibrium is aﬀected by three
frictions. The first is the fire-sale externality in the distressed property market at t = 2,
the second is the information asymmetry at t = 1, and the last is the market power
enjoyed by each securitiser when making the foreclosure policy at t = 0.
The first benchmark considered is the full information benchmark (FI) which is absent
of the first friction only. Under full information, all securitisers sell their entire cash flows
from the mortgage pools to outside investors. The foreclosure policy is thus chosen to
maximise the ex ante value of each mortgage pool.
(λFIH ,λ
FI
L ) ≡ arg max
(λnH ,λ
n
L)
γ EH
[
LnH,s(λ
n
H,s,Λ
−n
s ) + (1− λ
n
H,s)θHX
]
+(1− γ)EL
[
LnL,s(λ
n
L,s,Λ
−n
s ) + (1− λ
n
L,s)θLX
]
(2.79)
We also present the full information central planner solution – the first best solution
(FB). Notice that in the full information benchmark, there are two types of externality
ignored by a securitiser. One is the fire-sale externality a securitiser has on other
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securitisers, and the other is the investor surplus Xb − (1 + r) when an investor with
private cost r purchases the distressed properties at price b. Therefore in the first best
case, a central planner maximises the total surplus in the economy,
(λFBH ,λ
FB
L ) ≡ arg max
(λnH ,λ
n
L)
N∑
n=1
(
γ EH
[
LnH,s(λ
n
H,s,Λ
−n
s ) + (1− λ
n
H,s)θHX
]
+(1− γ)EL
[
LnL,s(λ
n
L,s,Λ
−n
s ) + (1− λ
n
L,s)θLX
])
+E
[∫ X
bs(Λs)
1
(
X
bs(Λs)
−R
)
dI(R)
]
(2.80)
where Λ−n is given by all other securitisers choosing the same foreclosure policy.
First of all, we highlight the eﬀect of the market power enjoyed by the securitisers, by
comparing the two benchmarks. Consider a state s, in which securitiser n is of type i,
and in which the number of low type securitisers among the remaining N − 1 securitisers
is N sL. The first order conditions that determine a securitiser’s foreclosure policy λ
n
i,s in
the full information case and the first best case respectively are given by
(FOCFI) :
Lni,s(λ
n
i,s,Λ
−n
s )
λni,s
− θiX = 0 (2.81)
(FOCFB) :
(
Lni,s(λ
n
i,s,Λ
−n
s )
λni,s
− θiX
)
+
(
N − 1−N sL
N
LmH,s(λ
m
i,s,Λ
−m
s )
λni,s
+
N sL
N
LmL,s(λ
m
i,s,Λ
−m
s )
λni,s
)
+aX
[
I
(
X
bs(Λs)
)
∂
∂bs
(
X
bs(Λs)
)
∂bs(Λs)
∂Λs
1
N
]
= 0 (2.82)
It is immediate that the diﬀerence between the two first order conditions is in Line 2
and 3 of Eq. 2.82. Specifically, Line 2 of Eq. 2.82 represents the fire-sale externality of
securitiser n’s foreclosure policy on all other securitisers in a symmetric equilibrium. This
eﬀect is negative, suggesting the a securitiser under full information tends to foreclosure
excessively relative to the first best case. Line 3 of Eq. 2.82 captures the eﬀect of
securitiser n’s foreclosure policy on the total investor surplus. This eﬀect is positive, since
a higher foreclosure policy tends to lower the market price of the distressed property,
benefiting the investors. Failing to account for the investor surplus, a securitiser under
full information tends to foreclose insuﬃciently. The following lemma summarises the
important trade-oﬀ eﬀects of competition. Two extreme states are of particular interest.
Denote s the state in which all securitisers have low quality mortgage pools, and s¯ the
state in which all securitisers have high quality mortgage pools. I will later refer to the
former state the “boom” and the latter state the “bust”.
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Lemma 1. There exists N¯ ,N such that,
For N > N¯, ΛFIs¯ > Λ
FB
s¯ and Λ
FI
s > Λ
FB
s (2.83)
For N < N, ΛFIs¯ < Λ
FB
s¯ and Λ
FI
s < Λ
FB
s (2.84)
That is, relative to the first best solution, the full information solution entails excessive
foreclosure if the securitisation industry is competitive, but entails insuﬃcient foreclosure
if the securitisers enjoy large market power in the extreme states.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result can be understood by examining the extreme cases. For N = 1
when there is only one monopolistic securitiser, there is no fire-sale externality. The
market power of the monopoly securitiser therefore leads to insuﬃcient foreclosure in an
attempt to maximise her monopoly profit. For N → ∞, the eﬀect of each securitiser’s
foreclosure policy on the investor surplus diminishes because each securitiser’s price
impact diminishes. The competitive equilibrium under full information thus lead to
excessive foreclosure due to the eﬀect of fire-sale externality.
The following proposition highlights the properties of the equilibrium foreclosure
policy, which is aﬀected by asymmetric information as well as the above mentioned
trade-oﬀ eﬀect of market power.
Proposition 19. (i) Asymmetric information exacerbates the countercyclicality of the
equilibrium foreclosure policy. That is, for any pair of states s, s′ in which all other
securitisers are of the same type in both states except for securitiser n who is of the
high type in state s and of the low type in state s′,
ˆλnH,s < λ
FI
H,s < λ
FI
L,s′ < λˆ
n
L,s′ (2.85)
In particular,
Λˆs¯ < Λ
FI
s¯ < Λ
FI
s < Λˆs (2.86)
(ii) When competition is strong, the equilibrium entails excessive foreclosure during the
bust. That is, for N > N¯ ,
Λˆs > Λ
FI
s > Λ
FB
s (2.87)
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(iii) When competition is weak, the equilibrium entails insuﬃcient foreclosure during the
boom. That is, for N < N ,
Λˆs¯ < Λ
FI
s¯ < Λ
FB
s¯ (2.88)
Proof. See Appendix.
Part (i) of Proposition 19 follows the same intuitive as the baseline case illustrated in
Proposition 14.
Part (ii) can be understood as the “foreclosure crisis” scenario. When competition
is strong, fire-sale externality is prominent, leading to excessive foreclosure among
low quality mortgage pools. Therefore during the bust, the equilibrium foreclosure is
significantly higher than in the first best case. This also leads to depressed property
prices. This is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Piskorski et al. (2010)
that the foreclosure rate of delinquent bank-held loans is 3% (13%) to 7% (32%) lower
in absolute (relative) terms. The authors also recognise that the primary reason for such
findings is whether or not the servicer internalises the costs and benefits from the decision
to foreclose a delinquent loan.
Part (iii) is the opposite scenario. If the securitisers have strong market power, they
reduce foreclosure to maximise their profits from property sales. During the boom,
the securitisers with high quality mortgage pools have the further incentive to avoid
foreclosure in order to facilitate their securitisation process under asymmetric information.
This results in ineﬃciently high property prices.
2.6 Empirical implications
This section summarises the empirical implications of our model related to foreclosure
policy and characteristics of mortgage servicers’ compensation contracts.
1. In a bad state, securitised mortgages on average have a higher foreclosure rate
than comparable bank-held loans. The main result of our model shows that the
asymmetric information friction in the process of mortgage securitisation will
exacerbate the countercyclicalilty of foreclosure of delinquent mortgage. In a bad
state where most mortgage pools are of low quality, securitised loans on average have
a higher foreclosure probability than comparable bank-held loans (no information
problem), which is consistent with the empirical finding of Piskorski et al. (2010)
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2. In a bad state, the foreclosure rate of delinquent mortgages in a securitised pool is
higher than the ex post eﬃcient level on average. Specifically we show that when
the mortgage pool is of low quality, the proceeds from foreclosing the marginal
mortgages are lower than their expected recovery value, i.e. its foreclosure will be
negative NPV or value-destroying decision from the ex post perspective. This is in
line with the finding of Levitin (2009).
3. In a bad state, the third-party servicer’s contract on average is biased towards
foreclosure. We show that a securitiser oﬀers an optimal incentive contract to a
third-party servicer to implement the optimal foreclosure policy. In a bad state, the
incentives for the servicer on average are biased towards foreclosure. This is in line
with the anecdotal evidence of Goodman (2009).
4. Securitised mortgages serviced by third-party servicers are foreclosed more on
average than comparable mortgages with in-house servicers. Our model shows that
in-house servicers face a time-inconsistency problem and cannot commit to the
ex-ante optimal foreclosure policy. An in-house servicer chooses little foreclosure
when he is of the high type because he holds a levered equity claim, but chooses
the ex post eﬃcient level of foreclosure when he is of the low type. A third-party
servicer, on the other hand, implements the optimal foreclosure policy which is
insuﬃcient when he is of the high type and excessive when he is of the low type. In
either case, the third-party servicer forecloses more than an in-house servicer of the
same type. Therefore we expect to observe higher foreclosure rates by third-party
servicers on average.
2.7 Conclusion
The recent subprime mortgage crisis has raised concerns regarding the economic and
social consequences of mortgage backed securitisation. In particular, the United States
experienced a “foreclosure crisis” subsequent to the crisis in 2008 that received much
public attention. Recent studies and reports have suggested that securitisation and the
biased incentives of mortgage services could have contributed to the foreclosure wave.
This paper formally studies the relationship between the foreclosure decision of delinquent
loans and the securitisation of mortgages, and examines the role of mortgage servicers in
this process.
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We investigate the optimal foreclosure decision in a model of mortgage-backed
securitisation under asymmetric information. A securitiser with a pool of mortgages
has private information regarding the recovery rate of the mortgages that ex post become
delinquent. The securitiser initially designs and sells a mortgage-backed security, and
makes the decision whether to foreclose or modify a mortgage when it becomes delinquent
ex post.
Relative to the case with full information, we show that the optimal foreclosure policy
under asymmetric information involves excessive foreclosure if the mortgage pool is of
low quality, and insuﬃcient foreclosure if the mortgage pool is of high quality. This is
because the signalling concern at the securitisation stage prompts the securitiser to take
procedures at the foreclosure stage to reduce the information sensitivity of the mortgage
pool cash flows.
Moreover, we propose a mechanism that involves mortgage servicers that resembles
the industry practice, to implement the optimal foreclosure policy. We notice that the
optimal foreclosure policy is not time-inconsistent. A securitiser with in-house servicing
therefore cannot credibly commit to the ex ante optimal policy. In our mechanism, the
securitiser designs a contract ex ante with a third-party servicer. This rids the securitiser
of the commitment problem, and the securitiser can design an incentive contract for the
third-party servicer to implement the ex ante optimal foreclosure policy.
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CHAPTER 3
BANKRUPTCY-REMOTE
SECURITISATION WITH IMPLICIT
GUARANTEE
3.1 Introduction
Securitisation has become a pervasive means of funding for banks over the last decade.1
Gorton and Souleles (2007) relate the prevalent use of “special purpose vehicles” (SPVs)
in securitisation to two important features of SPVs. The first is bankruptcy-remoteness.
An SPV operates as a distinct legal entity so that its bankruptcy has little or no impact on
the sponsoring bank. The second is the existence of implicit guarantees on the liabilities
of the SPV by the sponsoring bank. During the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007, banks
such as Citibank stepped in to rescue its special investment vehicles, or SIVs.2 This paper
show that these two features are important for the implementation of the optimal funding
arrangement for banks faced with repeated funding needs under asymmetric information
to finance portfolios with a risk-shifting potential.
1Calomiris and Mason (2004) state that in the credit card securitisation industry, banks that only
around 40% of total outstanding receivables in 2000 were retained on banks’ balance sheet.
2Higgins and Mason (2004) have also documented 17 discrete recourse events between 1987 and 2001.
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This paper seeks to provide a rationale for these two features of securitisation in
relation to two specific aspects that have not been studied in the literature. Firstly, the
fundamental concept of bankruptcy-remoteness is to allow the sponsoring bank to shield
the rest of its assets due to limited liability, even when the SPV defaults.For example,
PWC (2011) states that “SPVs can be used ... in particular to isolate the financial risk
in the event of bankruptcy or default”.3 Secondly, not only does the provision of implicit
guarantee reduce the funding cost of the SPV, an ex post realised recourse event also
conveys favourable information to investors that helps to reduce the sponsoring bank’s
future funding costs. The market reaction to a “failure to support the securitisation may
impair future access to the capital markets” (FitchIBCA, 1999).
To understand the roles played by these features of securitisation, this paper develops
a model of a bank with repeat investment opportunities that needs outside financing,
and show that the optimal funding arrangement of the bank can be implemented with
bankruptcy-remote securitisation with implicit recourse. In this model, the bank has an
opportunity to form a risky portfolio, whose risk increases with portfolio size, eventually
decreasing the value of the portfolio. Although not modelled explicitly, this can be
interpreted as a portfolio of mortgage, business or personal loans, and the bank has
to lower its credit standard in order to extend more loans.
The bank in this model is subject to two financial frictions. On one hand, in each
period the bank has an investment opportunity of either good or bad quality, which is
private information to the bank. On the other hand, the bank has a moral hazard problem
since it cannot commit to a given size of investment. At the beginning of each period,
the bank decides how much to raise in the capital market and to invest after acquiring
information regarding the quality of its investment portfolio. It may wish to choose a
suboptimal portfolio size given its private information. Since these are prevalent frictions
in the financial market, the theory may apply to other institutions with repeated funding
needs. This model focuses, for concreteness, on the SPVs of banks.
The interaction between these two frictions tends to result in over-investment in
equilibrium. This is because a bank with a good portfolio would choose an excessively
large and risky portfolio which has a value lower than the first best, as a means to signal
3This diﬀers from the view of Gorton and Souleles (2007), who argue that a key source of value to using
SPVs is that they help reduce bankruptcy costs, by subjecting less of the banks’ assets to bankruptcy
costs.
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its private information to the capital market. Therefore, there could be deadweight loss
in equilibrium in the form of over-investment, as a result of a bank trying to reduce its
private funding costs under asymmetric information.
This social cost of over-investment can be avoided in the second period, however, if
a good bank is able to signal its private information regarding the quality of its second
period investment opportunity by honouring its implicit guarantee. Specifically, suppose
the bank finances its first period investment opportunity by structuring a fraction of the
portfolio into an SPV and raises financing backed by a senior tranche issued by the SPV.
In case the SPV produces insuﬃcient cash flow to repay the debt holders, a bank can
allow recourse of the SPV debt onto the remaining fraction of the portfolio on its balance
sheet. Given the bankruptcy-remoteness of the SPV, a recourse is a wealth transfer from
the bank to its debt holders, and the bank is not willing to do so in the absence of
other incentives. In equilibrium, a bank with a good second period portfolio is willing to
provide recourse to its first period portfolio to signal its second period portfolio quality,
if the cost of providing recourse that deters a bank with a bad second period portfolio
from mimicking is lower than the cost of over-investment as a means of signalling. This
allows first best level of investment to be achieved in the second period.
The actions by the bank in this equilibrium highlights the two feature of securitisation
discussed in this paper. A bank with a bad second period portfolio takes advantage of
the bankruptcy-remoteness of the SPV structure, defaults on its first period debt, but
retains the cash flows from its on-balance-sheet portfolio. A bank with a good second
period portfolio, on the other hand, honours its implicit guarantee and provides recourse,
to signal the quality of its second period portfolio and reduce the funding cost in the
second period.
While implicit guarantee provided in the first period helps to restore the eﬃcient
investment level in the second period, it exacerbates the problem in the first period.
Due to the asymmetric information problem between the bank and the outside investors,
a debt like security is preferred as it is less information sensitive. In order to provide
implicit guarantee, however, the bank must retain a fraction of the portfolio on its balance
sheet. This increases the information sensitivity of the security issued to outside investors
in exchange for financing. Due to the interaction between the asymmetric information
problem and the moral hazard problem, I show that the bank over-invests more in the
first period than in an equilibrium without implicit guarantee.
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The model yields two empirical implications. Firstly, the extent of securitisation
is positively correlated with unobservable asset quality. This is because a bank’s
on-balance-sheet portfolio provides implicit guarantee for its SPV. Since the assets of
a bank with bad portfolio is less valuable, a larger fraction of the portfolio must be
retained to provide suﬃcient guarantee. This is supported by evidence presented by Casu
et al. (2011), Vermilyea et al. (2008) and Mandel et al. (2012). Secondly, conditional on
recourse becoming necessary, honouring implicit guarantee is positively correlated with
future loan performance, due to the signalling eﬀect. Amiram et al. (2011) provides
empirical evidence consistent with this prediction.
Related literature
This paper relates to the theoretical literature on securitisation via SPVs. Gorton and
Souleles (2007) view a key value brought by SPVs being reducing bankruptcy costs,
since transferring assets into an SPV subjects less assets, which remain on a bank’s
balance sheet, to bankruptcy costs. The authors further argue that commitment to rescue
the SPVs in certain states of the world, enforced in an infinite game, helps to mitigate
the strategic moral hazard problem that the bank transfers only bad assets into the
SPV. Kuncl (2014) shows that creditors signal its quality by reputation-based implicit
recourse, and conclude that the information tends to remain private in a boom, further
exacerbating a subsequent downturn. This paper emphasises a diﬀerent role for implicit
guarantee to signal quality regarding a sponsoring bank’s future investment opportunity,
and the bankruptcy-remoteness of securitisation to implement the desired level of implicit
guarantee.
Since the recent financial crisis, scholars have empirically investigated the relation
between bank performance and securitisation with implicit guarantee. Calomiris and
Mason (2004) considers the potential hypothesis that banks use securitisation to engage
in regulatory capital arbitrage, but concluded that securitisation is more consistent with
optimal contacting view. This paper supports that bankruptcy-remote securitisation
with implicit guarantee implements the optimal financing arrangement for a bank under
the asymmetric information with repeated funding needs. Gorton and Souleles (2007),
using credit card securitisation data, find that riskier firms are more likely to engage
in oﬀ-balance sheet financing, and that investors in the debt of the SPV incorporate
expectations about the risk of the sponsor, who provides implicit guarantee to the SPV
88
debt. Higgins and Mason (2004) study 17 discrete recourse events, and find that recourse
events are met with positive stock market reactions and improved long-run operating
performance. Using reported fraud losses as opposed to credit losses as a proxy for
implicit recourse, Vermilyea et al. (2008) find that the performance of the credit card
securitisation portfolio is negatively related to implicit guarantee provision. Casu et al.
(2011, 2013) investigate the eﬀect of securitisation on banks’ performance in general.
Some empirical evidence is discussed further in relation to the model predictions in
Section 3.4.2.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the structure of
the model in which the bank chooses its investment and oﬀers a general security to outside
investors in exchange for financing. Section 3.3 characterises and analyses the equilibrium
in the cases with and without recourses. Section 3.4 discusses the implementation of
the equilibrium optimal security through bankruptcy-remote securitisation with implicit
guarantee, and provides two empirical implications of the model in relation to existing
evidence. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model setup
There are three dates, 0, 1 and 2 and two periods. The model’s participants consist of a
long-lived bank (two-period) and a set of short-term outside investors (one-period). All
agents are risk neutral and there is no discounting. The bank is endowed with w0 unit of
capital. The outside investors are competitive and deep-pocketed.
At the beginning of each period, i.e. at t = 0 and t = 1, the bank has an opportunity
to form a risky portfolio of size Xt that pays oﬀ at the end of the period, i.e. at t = 1
and t = 2 respectively. A portfolio of size Xt requires an investment of kXt, and pays oﬀ
either Xt or (1− δ)Xt, where 1 > k > 1− δ. The cash flows are verifiable.
At the beginning of each period, the bank receives private information regarding the
quality of the portfolio in that period. The quality i, j of the portfolios in the two periods
respective can be either good or bad, i, j ∈ {G,B}. The quality of the portfolio determines
the probability θi(X0), θj(X1) ∈ [0, 1] that a high cash flow is realised at the end of the
period, where θG(Xt) > θB(Xt).
At the beginning of each period, the bank chooses the size of its portfolio Xt, t = 0, 1.
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In order to finance the portfolio, the bank contributes some or all of its own capital wt,
and raises the remaining fund needed through securitisation.
3.2.1 Assumptions and discussion
This section presents the assumptions on the distribution of the bank’s portfolio cash
flows and discusses how the bank can structure itself in order to finance its portfolio.
Distribution of portfolio cash flows
While the bank can increase the size of its portfolio, I assume that this decreases the
probability of the portfolio realising a high cash flow, i.e. θi
′
(X0), θj
′
(X1) < 0. This
captures the intuition that excessive lending by banks can be associated with relaxed
credit standard and excessive risk taking, as documented by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012). As
a result, there exists a first best level of investment XiFB = X
j
FB that maximises the NPV
of a portfolio of type i, j respectively.4 Denote the NPV of a portfolio of size X and type
i with V i(X) ≡ (1− δ)X + θi(X)δX − kX, and the first best NPV of the portfolio with
V iFB ≡ V
i(XiFB), where X
i
FB ≡ arg maxX V
i(X). I denote V j(X) and V jFB similarly for
the second period portfolio.
I further assume that an increase in the portfolio size is less detrimental to a good
portfolio than a bad one, i.e. ∂∂X
(
θG(X)
θB(X)
)
> 0. That is, when a bank has access to a pool
of high quality loans, the marginal decrease in the credit quality is smaller.
The probability of the first period portfolio being good is γ0. If the first period
portfolio realises a high cash flow, the second period portfolio is good with probability 1.
Otherwise, the second period portfolio is good with probability γ1. The assumption that
there is only asymmetric information in the second period following a bad realisation of
the cash flow is made to simply the analysis. It can be interpreted as the bad realisation
being a possibly transient or permanent shock to the quality of the portfolio. It is also
consistent with the case that a high cash flow realisation provided the bank with suﬃcient
retained cash flow to render the asymmetric information problem in the second period
immaterial.
4Further technical assumptions required to guarantee an interior solution are given in the Appendix
C.1.
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Financing through securitisation
In this section I take a security design approach to characterise the security to be sold
to the outside investors in exchange for financing. I restrict attentions to consider only
monotonic securities under limited liability. After describing a general security, I argue
that bankruptcy-remote securitisation with implicit guarantee implements the security.
I follow a backward induction process to describe the financing decisions of the bank.
At t = 1, the bank has w1 unit of capital from the first period cash flows after paying oﬀ
the outside investors. The bank also has an investment portfolio of type j. If the bank
chooses a portfolio size of X1, it must design a security to sell to the outside investors in
order to raise at least kX1 − w1. Denote the chosen security (wH2 , w
L
2 ), where specifies
the amount of cash flows retained by the bank when a high or low cash flow is realised at
t = 2. Correspondingly, the cash flows promised to the investors are given by X1 − wH2
and (1− δ)X1 −wL2 . The competitive investors observes the banks choice of X1, w
H
2 and
wL2 , as well as the history of the actions taken by the bank in the first period, and form a
belief regarding the type of the portfolio in the second period. Competitive pressure then
determines the price of the security in equilibrium.
The security described above can be implemented with the following financial structure
of the bank commonly seen in practice. The bank invests in a portfolio of size X1, retains a
fraction α1 =
wL2
(1−δ)X1
of the portfolio on its balance sheet, while structuring the remaining
(1 − α1) fraction of the portfolio in an SPV for securitisation. The bank sells a senior
tranche backed by the SPV with promised cash flow F1 = X − wH2 to the investors.
Therefore, a bank retains part of its portfolio on balance sheet at t = 1 if it wishes to
retain a positive cash flow at t = 2 in case a low cash is realised. If the cash flows promised
to the outside investors are risky, the bankruptcy-remoteness of the securitisation allows
the bank to retain the cash flows from the part of the portfolio it keeps on balance while
defaulting on the SPV.
At t = 0, the bank similarly chooses to invest in a portfolio of size X0 and designs a
security to raise at least kX0 −w0 from the outside investors. However, at t = 1, given a
high or low realisation of the first period portfolio cash flow, the bank may wish to specify
a diﬀerent payoﬀ to the investors depending on its private information regarding the type
of its second period portfolio j, if it is incentive compatible to do so at t = 1. Denote the
chosen security (wH1 , w
L
1,j)j∈{G,B}. I will henceforth refer to an equilibrium in which this
is the case an equilibrium with recourse.
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This first period security can be implemented in a similar manner as the second period
security if it does not depend on the type of the second period portfolio j. Denote the
chosen security in this case (wH1 , w
L
1 ). I will henceforth refer to an equilibrium in which
this is the case an equilibrium without recourse.
The interesting case is when the first period security does depend on the type of the
second period portfolio j. In this case, the bank invests in a portfolio of size X0, retains
a fraction α0 =
maxj{wL1,j}
(1−δ)X0
of the portfolio on its balance sheet, while structuring the
remaining (1−α0) fraction of the portfolio in an SPV for securitisation. The bank sells a
senior tranche backed by the SPV with promised cash flow F0 = X−wH1 to the investors.
Consider for example the case where wL2,B > w
L
2,G, which will be the case in equilibrium.
Following a realisation of a low cash low, a bank with a good second period portfolio
provides recourse to a fraction
wL2,B−w
L
2,G
(1−δ)X0
of its on balance sheet. An implicit guarantee
of the securitisation vehicle by the bank therefore allows the bank to provide recourse
strategically in some of the states of the world but not others. In the following analysis
it will become clear that this adds value by allowing the bank to signal its type through
a recourse.
3.2.2 Definition of equilibrium
The equilibrium concept I use is subgame-perfect Bayesian equilibrium that satisfies the
Intuitive Criterion. An equilibrium consists of choices by the bank of the size of the
portfolio and of the security to issue at t = 0, 1, and a system of beliefs formed by outside
investors that satisfy the following conditions: (i) Choices made by the bank maximises its
expected value of retained payoﬀ at each date, given the set of equilibrium beliefs formed
by the investors in response to these choices; (ii) Beliefs of the investors are rational, given
the equilibrium choices made by the bank, and are formed using Bayes’ rule along the
equilibrium path while satisfying the Intuitive Criterion oﬀ the equilibrium path.
In a separating equilibrium, a bank with a bad portfolio receives the fair price for any
security it issues. It therefore always chooses the first best size of the portfolio XBFB. A
bank with a good portfolio behaves diﬀerently, since it has to choose a security and a
size of portfolio that deters mimicking by a bank with a bad portfolio. I analyse in the
following chapter the equilibrium choices of a bank with a good portfolio.
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3.3 Equilibrium
This section follows a backward induction process to consider first the second period
investment and funding problem, and then the first period problem. In particular,
attentions are paid to two types of possible equilibrium, an equilibrium with recourse
and one without. After characterising both types of equilibrium, I discuss and compare
their properties.
3.3.1 Second period problem
In this section I consider an equilibrium with recourse at the end of the first period and an
equilibrium without recourse. This illustrates the signalling value of providing recourse
in a model of asymmetric information.
Consider firstly that, following a high realisation of cash flow, it is common knowledge
that the second period is good. A bank with a retained cash flow wH1 after paying
oﬀ the investors chooses the first best size for the second period portfolio in equilibrium.
Because the investors always pay the fair price for any security issued, the bank’s objective
is equivalent to maximising the NPV of the portfolio. The security choice is irrelevant.
That is,
max
X1,wH2 ,w
L
2
θG(X1)w
H
2 + [1− θ
G(X1)]w
L
2 (3.1)
s.t. θG(X1)[X1 −w
H
2 ] + [1− θ
G(X1)][(1 − δ)X1 − w
L
2 ] + w
H
1 ≥ kX1 (3.2)
⇐⇒ max
X1
V G(X1) + w
H
1 (3.3)
where the constraint specifies that the sum of the the capital raised from outside investors
(the sum of the first two terms) and the bank’s own capital (wH1 ) is suﬃcient to finance
the portfolio.
I now turn to analyse the second period problem following a low realisation of cash
flow of the first period problem. In this case the bank has private information regarding
the type j of the second period portfolio. I consider the diﬀerent equilibria with and
without a recourse for for the bank’s first period portfolio separately.
In an equilibrium with recourse
In an equilibrium with recourse, the decision to provide recourse at the end of the first
period sends a credible signal regarding the type of the portfolio in the second period.
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The second period investment and financing decisions are thus made under complete
information.That is, the security design problem is irrelevant, and the portfolio size is at
the first best level XjFB . The value of the bank, with a type j portfolio and w
j
1 capital
after providing recourse for its first period portfolio, is given by V jFB + w
L
1,j.
In an equilibrium without recourse
In an equilibrium without recourse, the bank makes the financing and investment decisions
under asymmetric information. Given a retained capital level wL1 , a bank with a bad
portfolio makes, in a separating equilibrium, chooses the first best portfolio size and
realises a value of V BFB + w
L
1 . A bank with a good portfolio, on the other hand, chooses
its portfolio size and a security (wH2 , w
L
2 ) to sell to the outside investors in exchange for
financing according to the following optimisation programme
max
XG1 ,w
H
2 ,w
L
2
θG(XG1 )w
H
2 + [1− θ
G(XG1 )]w
L
2 (3.4)
s.t. θG(XG1 )[X
G
1 − w
H
2 ] + [1− θ
G(XG1 )][(1 − δ)X
G
1 − w
L
2 ] + w
L
1 = kX1 (3.5)
θB(XG1 )w
H
2 + [1− θ
B(XG1 )]w
L
2 ≤ V
B
FB + w
L
1 (IC2) (3.6)
where, in addition to the financing constraint, the incentive compatibility constraint (IC2)
specifies that a bank with a bad portfolio would prefer not to mimic a bank with a good
portfolio by choosing a portfolio size XG1 and issuing a security (w
H
2 , w
L
2 ).
The following proposition characterises the equilibrium in the second period following
no recourse at the end of the first period.
Proposition 20. In an equilibrium with no recourse, for given capital wL1 , a bank with
a bad portfolio chooses at t = 1 the first best portfolio size XBFB, and a bank with a good
portfolio chooses XG∗1 (w
L
1 ) ≥ X
G
FB, where
XG∗1 (w
L
1 ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
XGFB, if w
L
1 ≥ w1,FB
Xˆ1(wL1 ), otherwise
(3.7)
where Xˆ1(wL1 ) is such that
θB(Xˆ1(·))
θG(Xˆ1(·))
V G(Xˆ1(·))− V
B
FB =
[
1−
θB(Xˆ1(·))
θB(Xˆ1(·))
]
wL1 (3.8)
and w1,FB such that Xˆ1(w1,FB) = XGFB.
The equilibrium security issued by a bank with a bad portfolio is arbitrary, whereas
that issued by a bank with a good portfolio is
(
wH∗2 (w
L
1 ), w
L∗
2 (w
L
1 )
)
= (
V G(XG∗1 (·))+w
L
1
θG(XG∗1 (·))
, 0).
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Proof. This and all other proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Condition 3.8 is given by binding the two constraints Eq. 3.5–3.6 in the maximisation
programme, while setting wL2 = 0. The security issued in equilibrium indeed leaves
the bank a higher powered stake with wL∗2 = 0. This confirms the intuition of Myers
and Majluf (1984) that issuing a debt-like security to the outside investors mitigates the
asymmetric information problem.
The equilibrium portfolio size is equal to the first best level for a bank with a good
portfolio if it has suﬃcient capital wL1 ≥ wFB. This is consistent with the literature
on asymmetric information that suﬃcient internal financing eliminates the information
problem.
The interesting case is when the bank has insuﬃcient capital enter into the second
period wL1 ≥ wFB. In this case, a bank with a good portfolio over-invests at Xˆ(w
L
1 ) >
XGFB. This result is due to two eﬀects that mitigates the asymmetric information problem.
Firstly, recall the assumption that the diﬀerence between a good and a bad portfolio
becomes more significant as the bank increases its portfolio size and lows the credit
standard, i.e. ∂∂X
(
θG(X)
θB(X)
)
> 0. Therefore the retained equity stake in equilibrium
becomes more information sensitive, making it less profitable for a bank with a bad
portfolio to mimic. Secondly, as a bank over-invests in a good portfolio, the NPV of the
portfolio decreases, further reducing the mimicking incentives.
For reasons mentioned above, a bank with a good portfolio in this model essentially
signals its private information through over-investment in the presence of the asymmetric
information. Since internal financing mitigates the asymmetric information problem, I
derive the following corollary.
Corollary 2 (to Proposition 20). For wL1 ≤ wFB,
∂XG∗(wL1 )
∂wL1
< 0 and
∂V G(XG∗(wL1 ))
∂wL1
> 0.
That is, the extend of over-investment in the second period in equilibrium decreases with
the amount of capital the bank has at the beginning of the second period, and the NPV of
the bank’s portfolio increases.
3.3.2 The incentives to provide recourse
In this section I first consider the benefits and costs of providing recourse at the end of
the first period by comparing the two types of equilibrium in the second period. I then
derive the incentive compatibility conditions for recourse to be in equilibrium. I finally
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discuss the eﬃciency of an equilibrium with recourse at t = 1.
From the analysis in Section 3.3.1, recourse and over-investment are the two means
for the bank to signal the type of its second period portfolio, in an equilibrium with and
without recourse respectively. In an equilibrium with recourse, a good bank incurs a cost
wL1,B−w
L
1,G by providing recourse, and is able to achieve eﬃcient investment in the second
period.5 In an equilibrium without recourse, on the other hand, a good bank over-invests
in order to signal its private information, and thus incurs a cost of V GFB − V
G(XG∗1 (w
L
1 )).
Even in an equilibrium with recourse, a security whose payoﬀ is characterised by
(wL1,G, w
L
1,B) is not contractable, as mentioned in the model setup. It must therefore be
incentive compatible for (wL1,G, w
L
1,B) to characterise the equilibrium security issued by
the bank in the first period in an equilibrium with recourse.
For a bank with a good portfolio to be willing to provide recourse such that its retained
capital becomes wL1,G at the beginning of the second period, instead of w
L
1,B . The incentive
compatibility constraint (RCG) thus specifies that the payoﬀ from providing recourse and
subsequently investing in an first-best sized portfolio is greater than or equal to the payoﬀ
of not providing recourse but subsequently engaging in over-investment, i.e.
V GFB + w
L
1,G ≥ V
G(Xˆ(wL1,B)) + w
L
1,B (RC
G) (3.9)
This can also be interpreted as when the benefit of eﬃcient second period investment
outweighs the cost of providing recourse.
A bank with a bad portfolio, on the other hand, should prefer not to mimic a bank with
a good portfolio and provide recourse. The payoﬀ to a bank with a bad portfolio without
recourse is V BFB +w
L
1,B . Should it choose mimic, it similarly provides recourse, chooses a
portfolio size XGFB and issues a security the same as a bank with a good portfolio. The
resulting payoﬀ is
θB(XGFB)w
H
2 + [1− θ
B(XGFB)]w
L
2 (3.10)
s.t. θB(XGFB)w
H
2 + [1− θ
B(XGFB)]w
L
2 + w
L
1,G ≥ kX
G
FB (3.11)
This payoﬀ is minimised in an equilibrium in which a bank with a good portfolio retains
a high powered security wL2 = 0. Therefore the incentive compatibility constraint (RC
B)
therefore specifies that the in this equilibrium, the payoﬀ to a bank with a bad portfolio
when it mimics by providing recourse is less than or equal to the payoﬀ when it does not
5It will become clear that indeed the cost is positive, i.e. wL1,B > w
L
1,G, in equilibrium.
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provide recourse and subsequently choosing an eﬃcient portfolio size. That is,
θB(XGFB)
θG(XGFB)
[
V GFB + w
L
1,G
]
≤ V BFB + w
L
1,B (RC
B) (3.12)
Notice that (RCB) implies that wL1,B > w
L
1,G whenever wFC > 0. That is, whenever
the asymmetric information problem is suﬃciently severe that a penniless bank cannot
achieve the first best outcome, there is signalling value for a bank with a good portfolio
to provide costly recourse.
Combining (RCG) and (RCB) suggests that, while a larger recourse by a bank with a
good portfolio wL1,B −w
L
1,G incurs higher cost, tightening (RC
G), it prevents a bank with
a bad portfolio from mimicking, relaxing (RCB). An equilibrium with recourse is feasible
if there exists (wL1,B , w
L
1,G) that satisfies (RC
G) and (RCB).
This leads to the following proposition regarding the eﬃciency of an equilibrium with
recourse.
Proposition 21. Whenever feasible, an equilibrium with recourse is eﬃcient at t = 1 as
first best portfolio sizes are achieved in the second period.
An equilibrium with recourse is eﬃcient at t = 1. Although providing recourse incurs
a private cost for a bank with a good portfolio, it is not a social cost since a recourse
represents a transfer from the bank to outside investors without any dead weight loss.
This contrasts with an equilibrium without recourse, in which a bank with a good portfolio
engages in over-investment in order to signal its private information, incurring a social
cost.
3.3.3 First period problem
I now turn to consider the first period problem. I first consider an equilibrium with
recourse. I then consider an equilibrium in which a bank with a good portfolio at t = 0
does not provide recourse, and finally discuss whether a bank has the incentives to do so
in equilibrium.
In an equilibrium with recourse
In an equilibrium with recourse, a bank at t = 0 chooses the size of its first period
portfolio, and the security to raise financing characterised by (wH1 , w
L
1,G, w
L
1,B). I first
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derive the equilibrium choices of a bank with a bad portfolio, and then those of a bank
with a good portfolio, in a separating equilibrium.
A bank with a bad portfolio chooses its portfolio size and the security to issue to
maximise its expected payoﬀ, in an equilibrium with recourse. I write this problem
recursively by taking into account that in this equilibrium, the value of the bank at t = 1
is the sum of V jFB and its retained cash flow at t = 1, i.e.
max
XB0 ,w
B,H
1 ,w
B,L
1,G ,w
B,L
1,B
θB(XB0 )(V
G
FB + w
B,H
1 )
+[1− θB(XB0 )]
[
γ(V GFB + w
B,L
1,G ) + (1− γ)(V
B
FB + w
B,L
1,B )
]
(3.13)
s.t. θB(XB0 )[X
B
0 − w
B,H
1 ] + [1− θ
B(XB0 )]
[
(1− δ)XB0 − γw
B,L
1,G − (1− γ)w
B,L
1,B
]
+w0 ≥ kX
B
0 (3.14)
(RCG) and (RCB) (3.15)
Denote the equilibrium expected payoﬀ to a bank with a bad first period portfolio
UB∗(w0).
A bank with a good portfolio faces a similar problem, subject an additional incentive
compatibility constraint (IC1) that a bank with a bad portfolio would prefer not to mimic.
max
XG0 ,w
G,H
1 ,w
G,L
1,G ,w
G,L
1,B
θG(XG0 )(V
G
FB + w
G,H
1 )
+[1− θG(XG0 )]
[
γ(V GFB + w
G,L
1,G ) + (1− γ)(V
B
FB + w
G,L
1,B )
]
(3.16)
s.t. θG(XG0 )[X
G
0 − w
G,H
1 ] + [1− θ
G(XG0 )]
[
(1− δ)XG0 − γw
G,L
1,G − (1− γ)w
G,L
1,B
]
+w0 = kX
G
0 (3.17)
θB(XG0 )(V
G
FB + w
G,H
1 ) + [1− θ
B(XG0 )]
[
γ(V GFB + w
G,L
1,G )
+(1− γ)(V BFB + w
G,L
1,B )
]
≤ UB∗(w0) (IC1) (3.18)
(RCG) and (RCB) (3.19)
Notice that, without the (RCG) and (RCB) constraints, the above programme can be
optimised by maximising wG,H1 and minimising
[
γwG,L1,G + (1− γ)w
G,L
1,B
]
by setting wG,L1,G =
wG,L1,B = 0, and w
G,H
1 to bind the financing constraint. This follows from the simple
intuition of financing under asymmetric information, in the absence of concerns for the
second period funding problem, as represented by (RCG) and (RCB). In this case, the
security chosen by a bank with a good portfolio is debt like, leaving the bank a high
powered security that only pays oﬀ if a high cash flow is realised.
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When taking into consideration the need to finance the second period portfolio, a bank
with a good portfolio must retain some cash flow when a low cash flow is realised, in order
to credibly signal its second period portfolio type through recourse. The equilibrium is
summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 22. In an equilibrium with recourse, with capital w0, a bank with a bad
portfolio chooses at t = 0 the first best portfolio XB∗0 (w0) = X
B
FB, and a bank with a good
portfolio chooses XG∗0 (w0) ≥ X
G
FB, where
XG∗0 (w0) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
XGFB, if w0 ≥ w0,FB
Xˆ0(w0), otherwise
(3.20)
where Xˆ0(w0) is such that
θB(Xˆ0(·))
θG(Xˆ0(·))
V G(Xˆ0(·)) − V
B
FB +
([
1− θB(Xˆ0(·))
]
−
θB(Xˆ0(·))
θG(Xˆ0(·))
[
1− θG(Xˆ0(·))
])
(1− γ)wˆL1 =
[
1−
θB(Xˆ0(·))
θG(Xˆ0(·))
]
w0(3.21)
wˆL1 =
θB(XGFB)
θG(XGFB)
V GFB − V
B
FB (3.22)
and w0,FB such that Xˆ0(w0,FB) = XGFB.
The equilibrium securities issued by a bank at t = 0 with a portfolio of the i ∈ {G,B}
is (wi,H∗1 (w0), w
i,L∗
1,G (w0), w
i,L∗
1,B (w0)) = (wˆ
i,H
1 (w0), 0, wˆ
L
1 ), where
wˆi,H1 (w0) =
1
θi(Xi∗(·))
(
V i(Xi∗0 (·) + w0 − [1− θ
i(Xi∗(·))](1 − γ)wˆL1
)
(3.23)
It is worth comparing the first period equilibrium to a second period equilibrium
without recourse, because both are signalling equilibria in which a bank with a good
portfolio signals its private information through over-investment. The corollary below
states that, for a given amount of capital w at the beginning of the periods, there is
greater distortion in the first period than in the second period.
Corollary 3 (to Proposition 22).
XG∗1 (w) ≥ X
G∗
0 (w) (3.24)
where the inequality is strict for w ≤ w0,FB.
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This is because the need to retain capital to facilitate the financing of the second
period portfolio hinders the extent to which the bank can use debt financing to mitigate
the asymmetric information problem, resulting in greater over-investment in equilibrium.
Moreover, in anticipating of the funding needs in the second period, a bank issues
a security with implicit guarantee regardless of the type of its first period portfolio. I
discuss the implementation of such security using bankruptcy-remote securitisation with
implicit guarantee in Section 3.4.1. This model therefore provides a rationale for such
arrangement in the securitisation industry.
In an equilibrium without recourse by a good type
Notice that, in a separating equilibrium, a bank with a bad portfolio at t = 0 has similar
incentives as one in an equilibrium with recourse. Because the bank raises capital at fair
price in a separating equilibrium, it optimally chooses the first best portfolio size and
issues a security with recourse so as to resolve the asymmetric information problem in
the second period and achieve first best investment decisions.
This section then considers a bank with a good portfolio at t = 0 chooses the size of
its first period portfolio, and the security to raise financing characterised by (wH1 , w
L
1 ),
subject to an incentive compatibility constraint (IC1) to prevent mimicking by a bank
with a bad portfolio.
max
XG0 ,w
H
1 ,w
L
1
θG(XG0 )
[
V GFB + w
H
1
]
(3.25)
+[1− θG(XG0 )]
(
γ
[
V G(XG∗1 (w
L
1 )) + w
L
1
]
+ (1− γ)
[
V BFB + w
L
1
])
(3.26)
s.t. θG(XG0 )[X
G
0 − w
H
1 ] + [1− θ
G(XG0 )][(1 − δ)X
G
0 − w
L
1 ] + w0 ≥ kX
G
0 (3.27)
θB(XG0 )
[
V B(XG∗1 (w
H
1 )) + w
H
1
]
+ [1− θB(XG0 )]
(
γ
[
V G(XG∗1 (w
L
1 )) + w
L
1
]
+(1− γ)
[
V BFB +w
L
1
])
≤ UB∗(w0) (IC1) (3.28)
The following proposition summarises the equilibrium.
Proposition 23. In an equilibrium with no recourse provided by a bank with a good
portfolio at t = 0, a bank with a bad portfolio chooses at t = 0 the first best portfolio
XB∗0 (w0) = X
B
FB, and a bank with a good portfolio chooses X
G∗∗
0 (w0) ≥ X
G
FB, where
XG∗∗0 (w0) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
XGFB , if w0 ≥ w
′
0,FB
X˜0(w0), otherwise
(3.29)
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where X˜0(w0) is such that
θB(X˜0(·))
θG(X˜0(·))
V G(X˜0(·)) − V
B
FB +
[
1− θB(X˜0(·))
]
γ
[
V G(Xˆ1(0)) − V
G
FB
]
=
[
1−
θB(X˜0(·))
θG(X˜0(·))
]
w0 (3.30)
and w′0,FB such that X˜0(w
′
0,FB) = X
G
FB.
The equilibrium security issued by a bank with a good portfolio is one
without guarantee, (wG,H∗∗1 (w0), w
G,L∗∗
1 (w0)) = (
V G(XG∗∗0 (·))+w0
θG(XG∗∗0 (·))
, 0). The equilibrium
security issued by a bank with a bad portfolio is one with implicit guarantee,
(wB,H∗∗1 (w0), w
B,L∗∗
1,G (w0), w
B,L∗∗
1,B (w0)) = (wˆ
B,H
1 (w0), 0, wˆ
L
1 ).
Notice that in this case, a bank with a good portfolio at t = 0 issues a debt like
security that leaves a high powered equity stake with wG,L∗∗1 (w0) = 0, in order to mitigate
the asymmetric information problem between the bank and outside investors, thereby
minimising the amount of over-investment in equilibrium as a signal.
I again compare this first period equilibrium to a second period equilibrium without
recourse. In contrast to the previous equilibrium with recourse, for a given amount of
capital w, there is less distortion in the investment decision of a bank with a good portfolio
in the first period than in the second period XG∗∗1 (w) < X
G∗
0 (w).
Corollary 4 (to Proposition 23).
XG∗∗1 (w) ≤ X
G∗
0 (w) (3.31)
where the inequality is strict for w ≤ w1,FB.
This is because, without recourse, the bank over-invests in its second period portfolio
if it is of a good type. This reduces the incentive for a bank with a bad portfolio to mimic
in the first period, since it otherwise achieves the first best outcome in the second period
through providing recourse in equilibrium. Therefore the investment decision of a bank
with a good portfolio in the first period involves less over-investment while serving as a
signal of its type.
3.3.4 Recourse versus no-recourse equilibrium
This section discusses the economic intuition for the two types of equilibrium for each of
the two types of banks.
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The trade-oﬀ between the two types of equilibrium follows from the above discussion.
On the one hand, providing recourse at the end of the first period is a socially eﬃcient
way to resolve the asymmetric information problem in the second period, restoring first
best investment levels. On the other hand, for recourse to be credible in equilibrium, a
bank with a bad project in the second period refrains from providing recourse and retains
wB,L∗1,B (w0) = wˆ
L
1 > 0 when the first period portfolio returns a low cash flow.
For a bank with a bad portfolio in the first period, it chooses the first best portfolio
size in the first period and is free to design a security with recourse to achieve eﬃcient
investment in the second period as well. It enjoys the benefit of providing recourse
in equilibrium at no cost, and therefore always chooses a security with recourse in
equilibrium.
For a bank with a good portfolio in the first period, however, the need to retain
wB,L∗1,B (w0) in order for recourse to be credible limits the bank’s ability to issue debt and
retain only high powered stake to mitigate the asymmetric information problem in the
first period, resulting in greater extent of over-investment. The bank therefore trades
oﬀ the benefit and cost of providing recourse. The resulting equilibrium is one in which
a bank with a good portfolio in the first period issues a security with recourse if and
only if the UG∗(w0) ≥ UG∗∗(w0), where UG∗(w0), UG∗∗(w0) are expected the payoﬀs to a
bank with a good portfolio in an equilibrium with with recourse and one without recourse
respectively,
UG∗(w0) ≡ θ
G(XG∗0 (·))V
G
FB +
[
1− θG(XG∗0 (·))
] [
γV GFB + (1− γ)V
B
FB
]
+V G(XG∗0 (·)) + w0 (3.32)
UG∗∗(w0) ≡ θ
G(XG∗∗0 (·))V
G
FB +
[
1− θG(XG∗∗0 (·))
] [
γV G(XG∗1 (0)) + (1− γ)V
B
FB
]
+V G(XG∗∗0 (·)) + w0 (3.33)
3.4 Bankruptcy-remote securitisation with implicit
guarantee
In this section I highlight the two important features of the securitisation process, namely
bankruptcy-remoteness and the presence of implicit guarantee, and discuss their roles in
implementation the equilibrium with recourse. I then discuss the empirical implications
of this model in relation to existing evidence.
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3.4.1 Implementation of the equilibrium with recourse
In this section I discuss an implementation of the equilibrium with recourse via
bankruptcy-remote securitisation with implicit guarantee.
Proposition 24. An equilibrium in which a bank of type i at t = 0 invests in a portfolio
of size Xi∗0 (w0) and issues a security characterised by (w
i,H∗
1 (w0), w
i,L∗
1,G (w0), w
i,L∗
1,B (w0)) =
(wˆi,H1 (w0), 0, wˆ
L
1 ) can be implemented according to the following.
• Invest in a portfolio of size Xi∗0 (w0) at t = 0.
• Transfer a fraction (1 − αi∗(w0)) of the asset into a special purpose vehicle (SPV),
and retain the remaining αi∗(·) fraction on the book of the bank, where αi∗(·) ≡
wˆL1
(1−δ)Xi∗0 (w0)
.
• Issue a senior tranche back by the SPV with promised repayment Ri∗(w0) ≡
Xi∗0 (w0)− wˆ
i,H
1 (w0) ∈
[
(1− δ)Xi∗0 (·), (1 − α
i∗(·))Xi∗0 (·)
]
, to raise kXi∗0 (·)−w0 from
the investors.
• If a high cash flow Xi∗0 (w0) is realised at the end of the period, the investors are
paid in full and the bank retains the residual cash flow.
• If a low cash flow (1 − δ)Xi∗0 (w0) is realised, the bank decides whether to provide
recourse depending on the type of its second period portfolio.
– If the second period portfolio is a good type, the bank provides recourse onto the
remaining αi∗(·) fraction of its assets and repays (1 − δ)Xi∗0 (w0) ≤ R
i∗(w0),
retaining zero cash flow.
– If the second period portfolio is a bad type, the bank defaults on the SPV, repays
the investors with cash flow (1−αi∗(·))(1− δ)Xi∗0 (·) from the SPV, and retains
the payoﬀ αi∗(·)(1 − δ)Xi∗0 (·) from the assets on its book.
• Observing the decision to provide recourse or otherwise, the investors learn the true
type of the bank’s second period portfolio. The bank forms a portfolio of the first
best size and issues a security backed by the portfolio at fair price at t = 1.
The above implementation highlights two important features of the secularisation
process, as discussed by, for example, Gorton and Souleles (2007). Firstly, the SPV
is structured to be bankruptcy-remote, and secondly, there is often implicit guarantee.
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Both features are necessary in this implementation. Since recourse is contingent on the
unobservable and uncontractible type of the second period portfolio at t = 1, it must
be implicit and incentive compatible. Recourse is thus provided only by a bank with a
good second period portfolio. Meanwhile, the bankruptcy-remoteness of the SPV enables
costless default by a bank with a bad second period portfolio.
3.4.2 Empirical implications
The above implementation gives rise to the following empirical implications.
1. The extent of securitisation is positively correlated with unobservable asset quality.
The discussion in Section 3.3.4 suggests that, while a bank with a bad portfolio at
t = 1 always provides implicit guarantee in equilibrium, a bank with a good portfolio
only does so if providing recourse does not induce too much distortion in its current
period investment decision. Further more, in an equilibrium in which a bank with
both a good and a bad portfolio provides implicit guarantee, a bank with a bad
portfolio retains a larger fraction of its assets on its book, i.e. αB∗(w0) > αG∗(w0).
This is because a bad portfolio has a lower expected value, and a larger piece is
required to support the level of implicit guarantee provided. This is consistent with
the evidence presented by Casu et al. (2011) using US Bank Holding Company data
from 2001 to 2007.
Since in this model the retained fraction of the portfolio provides implicit guarantee,
this can also be interpreted as a negative correlation between implicit recourse and
unobservable asset quality. Vermilyea et al. (2008) show that, reported fraud losses
in credit card securitisation, as a proxy for implicit recourse, is negatively related
to the performance of the portfolio. Mandel et al. (2012) similarly found a positive
relationship between delinquency on securitised assets and enhancements.
2. Conditional on recourse becoming necessary, honouring implicit guarantee is
positively correlated with future loan performance.
At the end of the first period, the act of providing recourse serves as a credible
signal for the type of the second period portfolio. Indeed Higgins and Mason (2004)
show that conditional on being in a situation where recourse is needed, it is met
with positive short- and long-term stock market reactions. This is also consistent
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the point made by Amiram et al. (2011), that an increase in trading volume, equity
volatility and spreads when retained interest write downs are announced indicates
that the market views such events as providing significant information.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper show that the bankrupt-remoteness and the presence of implicit guarantee are
two important feature of securitisation to implement the optimal funding arrangement for
banks, in a model of repeated investment with risk-shifting potential and financing under
asymmetric information. Consistent with conventional wisdom in the industry, honouring
implicit guarantee helps a sponsoring bank reduce its future funding cost. This is because
in this model, recourse serves as a signal for the quality of the bank’s future investment
opportunity. Meanwhile, bankruptcy-remoteness contribute to the credibility of recourse
as a signal, be allowing a bank with a bad future investment opportunity to default on
its SPV without damaging the rest of the bank asset.
Although providing implicit guarantee mitigates the asymmetric information and
risk-shifting problems for the bank in the future, it exacerbates the current period
over-investment due to the frictions. A bank therefore would only engage in securitisation
if the future benefit outweighs the current cost.
This model has also implications for the regulatory discussion regarding a ban on
implicit guarantee. Due to concerns about risks brought to the banks by rescuing failing
SPVs, it is argued that implicit recourse should not be allowed. In the context of
this model, implicit guarantee as a means to mitigate the asymmetric information and
risk-shifting problem is socially eﬃcient, compared to the alternative of over-investment.
This paper thus adds to the discussion a potential benefit of allowing implicit guarantee.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 1: CONTINGENT CAPITAL
STRUCTURE
A.1 Parameter restriction on ηi + θs
As given in Eq. 1.3, the optimal risk choice δi,s(F s) in state s given a financing plan with
debt of face value F s is 12(η
i − θs − X−F
s
∆X
). This implies that the success probability is
qi,s(F s) ≡ ηi− δi,s(F s) = 12(η
s+ θs+ X−F
s
∆X
) and the conditional probability of realising a
high cash flow is θs + δi,s(F s) = 12(η
i + θs − X−F
s
∆X
), where the first best case is produced
when F s = 0.
That the success probability lies in (0, 1) is equivalent to −X−F
s
∆ < η
i+θs < 2−X−F
s
∆ .
That the conditional probability of realising a high cash flow lies in (0, 1) is equivalent to
X−F s
∆ < η
i + θs < 2 + X−F
s
∆ .
As it will become clear later, the equilibrium face value of the debt F s ∈ [0,X).
Therefore the necessary condition that guarantees that the equilibrium probabilities lie
in (0, 1) is that
X − F s
∆
< ηi + θs < 2 (A.1)
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A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1 and 2
The problem in the case of ex post financing can be interpreted as a special case of the
problem in the case of ex ante financing, when the set of macroeconomic states S is a
singleton. Proposition 1 is therefore implied by Proposition 2. Here I present the proof
for the latter proposition, which then also implies the former.
I first show in Claim 1 that the set The set of equilibria that satisfy the Intuitive
Criterion is given by the programme given in Proposition 2. I then show in Claim 2 that
all equilibria that satisfy the Intuitive Criterion are fair-price separating. Finally I derive
the threshold e˘C such that the bank issues debt if and only if e¯ < e˘C .
Claim 1. The set of equilibria that satisfy the Intuitive Criterion is given by the
programme given in Proposition 2.
Proof of Claim 1. Denote (eˆ,F C ,αC) a maximiser of the programme given in Proposition
2. The proof is consisted of two parts. Firstly I apply the Intuitive Criterion to discard
any equilibrium in which the capital structure is not a maximiser of the said programme.
Intuitively, the Good bank always has the incentive to deviate to a capital structure that
gives it a higher payoﬀ which still allows it to separate from the bad. I then show that a
maximise of the programme satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
The first part of the proof is to show that any equilibrium capital structure that
satisfies the Intuitive Criterion a maximiser of the programme given in Proposition 2.
I show this in the following two steps: (i) any separating equilibrium that is not a
maximiser of the said programme does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion, and (ii) any
pooling equilibrium does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion.
(i) Consider a separating equilibrium with a contingent capital structure (e,F ,α),
which is not a maximiser of the said programme. A deviation to the capital structure
(eˆ,FC ,αC) provides the Good bank with a strictly higher payoﬀ whereas the Bad bank
receives a lower payoﬀ than in the equilibrium, while the outside investors at least
break even, if the outside investors hold a belief that the deviation can only come from
the Good type. The separating equilibrium (F ,α) thus does not satisfy the Intuitive
Criterion. Therefore any contingent capital structure equilibrium that survives the
Intuitive Criterion must be a maximiser of the said programme.
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(ii) Consider a pooling equilibrium with a contingent capital structure (e,F ,α). The
equilibrium capital structure satisfies the following constraints,
(PCBPool) : E[(1− α
s)EB,s(F s)] ≥ e (A.2)
(PCGPool) : E[(1− α
s)EG,s(F s)] ≥ e (A.3)
(IRPool) : E[γV
G,s(F s) + (1− γ)V B,s(F s)− (1− αs)(γEG,s(F s) + (1− γ)EB,s(F s))]
≥ 1− e (A.4)
In equilibrium, the payoﬀ to the existing shareholders of the bank, if the bank issues
securities according to the equilibrium financing plan, is given by
E[(1− αs)Ei,s(F s)] + (e¯− e) = u (A.5)
for some constant u. Implicitly diﬀerent F s in Eq. A.5 with regard to αs to find the
derivative
f i,sαs,F s(e,F ,α) ≡
∂αs
∂F s
= −
1− αs
qi,s(F s)∆X
(A.6)
The derivative is negative, and more so for the Bad type than for the Good type. That is,
the Bad bank requires the equity issuance to be decreased more, in order to compensate
for an increase in the leverage. Therefore there exists a deviation (e,F ′,α′), such that
F s
′
> F s, αs
′
< αs, and all other financing parameters are the same as in the equilibrium.
This deviation, compared to the original pooling equilibrium, provides the Good bank with
a strictly higher payoﬀ whereas the Bad bank receives a lower payoﬀ than in equilibrium,
if the outside investors are willing to provide capital.
If the investors believe that such a deviation can only come from a Good bank, they
should accept as long as they at least break even. In a separating equilibrium, the
investors’ rationality constraint is given by Eq. 1.7. Binding the (IR) and implicitly
diﬀerentiating it yields the derivative
f IR,sαs,F s(e,F ,α) ≡
∂αs
∂F s
=
F s
2∆X
−
1− αs
qG,s(F s)∆X
(A.7)
Notice that |fG,sαs,F s(·)| > −f
IR,s
αs,F s(·) ∀F > 0. That is, an increase in F and a decrease
in α that leaves the marginally lower payoﬀ to a Bad bank would strictly benefit the
investors. Therefore there indeed exists such a deviation that the investors would be
willing to accept and allow the Good bank to be strictly better oﬀ.
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(i) and (ii) thus collectively suggest that any contingent capital structure equilibrium
that survives the Intuitive Criterion must be a maximiser of the said programme.
The second part establishes that a maximiser of the programme satisfies the Intuitive
Criterion. Suppose that there exists a capital structure (F ,α) which is a maximiser of
the programme but it does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. That is, there exists a
capital structure (F ′,α′) such that the good bank receives a strictly higher payoﬀ and
the bad bank receives a lower payoﬀ than at (F ,α), and that the outside investors at
least break even. This suggests that (F ′,α′) satisfies the constraints (PCBC ) and (IRC)
and gives the good bank a strictly higher payoﬀ than (F ,α). This contradicts with the
assumption that (F ,α) is a maximiser of the programme.
Therefore, the set of equilibrium contingent capital structures that satisfy the Intuitive
Criterion is given by the set of maximisers of the programme given in Proposition 2. This
result implies Proposition 1.
Claim 2. Any equilibrium that survives the Intuitive Criterion is fair-price separating.
Proof of Claim 2. I prove this claim by showing that otherwise there exists a deviation
to eliminate the equilibrium according to the Intuitive Criterion. This part of the proof
builds upon the previous claim and only considers separating equilirbia.
Intuitively, if the (IRC) is not binding given a separating belief, a Good bank can
increase its leverage and decrease its equity issue to maintain the same payoﬀ, while still
allowing the investors to at least break even, despite the value destruction due to increase
leverage and risk-taking. Moreover, substituting debt for equity also hurts the Bad bank
more than the Good because it reduces the mispricing. A change that leaves the Good
bank indiﬀerent should then make the Bad strictly worse oﬀ.
This argument is formally established below. Consider an underpricing separating
equilibrium with financing plan (e,F ,α) such that
E[V G,s(F s)− (1− αs)EG,s(F s)] > 1− e (A.8)
There thus exists a deviation to financing plan (e,F ′,α′), where where F s
′
> F s, αs
′
< αs
and all other financing parameters are the same, such that, if accepted by the investors,
this financing plan makes a Good bank strictly better oﬀ, whereas it makes a Bad bank
strictly worse oﬀ in comparison to the equilibrium outcome, following similar argument
as in Part 1(ii) of the proof of Claim 1.
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If the investors believe that such an deviation can only come from a Good bank,
they are willing to accept the financing terms if the increase in leverage is small. This is
because the investors make a positive payoﬀ in equilibrium. A suﬃciently small increase
in leverage reduces the payoﬀ left for investors but they can still at least break even.
Therefore in any Intuitive equilibrium, (IRC) binds. The equilibrium thus must be a
fair-price separating equilibrium.
I now derive the threshold e˘C in Proposition 2. First consider the fair-price separating
equilibria with no capital market debt that survives the Intuitive Criterion. Combining
(IRC) with (PCBC ) yields that, at F = 0, the conditions can be satisfied if
e ≥ e˘C ≡
E
[
(1− αs)EG,sFB
]
E
[
(1− αs)(EG,sFB − E
G,s
FB)
] (E [V G,sFB ]− 1) (A.9)
That is, a Good bank must put in at lease e˘C of its internal capital in order to separate
from the Bad. This implies that no separating equilibrium exists if e¯ < e˘C . Moreover, for
e˘ ≥ e˘C , the bank is able to achieve separation without leverage. A separating equilibrium
without leverage therefore cannot satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. In summary, the bank
issues debt in equilibrium if and only if e¯ < e˘C .
A.2.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Because of the complex nature of the problem, I impose parameter restrictions to
guarantee an interior solution, that maxF s V B,s(F s) +
ηG−ηB
2 F < 1. Intuitively, this
is the case if the Good and the Bad types are not too diﬀerent, i.e. ηG − ηB small.
To characterise the unique equilibrium leverage that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion,
I start by establishing the following claims. The Intuitive Criterion is applied to discard
equilibria in which there exists an out-of-equilibrium action such that (i) a Bad bank is
strictly worse oﬀ deviating to it, and (ii) if the investors believe that such a deviation can
only come from a Good bank, the Good bank is strictly better oﬀ deviating to it. This
process is equivalent to establishing that there is a unique solution Fˆ s to the maximisation
programme given by Proposition 1.
Claim 3. Any equilibrium with capital market debt F s > 0 that survives the Intuitive
Criterion has a binding (PCB).
120
Proof of Claim 3. I show this claim by constructing a deviation according to the Intuitive
Criterion. Intuitively, if the (PCB) is slack, a Good bank can reduce its leverage to enjoy
the value created by the reduction in risk-shifting incentive, while still achieving separation
from the Bad.
Formally, consider a fair-price separating equilibrium with financing plan (e¯, F s,αs)
such that (1−αs)EB,s(F s) < e¯ where F s > D¯. There exists a deviation to financing plan
(e¯, F ′,α′), where F ′ < F s and α′ > αs, such that a Good bank strictly benefits if the
financing plan is accepted by the investors, and that (1− α′)EB,s(F ′) < e¯ so that a Bad
bank has no incentive to deviate to this financing plan.
Consider any financing plans (e, F,α) such that the payoﬀ to the insiders of a bank of
type i is
(1− α)Ei,s(F ) + (e¯− e) = u (A.10)
where u is any constant. The existence of such a deviation thus follows from the properties
of the functions f i,sαs,F s(·) and f
IR,s
αs,F s(·) given by Eq. A.6–A.7 and discussed in Part 1(ii)
of the proof of Claim 1.
Claims 2–3 thus suggest that both (PCB) and (IR) bind in an equilibrium that satisfy
the Intuitive Criterion. Combining both binding constraints implies that, for a a given
F s, the equilibrium input of internal capital e is given by
e = e˘s(F s) ≡
EB,s(F s)
EG,s(F s)− EB,s(F s)
[
V G,s(F s)− 1
]
(A.11)
This implies an equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion with F s exists only for
e¯ ≥ e. Particularly, for e¯ ≥ e˘s, fair-price separation can be achieved without leverage.
The financing plan in the unique Intuitive equilibrium is thus (eˆ, 0, αˆs(e¯)) where eˆ ≥ e˘s
and αs(·) is given by a binding (IR). That is, αˆs(·) = (1− e¯)/V G,sFB .
For e¯ < e˘s, however, the bank must resort to taking leverage in order to achieve
fair-price separation.
Claim 4. In any equilibrium with capital market debt F s > 0 that survives the Intuitive
Criterion, the bank puts up all of its internal capital e¯.
Proof of Claim 4. The proof builds upon that of Claims 2–3 and only considers fair-price
separating equilibria with a binding (PCB).
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Intuitively, because internal capital is even less information sensitive than debt,
substituting internal capital for debt hurts the Bad bank and benefits the Good by
reducing the mispricing from debt issuance. Therefore a Good bank can deviate to a
lower leverage level and puts up more internal capital. This deviation still allows the
outside investors to break even since a reduction in leverage increases the total value of
the bank.
Formally, I implicitly diﬀerentiate Eq. A.10 to find the derivative
f iα,e(e, F,α) ≡
∂α
∂e
= −
1
Ei,s(F )
(A.12)
The derivative is negative, suggesting that increasing internal capital input by a marginal
unit while decreasing the fraction of equity issued by 1/Ei,s(F ) leaves a type i bank with
the same amount of payoﬀ, holding the face value of the debt outstanding unchanged.
Notice that |fBα,e(·)| > |f
G
α,e(·)|. That is, a Bad bank requires to retain more equity in
order to compensate for the additional internal capital input than a Good bank.
Consider a fair-price separating equilibrium (e, F s,α), where F s > 0. There exists
a financing plan (e′, F ′,α), where e′ > e and 0 < F ′ < F such that if raises financing
successfully , a Good bank is strictly better oﬀ, whereas a Bad bank is strictly worse oﬀ
than in equilibrium.
If the investors believe that such an deviation can only come from a Good bank, they
are willing to accept the financing terms. Because the reduction in leverage increases the
value of the bank, a Good bank can be better oﬀ and still allow the investors to at least
break even.
Therefore in any Intuitive equilibrium in which the bank issues capital market debt,
it puts up all of its internal capital.
Therefore for e¯ < e˘s, any fair-price separating equilibrium in which the (PCB) holds
with strict inequality does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion because it entails some
leverage F s > 0. Intuitively, because reducing leverage increases the bank’s value, the
bank can share some of it with the investors and still benefit from the deviation. The
unique Intuitive equilibrium is thus characterised by a binding (PCB) and a binding (IR).
Specifically, the equilibrium face value of debt Fˆ s(e¯) is given by e¯ = e˘s(Fˆ s(·)). The
equilibrium fraction of outside equity issued is then given by αˆs(e¯) = 1− e¯/EB,s(Fˆ s(·)).
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A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3 and 4
Ex post financing
In the equilibrium with ex post financing, the equilibrium leverage is given by binding
(PCB) and (IR), which yields
e˘(Fˆ s) ≡
EG,s(Fˆ s)
EG,s(Fˆ s)− EB,s(Fˆ s)
[
V G,s(Fˆ s)− 1
]
= e¯ (A.13)
The procyclicality of book leverage Fˆ s(·) is derived by implicitly diﬀerentiating Eq.
A.13 with regard to θs. The equity value of a bank given the face value of the debt and
the optimal risk choice can be expressed as Ei,s(F s) ≡
[
qi,s(F s)
]2
∆X . I then express Eq.
A.13 as
[
qG,s(Fˆ s(·))
]2
∆X + q
G,s(Fˆ s(·))Fˆ s(·)− e¯
[
qG,s(Fˆ s(·))
]2
[
qB,s(Fˆ s(·))
]2 = 1− e¯ (A.14)
Denote by A the total derivative of the left hand side of Eq. A.14 with respect to
qG,s(·), when expressing qB,s(·) = qG,s(·) − η
G−ηB
2 . Implicitly diﬀerentiating Eq. A.14
with regard to θs yields
∂Fˆ s(·)
∂θs
= ∆X
A
A− 2qG,s(·)∆X
> ∆X > 0 (A.15)
where A ≡ 2qG,s(·)∆X + Fˆ
s(·) + e¯
[
qG,s(·)− qB,s(·)
] qG,s(·)
qB,s(·)
(A.16)
> 2qG,s(·)∆X (A.17)
The partial derivative of the success probability qG,s(Fˆ s(e¯)) with respect to θs is
therefore
dqG,s(·)
dθs
=
∂qG,s(·)
∂θs
+
∂qG,s(·)
∂F s
∂Fˆ s(·)
∂θs
<
1
2
−
1
2∆X
∆X = 0 (A.18)
Ex ante financing
The intuition for cyclical leverage is as follows. If the default probability is higher in one
state than in another, eﬀectively the debt in the higher leverage state is more information
sensitive than in the other state. Then Good bank should have incentive to equalise
the resulting default probabilities across states to reduce the mispricing. Since a better
economic fundamental sustains higher leverage to produce the same default probability,
leverage tends to be procyclical. However, since high leverage is required in booms to
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equalise the resulting default probabilities, it may becomes too costly in terms of the risk
shifting incentives. Therefore in equilibrium, the default probabilities may not be equal
across the states, but countercyclical.
Formally, I implicitly diﬀerentiate Eq. A.6 to find the derivative
f iF s,F z(e,F ,α) ≡
∂F s
∂F z
= −
1− αz
1− αs
qi,z(F z)
qi,s(F s)
p(z)
p(s)
(A.19)
where p(s) is the probability of state s.
The derivative is negative if αz < 1, suggesting that increasing the leverage in state
z by a marginal unit while decreasing leverage in state s by 1−α
z
1−αs
qi,z(F z)
qi,s(F s) leaves a type i
bank with the same amount of payoﬀ, holding all other financing parameters unchanged.
Notice that |fBF s,F z(·)| > |f
G
F s,F z(·)| iﬀ q
i,z(F z) > qi,s(F s). That is, a Bad bank
requires to reduce leverage in the highly levered state by more in order to compensate for
the increase in leverage in the less levered state than a Good bank.
If the investors believe that a financing plan can only come from a Good bank, they
should accept the financing plan if they can at least break even. I implicitly diﬀerentiate
the binding (IRC) (Eq. 1.11) to find the derivative
f IRF s,F z(e,F ,α) ≡
∂F s
∂F z
= −
(1− αz)qG,z(F z)− F
z
2∆X
(1− αs)qG,s(F s)− F
s
2∆X
p(z)
p(s)
(A.20)
That is, increasing leverage in state z by a marginal unit while decreasing leverage
in state s by
(1−αz)qi,z(F z)− F
z
2∆X
(1−αs)qi,s(F s)− F
s
2∆X
p(z)
p(s) leaves the investors with the same amount of payoﬀ,
holding all other financing parameters unchanged.
I now show that there exists a deviation to eliminate any equilibrium in which
the contingent leverage that is countercyclical or in which the default probability is
procyclical. Consider any states s, z s.t. θs > θz.
Consider a fair-price separating equilibrium financing plan (e¯,FC ,αC) such that
(PCBC ) binds, where F
z > F s. This implies that qi,z(F z) < qi,s(F s). There exists a
financing plan (e¯,F ′,α′), where F s
′
> F s, F z
′
< F z and all other financing parameters
are the same, such that if raises financing successfully, a Good bank is strictly better oﬀ,
whereas a Bad bank is strictly worse oﬀ than in equilibrium. Thus only a Good bank has
the incentives to deviate to this financing plan.
Notice that |fGF z,F s(·)| < −f
IR
F z,F s(·) if F
z > F s and qi,z(F z) < qi,s(F s). That is, an
increase in leverage in state s and a decrease in leverage in state z that leaves the same
payoﬀ to the Good bank would strictly benefit the investors. Therefore there indeed exists
such a deviation as described above that the investors would be willing to accept.
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Consider now a fair-price separating equilibrium financing plan (e¯,F ,α) such that
(PCBC ) binds, where F
z < F s and qi,z(F z) > qi,s(F s). By the same reasoning, there
again exists a financing plan (e¯,F ′,α′), where F s
′
< F s, F z
′
> F z and all other financing
parameters are the same, such that if raises financing successfully, a Good bank is strictly
better oﬀ, whereas a Bad bank is strictly worse oﬀ than in equilibrium; and the investors
are willing to accept the financing plan given a belief that it can only come from the Good
bank.
Therefore in any equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion, leverage is such that
Fˆ sC > Fˆ
z
C and E
i,s(Fˆ s) ≥ Ei,z(Fˆ z) ∀ θs > θz, s, z ∈ {s ∈ S : αˆsC < 1}. This also implies
that 1− qi,s(Fˆ s) ≤ 1− qi,z(Fˆ z).
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 5
First, I notice that the equilibrium capital structures in the case of ex post financing also
satisfy the equilibrium conditions for the case of ex ante financing, since in the former
case the conditions are satisfied in each state ex post. Proposition 2 then implies that the
Intuitive contingent capital structure equilibrium must give the Good bank at least as
high an expected payoﬀ as the equilibrium with ex post financing. Moreover, given that
the outside capital market investors always break even in equilibrium, the bank captures
the entire value created by the bank. The contingent capital structure therefore produces
an expected bank value that is at least as high as in the other two cases.
Secondly, the contingent capital structure is strictly preferred to the ex post capital
structure when capital market debt is issued in equilibrium, i.e. e¯ < e˘C . This is because
by Proposition 3, the default probability in a contingent capital structure equilibrium
is countercyclical, while the face value of the debt is procyclical. The ex post capital
structure equilibrium has procyclical default probability, whereas the non-contingent
capital structure equilibrium has constant face value of debt. Therefore neither capital
structure belongs to the optimal set of contingent capital structures. The optimal
contingent capital structure thus must deliver strictly higher bank value than either of
the other two cases.
A.2.5 Proof of Proposition 6
The equilibrium contingent capital structure in the example of a tail event economy
is given by Proposition 2. In order to fully characterise the equilibrium, consider the
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following two scenarios for e¯ < e˘C .
Firstly, suppose an interior solution such that Ei,H(FˆHC ) = E
i,L(FˆLC ), i.e. Fˆ
H
C =
FˆLC +
θH−θL
∆X
. This also implies that qi,H(FˆHC ) = q
i,L(FˆLC ). Given this restriction, denote
the equity value and the success probability with Ei(F C) and qi(F C) respectively, which
are equal in both states. The maximisation programme can then be rewritten as
maxe,FLC ,αHC ,αLC [β(1 − α
H
C ) + (1− β)(1− α
L
C)]E
G(FC) (A.21)
s.t. e ≤ e¯ (A.22)
[β(1 − αHC ) + (1− β)(1− α
L
C)]E
B(F C) ≥ e (A.23)
βV G,H(FHC ) + (1− β)V
G,L(FLC )
−[β(1− αHC ) + (1− β)(1 − α
L
C)]E
G(FC) ≥ 1− e(A.24)
Applying similar reasoning as in the proof given in Appendix A.2.2, it is easy to show
that objective function is maximised when all three constraints bind, which determines
e = e¯ and the equilibrium FˆH = FˆLC +
θH−θL
∆X
, where FˆC is given by
e¯ =
EB(FˆC)
EG(FˆC)− EB(FˆC)
[
βV G,H(FˆHC ) + (1− β)V
G,L(FˆLC )− 1
]
(A.25)
as well as αˆC up to one degree of freedom, i.e.
β(1− αHC ) + (1− β)(1− α
L
C) =
e¯
EB(Fˆ C)
(A.26)
The restrictions FˆHC = Fˆ
L
C +
θH−θL
∆X
implies that FˆHC ≥
θH−θL
∆X
. Therefore the condition
for the first scenario to arise is that in equilibrium, Ei(Fˆ C) ≤ V
i,L
FB . This is the case if
e¯ ≤ e˘T ≡
V B,LFB
V G,LFB − V
B,L
FB
[
βV G,H(
θH − θL
∆X
) + (1− β)V G,LFB − 1
]
(A.27)
For e¯ ∈ [e˘T , e˘C), the second scenario arises, in which case FˆHC <
θH−θL
∆X
and FˆL = 0.
Imposing the restriction that FˆL = 0, the maximisation programme can then be rewritten
as
maxe,FHC ,αHC ,αLC β(1− α
H
C )E
G,H(FHC ) + (1− β)(1 − α
L
C)V
G,L
FB (A.28)
s.t. e ≤ e¯ (A.29)
β(1− αHC )E
B,H(FHC ) + (1− β)(1− α
L
C)V
B,L
FB ≥ e (A.30)
βV G,H(FHC ) + (1− β)V
G,L
FB − β(1− α
H
C )E
G,H(FHC )
−(1− β)(1− αLC)V
G,L
FB ≥ 1− e (A.31)
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It is straightforward that the solution entail e = e¯. The restriction FHC <
θH−θL
∆X
implies that EG,H(FHC ) > V
G,L
FB . Therefore the equity in the high state is relatively
less information sensitive in the low state. The solution should therefore entail αˆLC = 0.
The equilibrium leverage FˆHC and the equity issuance αˆ
H
C in the high state is therefore
given by binding the (IR) and (PCB),
e¯ =
EB,H(FˆHC )
EG,H(FˆHC )− E
B,H(FˆHC )
[
βV G,H(FˆHC ) + (1− β)V
B,L
FB
EG,H(FˆHC )
EB,H(FˆHC )
− 1
]
(A.32)
αˆHC = 1−
e¯+ (1− β)V B,LFB
βEB,H(FˆHC )
(A.33)
The implementation using CoCo bonds in addition to straight debt and equity
provided in the proposition follows intuitively from the characterisation of the equilibrium
contingent capital structure.
A.2.6 Proof of Proposition 7
To derive the optimal capital regulation, I first show in Claim 5 that any regulation
that imposes a leverage cap below the equilibrium level will bind in the resulting
equilibrium. I then characterise F˘ , the minimum leverage cap the regulate can impose,
while implementing a separating equilibrium. Finally I provide conditions for when this
is feasible, and derive the optimal capital regulation for the other cases.
Claim 5. The capital regulation F¯ binds in any Intuitive equilibrium if the bank has
insuﬃcient internal capital e¯ < e˘s(F¯ ).
Proof. This result follows the intuition of Claim 2. At any leverage level F such that
e¯ < e˘s(F ), the Good bank’s payoﬀ is increasing in the leverage level, in any separating
equilibrium. It therefore has the incentive to increase leverage until the capital regulation
binds. This is due to the underpricing of the claims issued by the Good bank in order to
separate at low leverage.
This eﬀectively allows the regulator to set leverage levels in the equilibrium. I now
characterise F˘ , the minimum leverage cap the regulate can impose, while implementing
a separating equilibrium.
I invoke the concept of undefeated equilibrium proposed byMailath et al. (1993).
Consider a pooling equilibrium and a separating equilibrium. If the pooling equilibrium
provides the Good bank with a strictly higher payoﬀ, the pooling equilibrium defeats the
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separating equilibrium, by restricting that the out-of-equilibrium belief upon observing
the pooling equilibrium action in the separating equilibrium to be consistent with the set
of types who strictly benefit form such a deviation. F˘ is therefore characterised by the
optimisation programme given by Eq. 1.20, where the expected retained payoﬀs to the
Good bank in the least-cost separating equilibrium vG(F ; e¯) and the least-cost pooling
equilibrium vGP (F ; e¯) are given by, respectively,
vG(FC ; e¯) ≡ max
e,αC
E
[
(1− αsC)E
G,s(F sC)
]
s.t. e ≤ e¯, (PCBC ), (IRC ) (A.34)
vGP (FC ; e¯) ≡ maxe,αC
E[(1− αsC)E
G,s(F sC)] s.t. e ≤ e¯, (PC
B
Pool) and (IRPool)(A.35)
I now derive the thresholds e˘CP and e˘
C
LP . e˘
C
P < e˘
C is the threshold for a separating
equilibrium that satisfy the Intuitive Equilibrium, given a leverage cap of zero F¯ = 0,
to be undefeated by a pooling equilibrium. Because the equilibrium payoﬀ to the Good
bank is increasing in its internal capital e¯, the threshold e˘CP is given by when the Good
bank is indiﬀerent between a pooling equilibrium and a separating equilibrium at zero
leverage. That is,
vG(0; e˘CP ) = v
G
P (0; e˘
C
P ) (A.36)
For e¯ < e˘CLP , the leverage required to implement a separating equilibrium is too
socially costly because of the risk-shifting problem, and the regulator prefers to implement
a pooling equilibrium at zero leverage. Such threshold e˘CLP is therefore given by
E[V G,s(F˘ s(e˘CLP )] = E[γV
G,s
FB + (1− γ)V
B,s
FB ] (A.37)
A.2.7 Proof of Proposition 8
For e¯ ∈ [e˘CLP , e˘
C
P ], the optimal capital regulation F¯ = F˘ , where F˘ is the least-cost
leverage cap a regulator can impose that implements a separating equilibrium given by
the optimisation programme Eq. 1.20. Within the example of a tail event economy, I
first characterise the functions vGP (F ; e¯) and v
G(F ; e¯). This allows me to then show that
F˘ is procyclical and derive the results in comparison to the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Lastly show that this implies that the capital ratio under the optimal capital regulation
is countercyclical for all e¯.
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Characterisation of vGP (F ; e¯)
In this part of the proof I characterise the function vGP (F ; e¯) given by Eq. A.35. The
solution to this maximisation programme must entail the constraints e ≤ e¯ and (IRPool)
binding. (i) e = e¯ following the reasoning for Claim 4. If e < e¯, there exists an alternative
financing plan that involves more internal capital investment and less equity issuance that
produces a higher payoﬀ to the Good bank while satisfying all the other constraints. (ii)
Similarly, if the (IRPool) is slack, there exists an alternative financing plan that involves
less equity issuance that produces a higher payoﬀ to the Good bank while satisfying all
the constraints.
(iii) Given F , equity should be issued primarily in the state in which the equity value
is higher. This is shown in the following. I diﬀerentiate αH in Eq. A.5 with regard to αL
to find the derivative
f iαH ,αL(e,F ,α) ≡
∂αH
∂αL
= −
Ei,L(FL)
Ei,H(FH)
1− β
β
(A.38)
This is derivative is negative, suggesting that increasing the equity issuance in the Low
state by a marginal unit while decreasing leverage in the High state by E
i,L(FL)
Ei,H(FH )
1−β
β leaves
a type i bank with the same payoﬀ.
Notice that |fBαH ,αL(·)| > |f
G
αH ,αL(·)| iﬀ E
i,H(FH) < Ei,L(FL). That is, a Bad bank
requires to equity issuance in the highly levered state by more in order to compensate for
an increase in equity issuance in the less levered state than a Good bank.
If the investors believe that a financing plan can only come from a Good bank, they
should accept the financing plan if they can at least break even. I implicitly diﬀerentiate
αH in the binding (IRPool) with regard to αL to find the derivative
f IR,Pool
αH ,αL
(e,F ,α) ≡
∂αH
∂αL
= −
γEG,L(FL) + (1− γ)EB,L(FL)
γEG,H(FH) + (1− γ)EB,H(FH)
1− β
β
(A.39)
That is, increasing equity issuance in the Low state by a marginal unit while decreasing
equity issuance in the High state by γE
G,L(FL)+(1−γ)EB,L(FL)
γEG,H (FH)=(1−γ)EB,H (FH)
1−β
β leaves the investors
with the same amount of payoﬀ, holding all other financing parameters unchanged. In
particular, |f IR,Pool
αH ,αL
(·)| ≤ |fBαH ,αL(·)|, iﬀ E
i,H(FH) < Ei,L(FL). That is, an increase in
equity issuance in the less levered state and a decrease in equity issuance in the highly
livered state such that the Bad bank enjoys the same payoﬀ, leaves the investors strictly
better oﬀ.
I can now establish that an maximiser of the programme given by Eq. A.35 should
entail equity issuance primarily in the state in which the is higher. Otherwise, there exists
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an alternative financing plan with high equity issuance in the state in which the equity
value is higher, and lower equity issuance in the state in which the equity value is lower.
Such a financing plan provides the Bad bank with lower payoﬀ while leaving the Good
bank and the investors strictly better oﬀ.
This discussion allows us to examine the marginal impact of a change in F on vGP (F ).
Specially, given that (IRPool) binds and that the equity issuance is a corner solution,
consider the marginal eﬀect of an increase in F sC on the equilibrium equity issuance in the
state z in which the solution is interior, where z can be either H or L. This is obtained
by implicitly diﬀerentiating (IRPool).
∂αz
∂F s
=
F
∆X
+ (1− αs)
[
γqG,s(F s) + (1− γ)qB,s(F s)
]
γEG,z(F s) + (1− γ)EB,z(F z)
ps
pz
(A.40)
where ps is the probability of state s realising, s ∈ {H,L}. Substituting this into the total
diﬀerentiation equation of the payoﬀ of the Good bank yields
∂vGP (F )
∂F s
= ps
F
∆X
EG,z(F z)
γEG,z(F z) + (1− γ)EB,z(F z)
+ ps(1− αs)
(
EG,z(F z)
[
γqG,s(F s) + (1− γ)qB,s(F s)
]
γEG,z(F s) + (1− γ)EB,z(F z)
− qG,s(F s)
)
(A.41)
Characterisation of vG(F ; e¯)
In this part I characterise the function vG(F ; e¯) given by Eq. A.34 by examining the
constraints in the maximisation programme. (i) The constraint e ≤ e¯ binds given the
solution. This follows similar reasoning for Claim 4. (ii) (IRC) is slack, implied by Claim
5, for e¯ < e˘s(F¯ ). (iii) Given that the (IRC) is slack, (PCBC ) binds. This is because
otherwise there exists an alternative financing plan with lower equity issuance that still
satisfies all constraints but leaves the Good bank a strictly higher payoﬀ. (iv) Given F ,
equity is issued primarily in the state in which the equity value is higher. This follows the
same reasoning as given in Part (iii) of the previous section when characterising vGP (F ; e¯).
Characterisation of F˘
I now turn to characterise F˘ , the least-cost capital regulation that implements a separating
equilibrium.
(i) The constraint that such a separating equilibrium is undefeated by a pooling
equilibrium binds given the F˘ , i.e. vG(F˘ ; e¯) = vGP (F˘ ; e¯). I show this by contradiction.
Suppose (e,F ,α) is a solution to the maximisation programme, such that vG(F ; e¯) >
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vGP (F ; e¯). Consider a financing plan (e,F
′,α′) such that F s
′
< F s, αs
′
> αs and
all other financing parameters are the equal. Because of the property of Eq. A.6
discussed in Part 1(ii) of the proof of Claim 1, there exists a financing plan (e,F ′,α′)
such that it provides the Bad bank with the same payoﬀ in the separating equilibrium
as the equilibrium financing plan, but reduces the Good bank’s payoﬀ relative to the
equilibrium financing plan. This also relaxes the (IRC) since it increases the value of
the Good bank in equilibrium. This alternative financing plan produces a higher social
value as it entails lower leverage. This contradicts with the supposition that the original
financing plan (e,F ,α) is a solution to the maximisation programme, as the constraint
vG(F ; e¯) ≥ vGP (F ; e¯) can still be satisfied for a suﬃciently small deviation in F
s.
I now examine the procyclical property of F˘ in the following. I show in the following
that F˘ is procyclical and that the resulting default probability is procyclical.
(ii) Consider FH < FL. This implies that qi,H(FH) > qi,L(FL). I eliminate this case
by constructing a socially preferred alternative. Consider another set of leverage caps F ′
such that FH
′
> FH and FL
′
< FL. Notice that in this case equity is only issued in the
high state in both the least-cost pooling and separating equilibria. By the reasoning in
Appendix A.2.3, there exists F ′ such that the resulting least-cost separating equilibrium
produces a higher payoﬀ for the Good bank than F , which implies that the social value
is also higher. Such an alternative is therefore socially preferred, if vG(F ′; e¯) ≥ vGP (F
′; e¯)
is still satisfied.
Indeed the constraint is satisfied. The payoﬀs to the Good bank in the least-cost
pooling and separating equilibria can be expressed as
vGP (F ; e¯) =
EG,H(FH)
γEG,H(FH) + (1− γ)EG,H(FH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(
E
[
γV G,s(F s) + (1− γ)V B,s(F s)
]
− 1 + e¯
)
−(1− β)
(
EG,L(FL)
−
[
γEG,L(FL) + (1− γ)EB,L(FL)
] EG,H(FH)
γEG,H(FH) + (1− γ)EB,H(FH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
⎞
⎟⎟⎠(A.42)
vG(F ; e¯) =
EG,H(FH)
EB,H(FH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
e¯− (1− β)
⎡
⎢⎢⎣EG,L(FL)−EB,L(FL) EG,H(FH)EB,H(FH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ (A.43)
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where C > B, and
∂B
∂FH
= (1− γ)
qG,H(FH)qB,H(FH)
[
qG,H(FH)− qB,H(FH)
]
[γEG,H(FH) + (1− γ)EB,H(FH)]2
∆X > 0 (A.44)
∂C
∂FH
= (1− γ)
qG,H(FH)qB,H(FH)
[
qG,H(FH)− qB,H(FH)
]
[EB,H(FG)]s
∆X >
∂B
∂FH
(A.45)
This suggests, for β suﬃciently large, an increase in FH and a decrease in FL such that it
leaves the social value unchanged would increases vG(·) more than vGP (·). Therefore there
exists F ′ such that the social value is improved while satisfying vG(·) ≥ vGP (·).
(iii) The case in which FH > FL such that qi,H(FH) < qi,L(FL) can also be eliminated
as it does not arise in equilibrium. Notice that, in this case, equity is only issued primary
in the Low state. Similar reasoning as above rules out this case as the optimal F˘ .
To conclude, F˘ is such that F˘H ≥ F˘L and qi,H(F˘H) ≥ qi,L(F˘L).
I now explicitly derive the optimal capital regulation that implements a separating
equilibrium F˘ . This part of the derivation is similar to those in of Proposition 6 given in
Appendix A.2.5. There are two scenarios.
Firstly, suppose an interior solution such that Ei,H(F˘H) = Ei,L(F˘L), i.e.F˘H = F˘L +
θH−θL
∆X
. This also implies that qi,H(F˘H) = qi,L(F˘L). Given this restriction, denote the
equity value and the success probability with Ei(F˘ ) and qi(F˘ ) respectively, which are
both equal in both states. The solution is characterised by imposing vGP (·) = v
G(·) as
given by Eq. A.42–A.43, given the result in Part (i) of this section. The solution is given
by
e¯ =
EB(F˘ )
γEG(F˘ ) + (1− γ)EB(F˘ )
(
E
[
γV G,s(F˘ s) + (1− γ)V B,s(F˘ s)
]
− 1
)
(A.46)
The condition for the first scenario to arise is that in equilibrium, Ei(F˘ ) ≤ V i,LFB . This
is the case if
e¯ ≤ e˘TLP ≡
EB,LFB
γEG,LFB + (1− γ)E
B,L
FB
(
β
[
γV G,H(
θH − θL
∆X
) + (1− γ)V B,H(
θH − θL
∆X
)
]
+(1− β)
[
γV G,LFB + (1− γ)V
B,L
FB
]
− 1
)
(A.47)
For e¯ ∈ [e˘TLP , e˘
C
P ], the second scenario arises, in which case F˘
H < θ
H−θL
∆X
and F˘L = 0.
The solution in this case is
e¯ =
EB,H(F˘ )
γEG,H F˘H) + (1− γ)EB,H(F˘H)
(
β
[
γV G,H(F˘H) + (1− γ)V B,H(F˘H)
]
+(1− β)
[
γV G,LFB + (1− γ)V
B,L
FB
]
− 1
)
+(1− β)
(
γEG,LFB + (1− γ)E
B,L
FB
γEG,H(F˘H) + (1− γ)EB,H(F˘H)
−
EB,LFB
EB,H(F˘H
)
EB,H(F˘H)(A.48)
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Countercyclical capital ratio
It is now straightforward to show that the capital ratio under the optimal capital
regulation is countercyclical. For all cases in which F¯L = F¯L = 0, the capital ratio
is always 100%. For e¯ ∈ [e˘TLP , e˘
C
P ], the capital ratio is 100% in the Low state and less
than 100% in the High state. For e¯ ∈ [e˘CP , e˘
T
LP ], the capital ratio is c
H < cL, because the
bank’s equity value is equalised in both state, but the bank has more debt in the high
state.
A.2.8 Proof of Proposition 9
Given the ex post bailout guarantee, the bank receives an implicit subsidy when it issues
debt to financing its loan portfolio. Therefore the only diﬀerence between this extension
and the baseline model is that the (IRC) is replaced with the following
(IRBOC ) : E
[
V G,s(F sC) +
(
1− qG,s(F sC)
)
F s − (1− αsC)E
G,s(F sC)
]
≥ 1− e (A.49)
All results the baseline model therefore hold qualitatively. I show below that the optimal
regulation in this case must permit higher leverage in order to implement a separating
equilibrium.
Consider imposing F˘ , the optimal regulation in the baseline model, in this economy
with bailouts. Since (PCBC ) binds in the regulated separating equilibrium, v
G(·) is equal to
that in the baseline model. However, vGP (·) is higher than before, because the (IRPool) is
now relaxed, which enables the Good bank to issue less equity in the pooling equilibrium.
This violates the constraint vG(·) ≥ vGP (·). Therefore leverage must be reduced in order
to implement a separating equilibrium.
In the interior solution region, the optimal capital regulation is given by
e¯ =
EB(F˘BO)
γEG(F˘BO) + (1− γ)EB(F˘BO)
(
E
[
γV G,s(F˘ sBO) + (1− γ)V
B,s(F˘ sBO)
]
− 1
+
[
1− γqG(F˘BO)− (1− γ)q
B(F˘BO)
]
E[F˘ sBO]
)
(A.50)
For a given e¯, the RHS of Eq. A.50 is strictly higher than the RHS of Eq. A.46 for
a given F˘ such that F˘H = F˘L + θ
H−θL
∆X
, the solution to Eq. A.50 is strictly higher than
the solution to Eq. A.46. That is, higher leverage must be permitted than in the baseline
model to implement a separating equilibrium, when there is the expectation of bailouts.
133
A.2.9 Proof of Proposition 10
Denote b ≡ qi,s(F s) +
[
1− qi,s(F s)
]
D¯
Dc2
≤ 1 the probability of receiving the repayment
c2 at t = 2 given the deposit insurance coverage D¯. A depositor breaks even at a deposit
contract (c1, cs) if
λu(c1) + (1− λ)bu(c2) = u(1) (A.51)
This condition is satisfied for a risk-free deposit contract c1 = c2 = 1 under full deposit
insurance D¯ = D.
I implicitly diﬀerentiate Eq. A.51 to find that ∂b∂c2 = −
bu′(c2)
u(c2)
. That is, if increase the
t = 2 repayment by a marginal unit, the probability of repayment b must decrease by at
most bu
′(c2)
u(c2)
≤ u′(1) to allow the depositor to break even.
Holding other liabilities of the bank constant, a marginal increase in the promised
repayment c2 reduces the success probability of the bank by
∂qi,s(F )
∂c2
= − D2∆X . Holding
the deposit insurance level D¯ constant, the probability of repayment to a depositor b
decrease by
∂
∂c2
(
qi,s(F s) +
[
1− qi,s(F s)
] D¯
Dc2
)
(A.52)
=
D
2∆X
+
D¯
Dcs2
[1− qi,s(F s −Dc2)] ≥
D
2∆X
(A.53)
If u′(1) ≤ (1−e¯−k)2∆X , a depositor will not be willing to deposit with the bank unless
he receives a certain repayment c1 = c2 = 1, given that the bank has to raise at least
D
1−λ =
1−e¯−k
1−λ from the depositors. This is because Eq. A.51 is not satisfied for any c2 > 1
for a given level of D and D¯ = D. Therefore deposits must be raised with a certain
promised repayment c1 = c2 = 1, backed by a full deposit insurance coverage D¯ = D.
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 2: COUNTERCYCLICAL
FORECLOSURE FOR
SECURITISATION
B.1 Proofs
B.1.1 Proof of Proposition 13
The optimal security for the low type is to issue all of the equity to outside investors in
order to minimise the retention cost. The optimal security for the high type, however,
has to satisfy an additional (IC) to prevent the bad type from mimicking. The remainder
of the proof characterises the optimal security issued by the high type.
Central to the characterisation is the monotonicity of the security payoﬀs. The set of
permitted securities (FH , fH , FL, fL) therefore depends on the ranking of the cash flows
from each type of securitisers. Notice also that the functional form of the liquidation
proceeds Li(λi) implies that, for λi, λj such that Li(λi) ≥ Lj(λj), Li(λi) + (1 − λi)X ≤
Lj(λj)+ (1−λj)X. Therefore two cases discussed below are relevant, as analysed below.
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Case 1: λH ≤ λL
This is the most important case as this will be the case in equilibrium. The solution to
this case is a debt contract as presented in Proposition 13 and derived below.
In this case, the liquidation proceeds are less for the high type securitiser than for
the low type securitiser. But if the delinquent mortgage recover, the total cash flows are
higher for the high type securitiser.
V + LH(λH) + (1− λH)X ≥ V + LL(λL) + (1− λL)X
≥ V + LL(λL) ≥ V + LH(λH) (B.1)
The two monotonicity constraints for the insiders and the outsiders, combined with the
limited liability constraints (LL), are
FH ≥ FL ≥ fL ≥ fH ≥ 0 (B.2)
V + LH(λH) + (1− λH)X − FH ≥ V + LL(λL) + (1− λL)X − FL
≥ V + LL(λL)− fL ≥ V + LH(λH)− fH
≥ 0 (B.3)
Firstly, examining the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) Eq. 2.22. The
constraint is relaxed by increasing FL and fL. That is, decreasing the payoﬀ to the
Low type securitiser if she mimics the High type and issues this security. However, this
increase will bind either the insider’s monotonicity constraint or the outsider’s. Depending
on which constraints bind, many cases can arise, as discussed below.
(i) Suppose fL binds the insider’s monotonicity constraint, i.e.
V + LL(λL)− fL = V + LL(λL)− fH (B.4)
This implies that fL > fH . Considering FL, there are again two scenarios. (a) Suppose
FL binds the insider’s monotonicity constraint, i.e.
V + LL(λL) + (1− λL)X − FL = V + LL(λL)− fL (B.5)
This implies that FL > fL and FH ≥ V +LL(λL). Substituting Eq. B.4 and B.5 into the
(IC) yields
UL(λL) ≥ θHFH + (1− θH)fH + δ[V + LH(λH)− fH ] (B.6)
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It is now clear that the (IC) must bind in order to maximise θHFH + (1 − θH)fH .
Substituting the (IC) into the objective function yields
max
fH
[A1 − (1− θH)fH + δfH ] + (1− θH)fH (B.7)
where A1 ≡ UL(λL) − δ[V + LH(λH)]. The solution is therefore to increase fH until the
(LL) binds. The solution in this scenario is given by
fH = V + LH(λH) (B.8)
fL = V + LL(λL) (B.9)
FL = V + LL(λL) + (1− θL)X (B.10)
FH = V +
LL(λL) + (1− λL)θLX − (1− θH)LH(λH)
θH
(B.11)
This is a solution if FH is indeed such that FH ≥ V + LL(λL), which is equivalent to
1− θH
θH − θL
[LL(λL)− LH(λH)] ≥ (1− λL)X (B.12)
I now turn to scenario (b) in which I suppose FL binds the onsider’s monotonicity
constraint, i.e.
FL = FH (B.13)
Which implies that FH ≤ V + LL(λL) + (1 − λL)X. Following similar reasoning as in
the previous scenario, we can substitute Eq. B.4, B.13 and the (IC) into the objective
function, which again suggests that the solution involves maximising fH until the (LL)
binds. The solution in this scenario is given by
fH = V + LH(λH) (B.14)
fL = V + LL(λL) (B.15)
FL = FH = V +
(1− δθL)LL(λL) + (1− δ)(1 − λL)θLX − (1− θH)LH(λH)
θH − δθL
(B.16)
This is a solution if FL satisfy the (LL), which is equivalent to the violation of the
condition given in Eq. B.12.
(ii) Suppose now that fL binds the outsider’s monotonicity constraint, i.e. fL = FL.
In this case, the only possibility for this to be the case is if FL ≤ V +LL(λL). Under this
constraint, we can increase FL to bind the outsider’s monotonicity constraint FL = FH
because the previous constraint implies that the insider’s monotonicity constraint for FL
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is not binding. Substituting fL = FL = FH and the (IC) into the objective function
implies that the objective function maximised when fH is minimised to bind the (CC) at
fH . This implies that
fH = 0 (B.17)
fL = FL = FH =
1− δ
θH − δ
[V + LL(λL) + (1− λL)θLX] (B.18)
However, this is not a solution as this result does not satisfy the (LL) for FL and fL.
Therefore for cash flows ranked according to Case 1, the optimal security is a debt
contract because the security payoﬀ is always equal to the cash flow apart from the highest
payoﬀ, which corresponds to the face value of a debt contract. The optimal face value of
the debt is summarised in Proposition 13 corresponding to the two scenarios in part (i)
of Case 1.
Case 2: λH > λL
We show that, in this case, the optimal security issued by a high type issuer is not debt.
However, we show that given the optimal security, the securitiser does no choose her
optimal foreclosure policy such that λH > λL. Therefore this case does not arise in
equilibrium.
In this case, the cash flows generated by the High securitiser dominates the cash flows
generated by the Low securitiser.
V + LL(λL) + (1− λL)X ≥ V + LH(λH) + (1− λH)X
≥ V + LH(λH) ≥ V + LL(λL) (B.19)
The two monotonicity constraints for the insiders and the outsiders, combined with the
limited liability constraints (LL), are
FL ≥ FL ≥ fh ≥ fL ≥ 0 (B.20)
V + LL(λL) + (1− λL)X − FL ≥ V + LH(λH) + (1− λH)X − FH
≥ V + LH(λH)− fH ≥ V + LL(λL)− fl ≥ 0 (B.21)
Following a similar procedure, it can be shown that in the solution is as follow. If
xxxxxx
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B.1.2 The optimal securities under competition
Following similar intuition, the low type securitiser issues equity. We now turn to consider
the optimal security for the high type when the conditions Eq. 2.72–2.73 for the ranking
of the cash flows in each state are satisfied.
Notice first that, in this case, the good cash flows produced by a securitiser in all
states are higher than the bad cash flows in all states, i.e.
Lni,s(λ
n
i,s,Λ
−n
s ) + (1− λ
n
i,s)X > L
n
i,z(λ
n
i,z,Λ
−n
z ) ∀ s, z ∈ S (B.22)
This is because the good cash flow is the highest if there is no foreclosure, at 1NX, while
the bad cash flow is the highest if there is a foreclosure rate of 1, at X. This reflects the
intuition that foreclosure reduces the risk in the mortgage pool.
The remainder of the argument proceeds as follows. We first conjecture that the
optimal contract a debt contract with face value F such that
max
s
{LnL,s(λ
n
L,s,Λ
−n
s ) ≤ F ≤ mins
{LnL,s(λ
n
L,s,Λ
−n
s ) + (1− λ
n
L,s)X}] (B.23)
The face value of this debt is relatively low so that the bad securitiser does not have to
default should she mimic the good type securitiser and issues this security, but suﬃciently
high so as to leave zero cash flow to the bad securitisers when their cash flows do not
recover. This enables direct comparison of this extension with competition with the
baseline case. We then discuss conditions for this security to be the optimal security.
Within the class of debt contracts with face value satisfying the above condition, the
optimal face value of the debt Fˆ (λnH ,λ
n
L) is given by the binding (IC),
Fˆ (λnH ,λ
n
L) = V +
1
θH − δθL
E[(1− δθL)L
n
L,s(λ
n
L,s,λ
−n
s )
−(1− θH)L
n
H,s(λ
n
H,s,λ
−n
s ) + (1− δ)(1 − λ
n
L,s)θLX](B.24)
If the face value characterised above indeed satisfies the condition, it is the optimal
contract. This can be shown by considering possible deviations. In this case, fH,s and fL,s
bind the (LL) for all s. The only possibly deviations are to increase or decrease Fi,s for
some s. I show in the following that there do not exist any deviations that can increase
the good type issuer’s payoﬀ while satisfying the monotonicity constraints, the (IC) and
the (LL).
(i) Suppose we decrease FL,s by for some s. This violates the (IC), and therefore
must be accompanied by a decrease in FH,z for some z, if possible without violating any
constraints. This, however, is not optimal as it reduces the payoﬀ to the good type issuer.
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(ii) Suppose we increase FL,s by ϵ for some s. This violates the monotonicity constraint
on FH,s, where also need to increase by at least ϵ. This, however, not violates the (IC) as
the payoﬀ to the low type issuer increases by (θH−δθL)ϵ. If more monotonicity constraints
are violated, we must also increase either FH,z for some z, or both FL,z and FH,z for some
z. Similar intuition holds.
B.1.3 Proof of Proposition 17
This proposition can be proved by examining the relevant first order conditions of the
maximisation problem given by Eq. 2.74–2.76.
Consider a pair of states s and s′ in which all other securitisers are of the same type,
except for securitiser n who is of the high type in state s and the low type in state s′. It
follows that the probability of state s conditional on the securitiser n being a high type
is equal to the probability of state s′ conditional on the securitiser n being a low type.
Denote pns,s′ this conditional probability.
The first order conditions for λnH,s(Λ
−n
s ) and λ
n
L,s′(Λ
−n
s′ ), taking the foreclosure policies
of other securitisers as given, can be expressed as
(FOCH,s) : γ
[
(1− δ)θH
∂Fˆ (·)
∂λnH,s
+ (1− δ)(1 − θH)
∂ LnH,s(·)
∂λnH,s
pns,s′
+δ
(
∂ LnH,s(·)
∂λnH,s
− λnH,sθHX
)
pns,s′
]
= 0 (B.25)
(FOCL,s′) :
[
γ(1− δ)θH
∂Fˆ (·)
∂λnL,s′
+ (1− γ)
(
∂ LnL,s′(·)
∂λnL,s′
− λnL,s′θLX
)
pns,s′
]
= 0(B.26)
where
∂Fˆ (·)
∂λnH,s
= −
1− θH
θH − δθL
∂ LnH,s(·)
∂λnH,s
pns,s′ (B.27)
∂Fˆ (·)
∂λnL,s′
=
[
δ(1− θL)
θH − δθL
∂ LnL,s′(·)
∂λnL,s′
+
1− δ
θ − δθL
(
∂ LnL,s′(·)
∂λnL,s′
− θLX
)]
pns,s′ (B.28)
(i) These conditions are very similar to those in the baseline case. Therefore similar
reasoning shows that for any foreclosure followed by other securitisers Λ−n, the foreclosure
rate of the low type is higher than that of the high type. Therefore this is also true in
equilibrium, i.e.
λˆnH,s < λˆ
n
L,s′ (B.29)
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(ii) In order to prove this part of the proposition, we first need to establish that
Λˆ−ns < Λˆ
−n
z and Λˆ
−n
s′ > Λˆ
−n
z′ . The result then follows.
This part of the proposition concerns equilibrium results. We here impose that the
equilibrium is symmetric. The equilibrium foreclosure decision is therefore given by the
following fixed point problems.⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
λˆnH,s = λ
n
H,s(Λˆ
−n
s ),
λˆnL,s′ = λ
n
L,s′(Λˆ
−n
s′ ),
(B.30)
where Λˆ−ns = Λˆ
−n
s′ =
N−NsL−1
N λˆ
n
H,s +
NsL
N λˆ
n
L,s′
Notice that the functions λnH,s(·) and λ
n
L,s′(·) are decreasing in the argument. This
can be easily checked by implicitly diﬀerentiating the (FOCH,s) and (FOCL,s′). The
intuition is, an increase the aggregate amount of foreclosure by the other securitisers
increases reduces the incentive for the securitiser n to foreclose because of the lower price
in the market.
Consider another pair of states z, z′ analogous to s, s′ such that N sL < N
z
L, and express
the solution to the optimal foreclosure policy in state z as the solution to a system similar
to the above. We now prove this part of the proposition by contradiction. Suppose that
the equilibrium is such that Λˆ−ns > Λˆ
−n
z . That the functions λ
n
H,s(·) and λ
n
L,s′ implies
that λˆnH,s < λˆ
n
H,z and λˆ
n
L,s′ < λˆ
n
L,z′ . Combined with the fact that there are fewer low type
issuers in state s than in z and the result of part (i), this contradicts with the supposition
that the aggregate foreclosure is greater in states s and s′ than in states z and z′. Similar
arguments show that Λˆ−ns′ > Λˆ
−n
z′ also leads to a contradiction.
Part (ii) of the proposition thus follows immediately. Since Λˆ−ns < Λˆ
−n
z and Λˆ
−n
s′ >
Λˆ−nz′ , it must be that λˆ
n
H,s > λˆ
n
H,z and λˆ
n
L,s′ > λˆ
n
L,z′ .
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APPENDIX C
CHAPTER 3:
BANKRUPTCY-REMOTE
SECURITISATION WITH IMPLICIT
GUARANTEE
C.1 The first best portfolio sizes
The first best portfolio size XiFB maximises the NPV of the portfolio. For tractability, I
assume that the second order condition is satisfied to guarantee an interior solution. The
first order condition that determines the solution is
1− k − δ + θi(XiFB)δ + θ
i′(XiFB)δX
i
FB = 0 (C.1)
It then follows from the previous stated assumptions that θG(·) > θB(·) and
∂
∂X
(
θG(X)
θB(X)
)
> 0 that XGFB > X
B
FB , because
∂
∂X
(
θG(X)
θB(X)
)
> 0 implies that θG
′
(·) > θB
′
(·).
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C.2 Proofs
C.2.1 Proof of Proposition 20
To derive the equilibrium security in the second period, notice firstly that if (wH2 , w
L
2 ),
wL2 > 0 is a solution to programme given by Eq. 3.4–3.6, then there exists w
H′
2 > w
H
2
such that (wH
′
2 , 0) is also a solution. This is because an increase in w
H
2 accompanied by
a decrease in wL2 such that the constraint Eq. 3.5 is kept constant keeps the objective
function constant while relaxes the (IC2) constraint.
The binding financing constraint and wL2 = 0 then determines w
H
2 in equilibrium for
a given investment level XG1 .
Substituting the binding financing constraint Eq. 3.5 and wL2 = 0 into the objective
function and (IC2) yields the following programme which determines the equilibrium
portfolio size XG1 ,
max
XG1
V G(XG1 ) + w
L
1 (C.2)
θB(XG1
θG(XG1 )
V G(XG1 )− V
B
FB −
[
1−
θB(XG1 )
θB(XG1 )
]
wL1 ≤ 0 (C.3)
If the above equation is satisfied at XG1 = X
G
FB, the first best payoﬀ is received by a good
bank. Otherwise, notice that the left hand side of the constraint is increasing in XG1 .
Therefore the programme is maximised at the larger solution to the binding constraint,
which is given by Xˆ1(wL1 ). Moreover, in equilibrium, Xˆ1(w
L
1 ) > X
G
FB.
Finally, since all constraints bind in the equilibrium with wL0 = 0, there exists no other
equilibrium with wL0 > 0.
In a separating equilibrium, a bank with a bad second period portfolio always issues
fairly priced security. Its security choice is therefore arbitrary, and it always chooses the
first best level of investment.
C.2.2 Proof of Propositions 23 and 22
The proofs of Propositions 23 and 22 are established immediately following similar
reasoning to those in Appendix C.2.1.
C.2.3 Proof of Corollaries 4 and 3
To show Corollary 3, compare Eq. 3.8 and ??, which determine XG∗1 (·) and
XG∗0 (·) respectively. Since the LHS of Eq. ?? is larger than the LHS of Eq.
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Eq:BR:Equilibrium:wFB, the solution to the former must be greater than the latter.
Similarly, to show Corollary 4, compare Eq. 3.8 and Eq. ??, which determine XG∗1 (·)
and XG∗∗0 (·) respectively. The LHS of the former equation is smaller than that of the
latter equation. Hence the result in the corollary.
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